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Some words are harder to learn than others. For instance, action verbs like
run and hit are learned earlier than propositional attitude verbs like think and want.
One reason think and want might be learned later is that, whereas we can see and
hear running and hitting, we can’t see or hear thinking and wanting. Children
nevertheless learn these verbs, so a route other than the senses must exist. There
is mounting evidence that this route involves, in large part, inferences based on the
distribution of syntactic contexts a propositional attitude verb occurs in—a process
known as syntactic bootstrapping. This fact makes the domain of propositional
attitude verbs a prime proving ground for models of syntactic bootstrapping.
With this in mind, this dissertation has two goals: on the one hand, it aims to
construct a computational model of syntactic bootstrapping; on the other, it aims to
use this model to investigate the limits on the amount of information about propo-
sitional attitude verb meanings that can be gleaned from syntactic distributions. I
show throughout the dissertation that these goals are mutually supportive.
In Chapter 1, I set out the main problems that drive the investigation. In
Chapters 2 and 3, I use both psycholinguistic experiments and computational mod-
eling to establish that there is a significant amount of semantic information carried
in both participants’ syntactic acceptability judgments and syntactic distributions
in corpora. To investigate the nature of this relationship I develop two computa-
tional models: (i) a nonnegative model of (semantic-to-syntactic) projection and
(ii) a nonnegative model of syntactic bootstrapping. In Chapter 4, I use a novel
variant of the Human Simulation Paradigm to show that the information carried in
syntactic distribution is actually utilized by (simulated) learners. In Chapter 5, I
present a proposal for how to solve a standing problem in how syntactic bootstrap-
ping accounts for certain kinds of cross-linguistic variation. And in Chapter 6, I
conclude with some future directions for this work.
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Words have meanings. Those meanings must be learned. Learning the mean-
ing of some words seems like it could be quite easy. For the moment, assume that
learning a word-meaning—e.g the meaning of the word dog—involves pairing some
concept or set—e.g. the dog concept or set of dogs, call either dog—with some
linguistic symbol: dog. How one goes about doing this, the intuitive story goes, is
by noticing that utterances involving the word dog cooccur with instantiations of
the concept/set dog quite often and thus an association between the word and the
concept is built. And just so, the meaning of dog is learned. In this scenario, the
learner’s ability to discover correlations between the language and the nonlinguistic
context—the perceivable objects and events surrounding the hearer—is paramount.
Left unelaborated, this story has well-known problems (cf. Goodman, 1955; Quine,
1960; Kripke, 1982): why not consider subparts of the dog (tail, head)? Super-
ordinate categories properly containing the dogs (mammal, animal)? Or dog at
the time of utterance, cat every other time?
Nonetheless, few would deny that nonlinguistic context plays a major role
in learning the meanings of at least some—maybe most—words. How else would a
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learner figure out that dog means dog? It has become clear that solving these prob-
lems requires understanding both the nature of human conceptual understanding—
how the learner conceptualizes the nonlinguistic context—and the structure of the
mechanism that learners use to link words with concepts—how the learner extracts
information from nonlinguistic context. Within the latter vein, there have been
many interesting proposals: some involving empirically motivated learning biases
that might direct the learner toward the correct concepts (cf. Carey and Bartlett,
1978; Markman and Hutchinson, 1984; Markman and Wachtel, 1988; Merriman
and Bowman, 1989; Markman, 1990, a.o.) and others that rely on more general
properties of inductive reasoning that might direct the learner toward the correct
concepts (cf. Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; Frank et al., 2009, a.o.). For instance,
maybe, as Markman and Wachtel (1988) suggest, children prefer to map words to
whole objects—dog is more salient as a meaning for dog than tail or head—or
maybe they assume that concepts with smaller extensions should be preferred to
ones with larger extensions (Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001)—a sort of weighted
Subset Principle (Berwick, 1985).
1.1.1 The problem of observability
But even equipped with these kinds of proposals, learning the meanings of
other words seems like it is probably quite a bit harder. For example, how do
learners acquire those words whose meanings are not obviously linked with features
of the nonlinguistic context—or more precisely, participants conceptualizations of
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these contexts? The parade case of such words—what Gleitman (1990) refers to as
words with meanings “closed to observation” and which Gleitman et al. (2005) dub
the hard words—are those that refer to abstract objects/concepts (liberty, tyranny),
mental states (think, know), preferences (want, prefer), authorizations (allow, for-
bid), etc. One property that binds many of these words together is that many are
verbs involving propositional attitudes, which express relations to ways the world
might be, in fact is, would be best if it were, etc. It is these hard words that this
dissertation focuses in on.
The problem with these hard words is that one can’t very well see, hear, or
feel propositional attitudes like thinkings or wantings, so it is quite unclear how
the learner pairs up words for these attitudes—think or want—with the appropriate
concepts—for now, call them think and want—under an account where correla-
tions between particular words and nonlinguistic context are the primary (or only)
data (Landau and Gleitman, 1985; Gleitman, 1990).
There is now a wealth of experimental results evidencing the magnitude of this
problem. One particular instance of this can be found in work within the Human
Simulation Paradigm (HSP; Gillette et al. 1999; Snedeker and Gleitman 2004)—
discussed at length and deployed in Chapter 4. In one instantiation of this paradigm,
adult participants are given videos of parents playing with their children. In these
videos the sound has been removed, with the idea that this partially replicates the
learner’s nonlinguistic context. A beep is then placed where a target word was
uttered, and participants are asked to say what the word is. Accuracy is quite high
in recovering concrete nouns, like dog, but essentially zero in recovering mental state
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verbs.
What this suggests is that—even for adults, who are constantly talking about
desires and beliefs—desires and beliefs are just not salient as potential word mean-
ings from the nonlinguistic context alone. And indeed, further work within this
paradigm suggests that, even if scenes are constructed to make propositional atti-
tudes salient, gains from nonlinguistic context alone are only modest (Papafragou
et al., 2007).
1.1.2 The problem of multi-faceted meanings
This problem of observability is sharpened by the fact that these words also
tend to have meanings that are multifaceted. For instance, one facet of the meanings
of both think and know is that they involve beliefs in some important way.
(1) a. Bo thinks that Jo is out of town.
b. Bo knows that Jo is out of town.
These words clearly don’t mean the same thing, though. They have (at least) a
second facet to their meaning on which they differ. In saying (1b), a speaker pre-
supposes something very specific about what they and their conversational partners
have (typically) already accepted as true—namely, that (2), corresponding to the
content of know ’s subordinate clause, is also true.
(2) Jo is out of town.
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This presupposition furthermore projects through—i.e. is unaffected by—various
semantic operators, such as negation (3a) and questioning (3b) (Kiparsky and
Kiparsky, 1970; Karttunen, 1971; Horn, 1972; Karttunen and Peters, 1979). Both
(3a) and (3b) show the same behavior as (1b) in requiring the speaker to presuppose
the truth of (2).
(3) a. Bo doesn’t know that Jo is out of town.
b. Does Bo know that Jo is out of town?
This is certainly not the case with (1a). In uttering (1a), a speaker has no commitments—
as far as the meaning of the sentence is concerned—with respect to whether (2) is
true. Indeed, one can easily imagine a discourse in which (1a) is uttered as a justi-
fication for a behavior that is based on mistaken premises. Maybe Jo is Bo’s boss
and, incorrectly believing that Jo has left for the day, he is packing up early. A
coworker who knows that Jo isn’t out of town might well say (1a) to explain Bo’s
behavior, but it would be very odd to say (1b).
And similarly, the negative (4a) and questioned (4b) versions of (1a) do not
show the projection behavior seen with (3a) and (3b).
(4) a. Bo doesn’t think that Jo is out of town.
b. Does Bo think that Jo is out of town?
In fact, rather than leaving the content of the subordinate clause alone, as it does
when it is attached to know, the negation attached to think in (4a) seems to reach
down into that content. A natural interpretation of (4a) is (5), where the negation
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has “lowered” into the subordinate clause.1
(5) Bo thinks that Jo isn’t out of town.
Thus, beyond the fact that states like thinkings and knowings are not salient in the
nonlinguistic context, whatever it means to learn the words think and know (and
want and prefer and allow and forbid), it doesn’t seem so simple, on the face of it,
as linking think with some concept think and know with some concept know.
1.1.3 Solving the two problems
But then how do learners acquire this constellation of facts about even just
these two verbs—think and know? How do they figure out, on the one hand, that
both think and know share a facet of their meaning in that they both involve beliefs
in some crucial way? And on the other hand, how do they figure out that know
and think differ with respect to other facet(s) of their meaning—e.g. that know
(i) requires the content of its complement to be presupposed and (ii) protects that
content from interference by negation and questions, while think (i) does not require
its content to be presupposed and (ii) allows its content to be interfered with by the
likes of negation?
The now standard answer, at least at a broad level, is that learners need to
move beyond nonlinguistic context as their only source of evidence for word-learning.
They need to furthermore incorporate a word’s linguistic context. To understand
1Or perhaps it has neg-raised from the subordinate clause to the matrix clause; cf. discussion
in Fillmore 1963; Horn 1971, 1975, 1978, 1989; Bartsch 1973; Ross 1973; Prince 1976; Gajewski
2007, a.o.
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what this means, it is useful to step back and consider a rough but useful division
that exists in the literature between two broad types of linguistic context: lexical
context and syntactic context.
To a first approximation, lexical context encompasses words that cooccur with
the one being learned, and syntactic context encompasses the types of abstract
structures the word is found in. For instance, suppose a learner received the datum
in (6). The lexical context of eat might be represented as in (6a). And assuming
the learner can parse the string in an adult-like way, its syntactic context might be
represented as in (6b).
(6) The men eat apples.





If linguistic context is necessary for learning words like think, know, and want–i.e.
those whose meanings are not associated with sensory correlates—which subtype of
information—lexical context or syntactic context—might be used? The likely answer
to this is that both are necessary in interaction, to different extents, for different
kinds of verbs. However, authors differ on whether syntactic context could ever be
necessary independent of lexical context. For instance, Pinker (1994) and Grimshaw
(1994) both argue that the only sense in which syntactic context might be useful is
in interaction with lexical context. Knowing that eat tends to take NPs referring
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to edibles, like apples, in object position could plausibly help a learner figure out
that eat means eat. But most of the information in this case is coming from a
semantic generalization—commonly occurs with words referring to edibles—and so
it is unclear what further work, if any, the syntactic context is doing here. Indeed,
if the learner can (i) figure out what role the referent of each noun phrase plays
in the event named by the verb—via only the semantics of those noun phrases—
and (ii) there are some general constraints regarding where each argument may
be syntactically situated given its entailments (cf. Baker, 1988; Grimshaw, 1990;
Dowty, 1991), the syntactic context may be doing little work beyond highlighting
the lexical material on which the learning mechanism should make its inferences (cf.
Connor et al., 2013).
I take this to be a reasonable position for verbs like eat, whose syntactic
contexts likely contains very little information about its meaning beyond that it
involves two participants. (In fact, due to the presence of intransitive uses such as
the men ate, unilateral reliance on the syntax might even lead learners astray.) Less
clear is whether this strategy of seeding inference with only lexical context could
be extended to all verbs—especially propositional attitude verbs like think, know,
and want. For instance, it seems unlikely that a learner could glean much at all
about the meaning of want from the distribution of nouns it occurs with, since want
imposes few to no restrictions on its direct object’s meaning (cf. Resnik, 1996, p.
138, Table 1). And this is not specific to want ; many propositional attitude verbs
that allow NP direct objects do not constrain the semantics of those objects.
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(7) Bo wants {an apple, a toy, a back rub}.
(8) Bo {knows, remembers, needs, demands} {a doctor, a story, the time}.
This leaves two alternatives: abandon linguistic context as a necessary condition
for learning the hard words—maybe it was brash to reject nonlinguistic context
so quickly after all—or assume that not all word learning relies chiefly on either
lexical or nonlinguistic context. It is quite unclear how the former route could work;
but even granting that a learner could learn the meaning of want without recourse
to some amount of linguistic context, telling a story about how learners go on to
distinguish want from, e.g., hope will likely be difficult.
To see this, note that hopings seem to involve wantings—if (9a) is true, (9b)
must also be true—but hope seems to have an extra facet of its meaning over and
above the component it shares with want. If (10) is true, (9a) is very odd, whereas
(9b) is fine. Thus hope seems to place an extra constraint on the states that it can
describe—namely, that the hoper believe that the state of affairs they hope to come
about is also possible (Portner, 1992; Scheffler, 2009; Anand and Hacquard, 2013;
Hacquard, 2014; Harrigan, 2015).
(9) a. Bo hopes to dance with Jo.
b. Bo wants to dance with Jo.
(10) Bo believes he’ll never dance with Jo.
This is similar to the previous example involving think and know. Remember that
think and know, like want and hope, share a component of their meaning involving
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belief, but they differ in the sorts of contexts they are allowed in. This suggests a
potentially quite general problem pertaining to propositional attitude verbs: even if
the nonlinguistic context is sufficient to learn the meaning of, e.g., want or think, a
learner who also posits the meaning of want for the meaning of hope, or the meaning
think for the meaning of know, might very well find herself with a subset problem
(Wexler and Hamburger, 1973; Baker, 1979; Berwick, 1985; Pinker, 1989); want will
always be true in the contexts hope is true, and know will always be true in contexts
where think is true, so it’s hard to see how a learner who posited the meaning want
for the meaning hope might change her mind given the nonlinguistic context alone.
Maybe one of the learning bias accounts could be made to block this from the
start. For instance, Markman and Wachtel (1988) show that learners are biased
to assume that word meanings are mutually exclusive: if they already have a word
associated with a particular meaning, they are biased to not associate a new word
with that meaning. So for the sake of argument, assume that a learner has acquired
want correctly—a plausible assumption given that want is almost two orders of
magnitude more frequent that hope—then she might be disinclined to posit the
meaning of want for that word, since she already has a word that corresponds to
that meaning.
And just so. But the learner is not out of the weeds yet. As noted earlier,
since x hopes p also seems to entail that x believes that p is possible and there
does not seem to be an English word meaning believe possible a mutual exclusivity
account alone will not solve all possible subset problems here. Indeed, if the learner
is biased to posit simpler lexical meanings, the believe possible meaning would be
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incorrectly preferred absent some further mechanism. Maybe the Size Principle can
be leveraged here: hope, in having a more complex meaning, plausibly constrains
the situations it is compatible with more than want or the non-attested believe-
possible. Then, it might be preferred over these alternatives based on a “suspicious
coincidence.”
Indeed, this strategy might be generalizable: just as hope p entails want p,
know p entails think p. And in each case, the former places a further constraint on
the states it describes. Maybe, then, learners could use aspects of the conversation
at hand—a special sort of context that straddles both nonlinguistic and linguistic
context that I refer to as the discourse context—to figure out that hope is only used
when describing situations in which the hoper believes the hoped state of affairs
to be possible and that know is only used when describing situations in which all
conversational participants take the known state of affairs for granted.
As noted by Hacquard (2014) and Dudley et al. (2015), this will likely be a
tough row to hoe, at least in the case of know v. think. Think has a property—
shared by many attitude verbs that Hooper (1975) dubs assertives (discussed in
more detail below)—that it can be (and often is) used to contribute not (just) a
report of someone’s mental state but also the content of that mental state. For
instance, adapting an example from Simons (2007) (cf. Hacquard’s 2014 example
4), the main point of Beth’s utterance in (11) is not to contribute the mental state
report but to proffer a possible answer to Anne’s question.2
2Note that this is not to say that (11) does not involve a mental state report but rather that
that mental state report is somehow secondary in this context.
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(11) Anne: Why isn’t Bo at the meeting?
Beth: Jo thinks he’s out of town.
In this circumstance, if Beth is being cooperative, she certainly seems committed to
Bo’s being out of town at least plausibly being true. And indeed, many uses of think
have this flavor, particularly within child-directed speech and children’s production
(Diessel and Tomasello, 2001). But if the complement of think is meant to be taken
as at least plausibly true, how does the learner distinguish it from know?
Maybe the learner has some exquisite sensitivity to whether a particular propo-
sition is taken for granted already or not, which is what seems to distinguish the
think and know uses. The problem here is that there are cases of know in child-
directed speech that patently could not involve all conversational participants taking
the content of know ’s subordinate clause for granted—for instance, cases where the
speaker wishes to convey that something is true while also also querying the hearer’s
mental state, as in (12).
(12) Do you know that Daddy’s coming home late tonight?
This suggests that the problem of multi-faceted meanings still rears its head, even
once nonlinguistic context is elaborated with discourse context. How does a learner
figure out that want and hope share some facet of their meaning involving desire
but that only hope requires that the desirer further believe their desire is realizable?
Or similarly, how does a learner figure out that think and know share some facet of
their meaning involving belief but that only know requires the presupposition of its
complement?
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1.1.3.1 Syntactic context and two problems
This is all to reiterate that, for at least some distinctions among propositional
attitude verbs, neither nonlinguistic context nor lexical context are likely to help in
drawing fine-grained distinctions among propositional attitude verbs, and so a final
possibility remains within the rough taxonomy given earlier: the sort of distinction
I have been discussing must be learned using syntactic context. How might the
learner do this?
The answer that Landau and Gleitman (1985) and Gleitman (1990) propose
under the heading syntactic bootstrapping is that children use the syntactic contexts
that a word cooccurs with—its syntactic distribution—to deduce its meaning.3 The
proposal moves forward in the following way. Suppose the learner makes the follow-
ing assumption: the degree to which two verbs overlap in their syntactic contexts
correlates with the degree to which their meanings overlap. She then notes that the
syntactic contexts of want and hope only partially overlap. Want, but not hope,
allows noun phrase objects (13a); both want and hope allow subjectless infinitival
complements (13b) (control complements); and hope, but not want, allows tensed
subordinate clause complements (13c).
(13) a. Bo {wants, *hopes} an apple.
3This is at least the accepted genealogy of the idea. As a historical note, this was actually
proposed earlier in Lasnik 1989, a paper in the proceedings of the 1982 University of Western
Ontario Learnability Workshop. The relevant quote: “...there appears to be a tacit assumption
that the meaning of, e.g., a verb, can be presented and apprehended in isolation. But this seems
implausible. Rather, verbs are presented in grammatical sentences which, therefore, explicitly
display subcategorization properties. In fact, one might consider reversing the whole story: sub-
categorization is explicitly presented, and the child uses that information to deduce central aspects
of the meaning of verbs” (p. 195, fn. 12).
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b. Bo {wants, hopes} to have an apple.
c. Bo {*wants, hopes} that he will have an apple.
Finally, based on these data and the premise that overlap in syntactic contexts
correlates with overlap in meaning, she might then infer that want and hope may
share some facet(s) of their meanings, but not others.
Now, this on its own is insufficient. Knowing that there is an overlap in
meaning does not yet indicate what that particular overlap is. Thus, this story
needs to be augmented to explain not only how to find out whether there’s an
overlap, but also to say how that overlap gets labeled with the appropriate facet or
feature of the words’ meanings. One wants to know not only that want and hope
share a meaning feature, but furthermore what that shared feature is. I refer to
the first of these problems—finding out that there is an overlap—as the clustering
problem because it deals with finding out that particular words cluster together
with respect to the syntactic contexts they occur in. I refer to the second of these
problems—finding out what facet of the meaning a particular clustering of verbs
corresponds to—as the labeling problem because it deals with labeling the clusters
of words that are found.4
The traditional solution to both problems within the syntactic bootstrapping
literature is to assume that whatever mechanism solves the clustering problem simul-
4The terminological choices clustering problem and labeling problem belie a particular view of
the problem a learner faces—namely, that at base, the learner must discover symbolic relation-
ships among verbs’ meanings. This does not preclude a learning model that imputes continuous
representations to the learner, as long as those representations are somehow linked to symbolic
representations. I do not intend any sleight of hand here, though; the tension between models that
(explicitly) traffic in symbols (at some level) and those that do not (explicitly) are discussed at
length in Chapters 2 and 3.
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taneously solves the labeling problem by associating particular syntactic contexts
with particular semantic features. Thus, under a standard syntactic bootstrapping
account, the learning mechanism comes pre-built with “...grammatical knowledge
[that] includes principles that provide a systematic mapping between semantic and
syntactic structures” (Lidz et al., 2004, but see also the rich literature on this topic
Fillmore 1970; Zwicky 1971; Jackendoff 1972; Grimshaw 1979; Pinker 1989; Levin
1993), and this systematic mapping is deployed to label clusters associated with
particular syntactic features. As noted by Kako (1997) as well as Lidz et al. (2004),
this might be cashed out in a couple different ways—either by imbuing syntactic
contexts themselves with semantic content (the Frame Semantic Hypothesis) or by
imbuing them with semantic content inherited from the verb’s semantic features
(the Lexical Projection Hypothesis)—but for current purposes what is important to
note is that the principles are taken to be hard-coded.
This hard-coding assumption is problematic in the current context because
it relies on an assumption that whatever these mapping principles look like, they
are cross-linguistically universal. This is a reasonable assumption in the context of
verbs that only occur with noun phrase and prepositional phrase arguments, like
hit or give, since these verbs’ occurrence in particular frames is quite stable across
languages. But it is problematic if one turns to a domain, such as the propositional
attitude verbs, where the syntactic contexts that particular subclasses of verbs occur
in apparently vary quite wildly. I note where this variability occurs briefly in the
next section and then again in Chapter 5.
This, among other considerations I lay out in Chapter 2, is one impetus for
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investigating the clustering problem and the labeling problem separately in the
domain of propositional attitude verbs, since it could well be that the solutions to
these two problems lie in separate mechanisms. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I focus in
on the clustering problem for attitude verbs, though along the way I note particular
successes of my solution to this problem in terms of its ability to find clusters which
the analyst might give a coherent labeling to. In Chapter 5, I give a suggestion for
a solution to the labeling problem that takes advantage of both a property of the
model I propose as well as a novel linguistic insight.
To set the stage for my solutions to these problems, it is useful to review what
is already known about the correlation between semantic features and syntactic
contexts in English. I carry this review out in the next section. This review has
two main purposes: to establish (i) that there appear to be promising correlations
between the syntax and the semantics that learners might take advantage of, but
(ii) that these correlations are not perfect thus making it unclear to what extent
they even could be relied on by a learner.
In the subsequent section, I note that this second point is the result of the
imprecise nature of traditional distributional analysis. Results of this methodology
are by necessity only suggestive for learning accounts due to the fact that traditional
distributional analysis cannot be done at scale; it is not possible to ask for precise
measures of the relationship between semantics and syntax that might validate or
invalidate a syntactic bootstrapping approach to propositional attitude verb learning
(or indeed word-learning more generally). Indeed, this is a more general problem for
an approach to understanding lexical semantics—a problem that this dissertation
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contributes a partial solution to.
1.2 Propositional attitude verb syntax and semantics
In the previous section, I briefly touched on three facets of propositional at-
titude verb meanings. I noted that think and know involve beliefs but that they
differ with respect to whether their complement is presupposed: know is factive, and
thus presupposes its complement, whereas think is nonfactive, and thus it does not.
The other distinction I noted was that between want and hope, which both involve
desires but which differ with respect to whether the referent of their subject must
furthermore believe that state of the world is possible. Hope requires such a belief,
whereas want does not. These examples, as one might expect, were not chosen at
random: these four verbs exemplify two of four high-level semantic distinctions that
appear in the literature to have some amount of correlation with the syntax. In the
remainder of this section, I review these four distinctions.
1.2.1 Representationality
Perhaps the most well-known semantic distinction among propositional atti-
tude verbs is that between verbs that express beliefs—or represent “mental pictures”
or “judgments of truth” (Bolinger, 1968)—and those that express desires—or more
generally, orderings on states of affairs induced by, e.g. commands, laws, preferences,
etc. (Bolinger, 1968; Stalnaker, 1984; Farkas, 1985; Heim, 1992; Villalta, 2000, 2008;
Anand and Hacquard, 2013, a.o.). Within the first class, which I henceforth refer
17
to as the representationals, fall verbs like think and know ; and within the second
class, which I henceforth refer to as the preferentials, fall verbs like want and order.
There appear to be various aspects of the syntactic distribution that roughly
track this distinction in English. One well-known case is finiteness: representationals
tend to allow finite subordinate clauses (1a) but not nonfinite ones (1b); preferentials
tend to allow nonfinite subordinate clauses (2b) but not finite ones (2a).
(14) a. John thinks that Mary went to the store.
b. *John thinks Mary to go to the store.
(15) a. *John wants that Mary went to the store.
b. John wants Mary to go to the store.
There are two important things to note about this distinction. First, though the
representationality distinction is often talked about as though it were mutually
exclusive, some verbs appear to fall into both categories, and suggestively, show up
in both frames. For instance, as noted in the last section, hope p involves both a
desire that p come about and the belief that p is possible (Portner, 1992; Scheffler,
2009; Anand and Hacquard, 2013; Hacquard, 2014; Harrigan, 2015, but see also
Portner and Rubinstein 2013), and it occurs in both finite (16a) and nonfinite (16b)
syntactic contexts.
(16) a. John hopes that Mary went to the store.
b. John hopes to go to the store.
Second, the link between representationality and finiteness is just a tendency. Some
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verbs plausibly classed as representationals allow nonfinite subordinate clauses (17a)/(17b),
and others plausibly classed as preferentials allow subordinate clauses that look finite
(17c).5
The roughness of this correlation is perhaps not surprising since not all lan-
guages track representationality with tense: for instance, various Romance languages
track the distinction with mood—representationals tending to take indicative mood
and preferentials tending to take subjunctive mood (Bolinger, 1968; Hooper, 1975;
Farkas, 1985; Portner, 1992; Giorgi and Pianesi, 1997; Giannakidou, 1997; Quer,
1998; Villalta, 2000, 2008, a.o.). I return to this cross-linguistic variability in detail
in Chapter 5.
(17) a. John believes Mary to be intelligent.
b. John claims to be intelligent.
c. John demanded that Mary go to the store.
But though the correlation between representationality and tense is imperfect, even
in English, finiteness does not appear to be the only associated syntactic (distri-
butional) property. Also relevant appears to be a distinction in whether the verb’s
subordinate clause can be fronted—or in Ross’s (1973) terms, S-lifted.6 At least
some representationals’ subordinate clauses (18) appear to be able to undergo S-
5Whether (17c) involves a finite subordinate clause is to some extent dependent on whether
what is often called the English subjunctive involves tense. On the one hand, the complementizer
that is the same one that occurs with tensed subordinate clauses, but on the other, the verb shows
up in its base (untensed) form.
6There is a further distinction in the literature made between S-lifts involving first person and
third person propositional attitude verb subjects (Reinhart, 1983; Asher, 2000; Rooryck, 2001). I
incorporate this first-third distinction into our experiment, but the data regarding this syntactic
distinction are murky at best.
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lifting, but many preferentials’ subordinate clauses (19) cannot (Bolinger, 1968).
(18) Mary already went to the store, I {think, believe, suppose, hear, see}
(19) a. *John already went to the store, I {want, need, demand}.
b. *John to go to the store, I {want, need, order}.
(Not all representationals allow S-lifting. This is likely because the availability of
S-lifting for a particular verb is conditioned by other semantic and pragmatic prop-
erties it has, so we defer further discussion of which verbs allow it until distinctions
beyond representationality have been discussed.)
1.2.2 Factivity
The representationality distinction is cross-cut by another common distinction:
factivity (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1970; Karttunen, 1971; Horn, 1972; Hooper, 1975).
Factivity is defined in terms of its discourse effects. I noted these effects briefly in
the last section in contrasting the verbs think and know, but very roughly, a verb
is factive if upon uttering a sentence containing a factive verb with a subordinate
clause, a speaker takes the content of the subordinate clause for granted regardless of
propositional operators placed around the propositional attitude verb: in particular,
negation (21b)/(20b) or questioning (21c)/(20c). For instance, each sentence in (20)
commits the speaker to (22) being true, but modulo the context, the sentences in
(21) do not. That is, in uttering the sentences in (20), the speaker presupposes (22)
(Stalnaker, 1973). This suggests that know, love, and hate are factive, while think,
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believe, and say are not.
(20) a. John {knew, loved, hated} that Mary went to the store.
b. John didn’t {know, love, hate} that Mary went to the store.
c. Did John {know, love, hate} that Mary went to the store?
(21) a. John {thought, believed, said} that Mary went to the store.
b. John didn’t {think, believe, say} that Mary went to the store.
c. Did John {think, believe, say} that Mary went to the store?
(22) Mary went to the store.
Factivity truly cross-cuts the representationality distinction in that there are verbs
representing all four possible combinations: (i) representational (cognitive) factives,
like know, realize, and understand, (ii) preferential (emotive) factives, like love and
hate, (iii) representational nonfactives, like think and say, and (iv) preferential non-
factives, like want and prefer.7
The factivity distinction appears to be tracked most closely by whether the
verb allows both question and nonquestion subordinate clauses (Hintikka, 1975;
Ginzburg, 1995; Lahiri, 2002; Sæbø, 2007; Egré, 2008; Uegaki, 2012; Spector and
Egré, 2014; Anand and Hacquard, 2014). For instance, the factive know can occur
7One question that arises here is whether, given the existence of representational+preferential
verbs like hope, there could also be such representational+preferential factives. In a certain sense,
this may be the case for the emotive factives, since it seems like sentences containing them imply
that the holder of the emotion also believes the subordinate clause to be true. If all preferential
factives are emotive (and show this behavior), this might suggest that there are no preferential
factives. One must tread carefully here, however, since not all entailments need be encoded in the
meaning of the verb—i.e. this belief entailment could plausibly arise via the same sorts of pragmatic
processes that give rise to the factive presupposition in the first place. I remain agnostic on this
issue here, since it does not bear on the current work.
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with both nonquestion (23a) and question (23b) subordinate clauses, while the non-
factive think can occur with nonquestion subordinate clauses (24a) but not question
subordinate clauses (24b).8
(23) a. Mary knows that John went to the store.
b. Mary knows {if, why} John went to the store.
(24) a. Mary thinks that John went to the store.
b. *Mary thinks {if, why} John went to the store.
1.2.3 Assertivity
Further cross-cutting representationality and factivity is the “assertivity” dis-
tinction (Hooper, 1975).9 Like factivity, assertivity is defined in terms of its effects
on discourse. Again very roughly, a verb is assertive if it can be used in situa-
tions where its subordinate clause is relevant to the main point of the utterance
(see Urmson 1952; Simons 2007; Anand and Hacquard 2014 for discussion). For
instance, think and say seem to allow this (25a), but hate does not (25b).
(25) a. A: Where is Mary?
B: John {thinks, said} that she’s in Florida.
b. A: Where is Mary?
B: # John hates that she’s in Florida.
8This paradigm is filled out by what Lahiri (2002) calls rogatives, like wonder and (for some
speakers) ask. Wonder, at least, takes only subordinate questions and not nonquestions.
9Whether assertivity fully cross-cuts representationality is unclear, since the only verb that
both has a preferential component and is plausibly assertive—hope—also has a representational
component.
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Assertivity correlates with the availability of S-lifting and the propositional anaphor
object so. Assertives, like think and say, can occur with S-lifted subordinate clauses
(26a) and so (27a), but doubt cannot occur with either S-lifting (26b) or so (27b).
(26) a. She’s in Florida, John {thought, said}.
b. *She’s in Florida, John doubted.
(27) a. John {thinks, said} so.
b. *John doubts so.
(Hooper, 1975) claims that the assertivity distiction cross-cuts the factivity distinc-
tion to give rise to a further split between semi-factives (assertive factives), like
know, and true factives (nonassertive factives), like love and hate (see Karttunen
1971 for an early description of this distinction).10 Important for my purposes is
that the semi-factive v. true factive distinction appears to correlate (i) with the
(semantic) representationality distinction—semi-factives also tend to be cognitive
factives and true factives, emotive factives—and (ii) at least two sorts of syntactic
distinctions. First, semi-factives tend to allow both polar (28a) and WH (28b) ques-
tions, but true factives tend to allow only WH questions (29b), not polar questions
(29a).
(28) a. Mary knows if/whether John sliced the bread.
b. Mary knows if/whether John sliced the bread.
10The pragmatic effects that distinguish semi-factivity from true factivity are beyond the scope
of this dissertation. Much ink has been spilled regarding the nature of semi-factivity in recent
years, however, so the interested reader is encouraged to see, e.g., Simons 2001; Abusch 2002;
Abbott 2006; Romoli 2011.
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(29) a. *Mary {loves, hates} if/whether John sliced the bread.
b. Mary {loves, hates} how John sliced the bread.
Second, semi-factives tend to allow complementizer ommission (30a), but true fac-
tives tend not to (30b). This second correlation is less strong and is likely modulated
by syntax: expletive subject emotive factives appear to be better with complemen-
tizer omission, particularly when they passivize (see Grimshaw 2009 for further
recent discussion of complementizer ommission).
(30) a. I {know, realize} (that) Mary already went to the store.
b. I {hate, love} *(that) Mary already went to the store.
(31) a. It {amazed, bothered} me ???(that) Mary already went to the
b. I was {amazed, bothered} ?(that) Mary already went to the
1.2.4 Communicativity
The final distinction I note is communicativity—which, transparent from its
name, roughly corresponds to whether a verb refers to a communicative act, or
perhaps more generally, (manner of) externalization of linguistic form. This dis-
tinction cross-cuts at least the representationality distinction—there are both rep-
resentational communicatives, like say and tell, and preferential communicatives,
like demand—and perhaps other distinctions as well, such as the factive-nonfactive
distinction (see Anand and Hacquard 2014 for extensive discussion of whether com-
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municativity truly cross-cuts factivity or not).11
The syntactic correlates of communicativity seem quite apparent on the sur-
face. Communicative verbs, along with a subordinate clause, tend to take noun
phrase (32a) or prepositional phrase (32b) arguments representing their communi-
catee (Zwicky, 1971).
(32) a. John told me that Mary went to the store.
b. John said to me that Mary went to the store.
But though this is often treated as a clearly marked distinction, there are var-
ious reasons to be cautious about it. For instance, note that demand and tell
can occur in string-identical contexts with want and believe. These string-identical
contexts appear to be be distinguished only given some parse of the string. Want-
ing and believing don’t seem to involve anything besides a wanter/believer and
a thing wanted/believed. In contrast, telling and demanding seem to require a
tellee/demandee.
(33) John {told, demanded, wanted, believed} Mary to be happy.
This is plausibly syntactically encoded. Note that the pleonastic element there,
which is plausibly an overt cue to the particular syntactic configuration in question,
is only allowed with want and believe, but not tell and demand. This has been used
to suggest that tell and demand in (33) involve an underlying object while want
and believe do not.
11Whether say and tell are only representational is a question. Both can be used to talk about
commands conditional on their taking a nonfinite subordinate clause. In any case, they plausibly
have something like a representational use with finite subordinate clause.
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(34) John {*told, *demanded, wanted, believed} there to be a raucous party
happening outside.
Further, there are some string-identical contexts that both communicative and non-
communicative verbs can appear in which plausibly have no syntactic (or perhaps
even selectional) distinctions. For instance, the communicative verb promise and
the verb deny, which is plausibly noncommunicative in this syntactic context, both
allow constructions with two noun phrases.
(35) John {promised, denied} John a meal.
This is not to say that the semantic distinction has no syntactic correlates, of course;
it is just to say that they may not be apparent from the string context.
1.3 Beyond pen and paper
In the last section, I showed various promising results regarding the rela-
tionship between semantic features and syntactic features derived from traditional
distributional analysis. In the context of propositional attitude verb learning, such
results are important in that, it provides a general guide to to where one might look
to see whether syntactic bootstrapping is feasible as a strategy for learning these
words.
The problem is that this is as far as traditional distributional analysis is likely
to take us. Understanding how words are learned involves understanding how con-
textual cues to a word’s meaning are utilized to infer that meaning. Distributional
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analysis can tell us which contextual cues (or combinations thereof) might be cor-
related with which features, but it cannot tell us the strength of this correlation.
But if what we are looking for is a mechanism to take advantage of contextual cues,
this information is crucial, especially if the correlations traditional distributional
analysis provides are not perfect. And as noted above, while possibly quite strong,
these correlations are certainly not perfect in the domain of propositional attitude
verbs. Indeed, as I note in Chapter 5, beyond not being perfect, they are also
cross-linguistically unstable.
So how does one go about assessing the correlations between contextual cues—
of interest here, syntactic contextual cues—and a word’s semantic features? The
answer is that one must devise some way of quantifiying the relationship between a
word’s semantics and its syntactic distribution. This in turn requires some way of
measuring a word’s semantics and its syntactic distribution. In Chapter 2, I address
how one can obtain a measure of the semantics (or at least a suitable proxy). For the
remainder of this section, I focus on what it means to obtain a measure of syntactic
distribution.
There are a couple ways to obtain such a measure, which correspond to two
common notions of syntactic distribution. For the syntactician and the semanticist,
a word’s syntactic distribution is defined modally: which syntactic contexts can
a word occur in? For the computational linguist, a word’s syntactic distribution
might more commonly be defined as actualized: which syntactic contexts does a
word occur in—e.g. in a corpus? The two are presumably related, but the latter
likely involve aspects of linguistic performance independent of the former. For this
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reason, I refer to the former (modal) notion as competence distribution and the latter
(actualized) notion as performance distribution.
To get a sense for how these two notions pull apart, note that a verb might
allow a frame according to its competence distribution that rarely, if ever, shows up.
For instance, believe can occur in the syntactic context I Mary to be intelligent,
but that locution has a register that will make that syntactic context’s empirical
distribution with believe look quite different from the nearly equivalent I that
Mary is intelligent. This is presumably not because believe is any worse in the first
context as compared to the second; it’s just that the second is found in a much
wider variety of registers. Further, this is not because the first syntactic context is
unlikely overall, since the highly frequent verb want shows up in contexts like I
Mary to be intelligent quite frequently.12
Pulling these two notions apart yields two kinds of syntactic distribution that
might be measured. Measurement of the first kind, the competence distribution,
corresponds most closely to the methodology employed in traditional distributional
analysis—grammaticality/acceptability judgments—and thus gathering such a mea-
sure provides a way of validating those traditional methodologies’ findings while
12A related distinction arises in the literature on selectional preferences/semantic plausibility
(Katz and Fodor, 1963; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Trueswell et al., 1993, 1994; Grimshaw, 1994; Pinker,
1994; Resnik, 1996, among many others). Frequency is only partially correlated with the plausibil-
ity of a description. For instance, in a search of the PukWaC corpus (Baroni et al., 2009), the six
most frequent content words heading objects of the verb eat (log relative frequency in parentheses)
are food (-3.25), meat (-4.16), meal (-4.35), diet (-4.51), fish (-4.59), and lunch (-4.83). In contrast,
words for offal, such as heart (-7.74) or liver (-8.15), occur much less frequently; and some, such as
kidney, do not occur at all in the corpus. This does not seem to be a fact about the coherence of
the description eat kidney, e.g., as compared to a description like eat idea. Rather, as in the case of
I believe Mary to be intelligent, some performance factor(s), broadly construed—e.g. the frequency
with which one has cause to talk about eating offal as opposed to eating lunch—conspire to make
it less frequent. The relationship between this notion of coherence and the notion of acceptability
in a frame is fleshed out in Chapter 3.
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augmenting them with an explicit methods for assessing correlation between par-
ticular semantic features and syntactic distribution. I carry this out in Chapter
2.
Measurement of the second kind of syntactic distribution, performance dis-
tribution, hews more closely to the sort of information that learners actually have
access to—a corpus of utterances—and thus gathering such a measure provides a
way of showing what may actually be learnable from the input. I carry this out in
Chapter 3 by building on the methods utilized in Chapter 2.
In the case of both of these measures, one can only say whether information
that correlates with the semantics lies in that measure’s notion of syntactic dis-
tribution. However, for a syntactic bootstrapping story to go through, it must be
further shown that learners can utilize the information in syntactic distribution in a
setting where they receive that information incrementally. In Chapter 4, I present
a methodology for assessing this.
1.4 Discussion and roadmap
In this chapter, I laid out the central problems of learning what Gleitman
et al. (2005) dub the hard words, focusing in particular on the propositional attitude
verbs like think, know, and want. I noted two main problems for learning these
verbs: (i) the eventualities they describe tend not to have sensory correlates, and
(ii) their meanings are both fine-grained and multi-faceted, thus presenting problems
for accounts based on learning from nonlinguistic context (or even discourse context)
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alone.
I then turned to a discussion of learning from linguistic context, noting two
particular kinds of linguistic contexts that have been discussed as possible learning
cues: lexical context and syntactic context. I noted that, while lexical context is
likely useful for certain distinction among verbs—indeed, it may be useful even for
some distinctions among propositional attitude verbs—it likely does not track other
distinctions of central interest. This led me to turn to the use syntactic context as
a word-learning cue—a strategy exemplified most notably in syntactic bootstrapping
approaches to word learning.
I noted two problems that any syntactic bootstrapping approach must solve:
(i) it must explain how learners cluster verbs based on the syntactic contexts they
occur with—the clustering problem—and (ii) it must explain how learners label
these clusters with the facets of meaning they correspond to—the labeling problem.
The ability of a syntactic bootstrapping account to solve either of these problems
for any particular type of verb is dependent on the (i) the granularity with which
that particular verb type’s semantics is mirrored by the syntactic distribution and
(ii) the availability of principles that would allow a learner to label the semantic
features. I raised doubts about this second prospect having to do with the cross-
linguistic stability of the mapping principles, particularly in the attitude domain,
arguing that the labeling problem quite plausibly could be solved via other means,
and so the first problem should be attacked first in isolation.
I then turned to an overview of what is known about this relationship in the
domain of propositional attitude verb. I showed that the results are quite promising
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but also that the correlations are not perfect. This raises the need for a more fine-
grained investigation of these correlations, which I carry out in this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, I begin this investigation by showing how to quantify the rela-
tionship between näıve speakers’ knowledge of the syntactic contexts a propositional
attitude verb can occur in—what I refer to as the competence distribution—and their
knowledge of that verb’s semantics. To do this, I deploy a methodology that Fisher
et al. (1991) used to probe such relationships as they obtain for verbs across the
lexicon, here focusing in on the propositional attitude verb domain in order to test
the limits of this relationship. The main result of this chapter is that there is a sig-
nificant correlation between the syntax measure and the semantics measure. This
omnibus result, however, tells us little about the relationship between particular
syntactic contexts and particular facets or features of the meaning. To delve into
this, I develop a model, which I dub the nonnegative model of projection, to investi-
gate this relationship. The benefit of this model is that it furthermore implements
part of a solution to the clustering problem. I show that this model discovers the
sorts of fine-grained features discussed above.
In Chapter 3, I investigate to what extent the same sort of relationship
found between verbs’ competence distributions and their semantics also obtains
between the distribution of syntactic contexts a propositional attitude verb occurs
in in a corpus, what I refer to as its performance distribution, and participants’
knowledge of those same verb’s semantics. To do this, I develop a model that
augments the nonnegative model of projection presented in the previous chapter
with a model of corpus count data. This model simultaneously discovers competence
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distributions using the corpus distributions, while at the same time solving the
clustering problem. The main result of this chapter is that performance distributions
also carry a significant amount of information about propositional attitude verb
semantics and that this information is comparable with that found in the direct
measures of competence distribution employed in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether the information in performance distri-
butions is in fact accessible to learners, and if so, how robustly represented this
information is. To do this, I adapt recently developed methodologies related to the
Human Simulation Paradigm (HSP) to (i) measure the informativity of particular
items in the performance distribution about the semantics of the word that occurs
in them and (ii) measure the informativity of the distribution itself. The main result
of this chapter is that, even if items are manipulated in such a way to give partic-
ipants as little information as possible, inference to all propositional attitude verbs
meanings are extremely robust, even down to extremely fine-grained facets of those
verbs’ meanings.
In Chapter 5, having focused for the majority of the dissertation on solving
the clustering problem, I present a novel proposal for how to approach the label-
ing problem. This proposal starts with the observations that, particularly in the
propositional attitude verb domain, the relationship between particular aspects of
the semantics and particular syntactic contexts seems to be cross-linguistically un-
stable. This does not raise problems for the model presented in previous section
necessarily, since as long as those languages exhibit roughly the same patterns of
correlations between meaning and syntactic context, this model should similarly
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succeed in solving the clustering problem. The problem arises if labels are some-
how associated a priori with particular syntactic contexts—for instance, if tense
were somehow associated with the representationality distinction—since not all lan-
guages show this correlation. The proposal presented in this chapter is that, while
not all languages associate particular facets of the semantics with particular syn-
tactic contexts, at least some particular facets may be associated with families of
syntactic contexts and that the learner’s job is to select the appropriate syntactic
context to associate with that facet using the data. I then show how this might be
encoded in a model like the one I develop in the previous chapters.
In Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation with future directions for this work.
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Chapter 2: A computational model of projection
In Chapter 1, I laid out the central motivations for the syntactic bootstrap-
ping approach. Propositional attitude verbs are prime candidates for words whose
meanings are learned via syntactic bootstrapping. This raises the question: how
much information about a propositional attitude verb’s meaning lies in its syntactic
distribution?
I begin to give an answer to this question in the current chapter by quantita-
tively assessing how much information about a word’s meaning lies in that word’s
competence distribution using both experimental and computational methods. As I
noted in the last chapter, such a quantitative assessment provides a way of assessing
the viability of results from traditional distributional analysis. I show that (i) there
is significant agreement between the competence distributions and the measure of
semantics employed and (ii) these agreements largely corroborate the results of the
traditional distributional analysis methods.
Besides providing such an assessment, this chapter also contributes a novel
methodology for inducing semantic features from the sorts of competence distribu-
tion measures employed here. I show that this methodology is furthermore linguis-
tically interesting in that it quite naturally models the linguist’s traditional notion
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of projection.
To lay the groundwork for this contribution, I begin the chapter with a broad
overview of the notion of projection. This leads naturally into a discussion of the
experimental methodology I utilize in this chapter to measure aspects of a word’s
meaning and its competence distribution. This methodology is the direct application
of one developed by Fisher et al. (1991) and extended by Lederer et al. (1995). As
it will be important for grounding discussion throughout the dissertation, I review
the logic of this methodology as it relates to the notion of projection.
Subsequently, I present three experiments that focus in on propositional atti-
tude verbs: one that aims at quantifying these words’ competence distributions and
two that aim at assessing their semantic properties. In analyzing the competence
distribution data, I explore various ways of extracting information from the measure
of the competence distribution that fall broadly in the domain of factor analysis.
I relate these factor analysis methods back to the earlier discussion of projection,
showing that the assumptions these methods make about the process that generates
competence distributions directly maps onto the linguist’s notion of projection. I
argue that in particular non-negative matrix factorization methods hew very closely
to the sorts of projection architectures linguists conceptualize.
In the next section, I turn to an analysis of the two semantic measures. I show
that, on the whole, these measures agree, but that they also show interesting areas
of disagreement. Despite this disagreement these measures both correlate reliably
with the competence distribution measure. This establishes that there is a significant
amount of information shared between the syntax and the semantics. I then delve
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into these what drives these correlations by asking how well particular features
extracted using the factor analysis methods employed to analyze the competence
distribution data fare in predicting the two measures of semantics. I then conclude.
2.1 The meaning-syntax relationship
In this section, I present an abstract characterization of the traditional method-
ology employed by linguists to study the relationship between meaning and syntactic
distribution. I then review a critique of this traditional methodology brought for-
ward by Fisher et al. (1991) along with their methodological solution.
2.1.1 Linguistically relevant meaning
Linguists of all stripes have a standing interest in the relationship between
word meaning and syntactic distribution—an interest that Zwicky (1971) distills
quite elegantly in the introduction to his classic squib on manner-of-speech verbs.
To what extent is it possible to predict certain properties of words (syn-
tactic, semantic, or phonological), given others? [And] insofar as there
are such dependencies among properties, what general principles explain
them? (ibid., p. 223)
Indeed, it has long been recognized that questions regarding which semantic
distinctions are morphosyntactically relevant are the only ones linguists can claim
propriety over; distinctions in meaning beyond those predictable from other lin-
guistic properties fall equally well into the domain of the lexicographer (Fillmore,
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1970)—or in modern times, the computer scientist (cf. Mikolov et al., 2013). Em-
bedded in this view is the idea that an item’s linguistic contexts are responsive
to only some conceivable contrasts in meaning and that a linguistic theory of the
link should speak to exactly which these are and why other conceivable contrasts
are excluded (cf. Jackendoff, 1972; Grimshaw, 1979; Pinker, 1989; Levin, 1993). As
Zwicky puts it, the question for the linguist is “what sorts of word classes are there,
and why these and not others?” (ibid., p. 223)
An example of the distinction between linguistically relevant and linguistically
irrelevant semantic distinctions comes from Pesetsky (1991). Following Zwicky,
he notes that, though “verbs of manner of speaking”—e.g. holler and whisper—
and “verbs of content of speaking”—e.g. say and propose—are distributionally
distinguishable, “verbs of loud speech”—e.g. holler and shout—and “verbs of soft
speech”—e.g. whisper and murmur—do not seem to be. (For example, verbs of
content of speaking “resist adjunct extraction and allow complementizer deletion”
(Pesetsky, 1991, p. 14).) That is, the manner-content distinction has consequences
for the syntax, whereas the loud-soft contrast does not.
In fact, the generalization extends beyond predicates that refer to speech
sounds to predicates that refer to sounds in general. The volume, pitch, resonance,
and duration of the relevant sound do not seem to have bearing on its distributional
properties, but the mode of generation (internally v. externally caused) does (Levin
and Hovav, 2005). This suggests that, whatever constitutes the nature of the con-
nection between a word’s semantic properties and its syntactic distribution, it is
blind to certain possible conceptual distinctions—in this case, sonic properties.
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Thus, though nonlinguistic meanings—i.e. concepts—may be distinguishable
to a very fine grain-size, linguistic meanings may not be. In this sense, the linguistic
system can be conceived of as a filter on the properties of the conceptual system’s
objects, retaining some properties wholesale while discarding others. To introduce
a convention I use throughout the dissertation, suppose ci is some representation of
concept i, then si is some representation that encodes all and only the linguistically
relevant features of ci.
1 At a high level of abstraction, then, (part of) the inter-
face between language and other areas of cognition—in particular, the Conceptual-
Intentional (CI) interface—might be viewed as an information-preserving, or homo-
morphic,2 mapping CI from objects in the concept space C to their syntactically
relevant features in the semantic feature space S.3
C
CI−→ S
1I use the following conventions throughout the remainder of the dissertation: italicized capital
letters stand for representational spaces—i.e. possible representations; normal capital letters refer
to mappings between these spaces; bolded lower-case letters, which will tend to be subscripted,
refer to particular instantiations of the corresponding space, and bolded upper-case letter refer to
collections of these specific instantiations. The bolding convention in particular is used because
representational instantiations are cashed out as vectors and their collections as matrices or tensors,
and bolding is standard in linear algebra and related disciplines for representing vectors and their
generalizations.
2This way of speaking assumes that the distinctions made among linguistic meanings is a subset
of those made between nonlinguistic meanings. Such a containment relationship is not conceptually
necessary. I have nothing to say about this possibility.
3This presupposes a contentious point about the complexity of lexical items (cf. Fodor and
Lepore, 1998, 1999). While Fodor and Lepore’s arguments are serious, I believe that a reader
who abides by the dictum that lexical items be represented atomically might still find use in this
chapter. This is one main reason that I stress the distinction between discovering distributional
regularities and discovering semantic content throughout the chapter. I take it as prima facie
reasonable that representations of a word’s distributional regularities may be complex in a way
that the representation of its content may not be, since of course, one needs to explain C-selection
somehow. One might then wonder whether I have just put a new name—distributional regularity—
on an old concept—semantic decomposition. I think there is reason to believe that I have not,
given the way I link distributional regularities to similarity judgments, but I will have to leave this
question open.
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It is worth stressing the following implication: si may not exhaust the seman-
tic representation of word i; indeed, si may not even be semantic in any important
sense. For instance, it might be conceived of as a (structured) index into sub-
sets/subspaces of concepts—hence the importance of specifying that the mapping is
homomorphic, not necessarily isomorphic. In this sense, si would be purely formal,
though depending on its structure, it might imperfectly mirror relationships in the
conceptual space. Thus, knowing si for a word i would be insufficient for fixing that
word’s corresponding concept ci.
By definition, however, si would be sufficient for determining various linguistic
properties of word i, such as its syntactic distribution di. To say that the syntactic
distribution di of word i can be determined from its linguistically relevant semantic
features si is to say that there is some mapping from the space of possible semantic
representations S to the space of syntactic distributions D. In standard models of
the syntax-semantics interface, this mapping, call it P, is determined by a set of
projection principles (cf. Gruber, 1965; Carter, 1976; Chomsky, 1981; Pinker, 1989;
Grimshaw, 1990; Levin, 1993; Hale and Keyser, 2002).4
S
P−→ D
To take a concrete example: in reviewing the literature on the representational
(think, say, know) v. preferential (want, order, prefer) distinction among proposi-
tional attitude verbs, I noted the apparent correlation (in English) between repre-
4In the remainder of the dissertation, I overload the term projection principles to refer to either
the mapping P itself or the principles that make it up, allowing context to disambiguate where
possible. In general, the term will be used to refer to the function P itself.
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sentationality and tense: representationals tend to take finite subordinate clauses,
whereas preferentials tend to take nonfinite subordinate clauses. If this correlation
holds, this would suggest (i) that representationality and preferentiality are encoded
in si; and (ii) that the principles map the encoding of representationality to some
representation of the distribution that encodes finite complementation and the en-
coding of preferentiality to some representation of the distribution that encodes
nonfinite complementation.
Putting these two components together—the mapping from the conceptual
space C to the (linguistically relevant) semantic feature space S and the mapping
P from the semantic feature space S to the syntactic distribution space D—the fol-
lowing abstraction over the relationship between meanings and distributions results.
C S DCI P
If this model is correct, the upshot for a theory of verb-learning that relies
on syntactic context—e.g. syntactic bootstrapping—is that there is likely a limit
on the meaning properties that syntactic context could be used to learn even in
principle. Why? Suppose the learner has access to the syntactic distribution di for
some word i and that their job is to infer the concept ci association with word i.
That is, they need to “reverse” both the projection rules P and the mapping from
the conceptual space to semantic features CI.5
5In the remainder of this chapter, I use the following convention: solid lines represent theo-
retical, or computational-level (Marr, 1982), relationships; dashed lines represent algorithms that
map between representations—as in the case of syntactic bootstrapping, possibly utilizing the
computational-level relationships.
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C S DCI P
SynBoot
A learner’s ability to perform this reversal from the syntax alone will necessar-
ily be bound by the information lost due to the mapping P from semantic features to
syntactic distributions—i.e. the projection principles—and the information lost due
to the mapping CI from concepts to semantic features. This gives Zwicky’s question
new force. Reformulating it relative to the above abstraction, this question has two
parts: (i) what kinds of things constitute the possible semantic representations S?
And (ii) what kind of relation do the principles P instantiate?
How does one approach this question? The traditional methodology—e.g. the
one that produced many of the results discussed in the last chapter—is to assume
knowledge of both the concepts C and the syntactic distributions D associated
with various words and then to attempt to infer both the space of (linguistically)
relevant semantic representations S and the projection principles P. Thus, making
the simplifying assumption that learners have access to all objects in the conceptual
space C and the syntactic distributions of some words D, the linguist and the learner
look very much alike. The only difference between the two under this model, modulo
the simplifying assumptions, is that the learner does not have access to the pairing
of the concept ci and syntactic distribution di for word i; rather, they have the
syntactic distribution di of word i and a set of possible concepts {cj}.6
6From a machine learning perspective, the linguist carries out some supervised learning algo-
rithm to inferm S and the learner carries out an unsupervised learning algorithm.
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This method has been quite successful, uncovering regularities in many dis-
parate areas of the lexicon (see Levin and Hovav 2005 and Williams 2015 for broad
overviews of this work). However, Fisher et al. (1991) note that this methodology
has its limits in the fact that
...only those semantic generalizations that can be readily labeled by the
investigator are likely to be discerned. It may well be that there are
semantic abstractions which, while correlated with the syntax, are not
so easy to puzzle out and name. (p. 342)
In the propositional attitude verb domain, for instance, one possibility is
that representationality, factivity, assertivity, and communicativity have been been
posited as syntactically relevant, in part, because they are readily labeled by in-
vestigators. This methodological problem arises, they argue, as a consequence of
confounding isolation of a property and labeling of that property, since “...disagree-
ments over labels for semantic features can get in the way of deciding whether those
features are marked in the syntax” (ibid, p. 342). Note that this is analogous to
the labeling problem, discussed in Chapter 1: even assuming syntactic distribution
is attended to, how does a learner link the appropriate features of that distribution
(syntactic contexts) to the appropriate meaning components?
Their methodological solution has three components: (i) independent mea-
sures of both the array of syntactic contexts a verb i can occur in (its syntactic
distribution) and that verb’s meaning; (ii) some way of extracting regularities from
meaning measure; and (iii) some way of stochastically mapping these regularities
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into the semantic measure. Within the above abstraction, (i) involves measuring
di and ci, while (ii) and (iii) involve constructing a mechanism that carries out the
same sort of reversal as syntactic bootstrapping.
To implement these components, Fisher et al. begin by attaining, for a set of
verbs spanning the lexicon, semantic similarity judgments for those verbs—call the
resulting data Y, an approximation to the true concepts C. The idea here is that
such quantitative representations allow one to bypass the sort of explicit labeling
inherent to the traditional method, since distinctions among features salient to the




Their goal is to then compare this proxy Y with a quantitative representation
of those verbs’ syntactic distributions gathered using an acceptability judgment
task.8 I refer to these sorts of quantitative representations as X, an approximation
of D.
7There is a question here to what extent the Ci is solely dependent on C and not, e.g., D
itself. Fisher et al. give various arguments that Y is plausibly the product of participants utilizing
some aspects of the meaning of the words in the task independently of the correspond syntactic
distributions D. As far as I can discern, it would be nearly impossible to tell whether the similarity
judgments Y are a product (to some extent) of comparing of verbs’ syntactic distributions D or
whether they are a product of conceptual feature correlated with those distributions.
8Lederer et al. (1995) took a similar tack, using the same sort of semantic similarity judgment





Fisher et al.’s question is then how well the semantic similarity judgments Y
and acceptability judgments X match up and in what ways do they match up. The
first method they use for doing this is direct comparison of the similarity judgments




The second method they use is to explicitly extract features from the semantic
similarity judgments. The specific algorithm they use for extracting these features
is a form of additive clustering (ADCLUS; Shepard and Arabie 1979), which can in
turn be viewed as doing inference over a generative model of similarity judgments,
where similarity judgments are the number of matching binary features, weighted
by feature and with noise (Tenenbaum, 1996; Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001).9 As
such, I denote it with a a dashed arrow back up to the conceptual space. The features
extracted using this procedure are then mapped into the syntactic distribution proxy
using a linear map.
9Fisher et al. actually use a related algorithm called OVERCLUS (Sarle, 1979). I have been
unable to track down the original reference for OVERCLUS, which is an unpublished dissertation
proposal, and an implementation no longer ships with the statistical package Fisher et al. report
using (SAS). As far as available secondary references go in describing OVERCLUS, however, it
appears to produce the same basic kind of representations as ADCLUS—binary features—and can






Another way of thinking about this mapping is as going from C to D directly.
This depends to some extent on whether there is some procedure for reconstructing
the distributions D from their acceptability judgment proxy X. For instance, aver-
aging acceptability judgments for a particular verb-subcategorization frame pair, as






One thing worth noting about these last two steps is that the methods that
Fisher et al. utilize to extract syntactic regularities and compare them against the
semantic similarities make potentially substantive assumptions about the nature of
the syntactic regularities and the nature of their relationship to the semantics—
in the case of the regularity extraction procedure, that these representations are
discrete/symbolic.
10As I note in the next section, however, averaging is not a particularly good way of analyzing
the sort of acceptability judgment data—ordinal data—Fisher et al. collect.
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2.1.2 Discussion
In this section, I presented an abstract characterization of the traditional
methodology employed by linguists to study the relationship between meaning and
syntactic distribution. The basic architecture of the system can be described by
two mappings: one from the conceptual space to a space of linguistically relevant
semantic features (CI) and another from the linguistically relevant semantic features
to syntactic distributions (P)—the projection principles.
C S DCI P
I casted the traditional methodology for discovering the projection principles
P and linguistically relevant semantic features S as involving analysis of concept
(ci)-syntactic distribution (di) pairs. I then reviewed a methodological critique of
the traditional methodology brought forward by Fisher et al. (1991) along with
their methodological solution. In the course of this review, I reified the logic of their
methodology pseudoformally as using quantitative proxies of the semantics Y and




The remainder of this chapter follows Fisher et al.’s experimental methodolo-





Figure 2.1: graphical model for generative model corresponding to S
P−→ D → X.
First, I focus here on a much smaller piece of the lexicon than Fisher et al., who look
at much wider swaths of the lexicon and similarly sized swaths with subcategoriza-
tion frames that were not particularly fine-grained. The idea of looking at a smaller
swath and using fine-grained frames is that this can help uncover the limits of se-
mantic information in syntactic distribution. Second, in contrast to Fisher et al.,
who are not concerned with the regularities that can be extracted from the syntax
directly, I present an analytical innovation that takes the above structure seriously
by reifying it into a generative model. This generative model gives the chapter its
title in that it naturally captures the traditional notion of projection.
Figure 2.1 shows an abbreviated representation of this model in the form of
a graphical model, where shaded circles represent observed variables—here, the
syntactic proxy X—and unshaded circles represent variables that must be inferred.
Following the logic laid out above, all but the syntactic proxy is observed, and thus
the true competence distribution D, the linguistically relevant semantic features S,
and the projection rules P must be inferred.
In the next section, I show two ways this model can be cashed out—Principal
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Component Analysis and Nonnegative Matrix Factorization—contrasting the output
of these methods with another: hierarchical clustering.
2.2 Experiment 1: verb-frame acceptability
In this section, I present an experiment aimed at getting a measure of how
acceptable a variety of propositional attitude verbs are in different syntactic con-
texts. My goal is two-fold. First, I assess how closely the sorts of regularities found
in these data correspond to the attitude verb distinctions discussed above. I carry
this out by using two standard exploratory analyses—hierarchical clustering and
principal component analysis—and one novel analysis (at least in this domain)—
nonnegative matrix factorization. Second, I assess the strengths and weaknesses
of each exploratory analysis with respect to how well they satisfy various method-
ological considerations. This assessment is driven in part by the sorts of regularities
that are discovered in the data, along with theoretical considerations. I suggest that
the nonnegative matrix factorization approach most closely fits with the traditional
notion of projection.
2.2.1 Design
This experiment aims to get a measure of how acceptable a variety of proposi-
tional attitude verbs are in different syntactic contexts. To do this, 30 propositional
attitude verbs were selected in such a way that they evenly spanned the classes
in Hacquard and Wellwood’s (2012) semantic classification. This classification is
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essentially a more elaborated version of the classification presented in Section 2.1.
19 syntactic features whose distribution has been claimed to be sensitive to
attitude verb lexical semantics were then selected. These features consist in five11
broad types: clausal complement features, noun phrase (NP) complements, prepo-
sitional phrase (PP) complements, expletive arguments, and anaphoric arguments.
(Note that I break these features into types for expository purposes only. No special
status is afforded to these groupings in the analysis.)
2.2.1.1 Features of interest
Six types of clausal complement features were selected: finiteness, complemen-
tizer overtness, subordinate subject overtness, subordinate question type, S-lifting,
and small clause type. Finiteness had two values: finite (1a) and nonfinite (1b).
(1) a. Mary thought that John went to the store.
b. Mary wanted John to go to the store.
Complementizer presence had two values: present (2a) and absent (2b).
(2) a. Mary thought that John went to the store.
b. Mary thought John went to the store.
Embedded subject presence had two values: present (3a) and absent (3b) and is
relevant only when the clause is finite and has no overt complementizer.
11A sixth feature—degree modification—was also selected for investigation. I exclude this from
the analyses since the information degree modification carries is likely purely—or at least mostly—
semantic in nature.
49
(3) a. Mary wanted John to go to the store.
b. Mary wanted to go to the store.
Embedded question type had three values: nonquestion (4a), polar question (4b),
and WH question (4c).
(4) a. Mary knows that John went to he store.
b. Mary knows if John went to he store.
c. Mary knows why John went to he store.12
S-lifting had two values: first person (5a) and third person (5b).
(5) a. John went to the store, I think.
b. John went to the store, Mary said.
Small clause type had two values: bare small clause (6a) and gerundive small clause
(6b).
(6) a. Mary saw John go to the store.
b. Mary remembered going to the store.
Two NP structures were selected: single (7a) and double objects (7b).13
(7) a. Mary wanted a meal.
b. Mary promised John a meal.
12Only adjunct questions were used, since constituent questions are ambiguous on the surface
between a question and a free relative reading.
13NPs were chosen so as not to have an interpretation in which they could be interpreted to
have propositional content (Moulton, 2009a,b; Uegaki, 2012; Rawlins, 2013; Anand and Hacquard,
2014).
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A third feature relevant to NP complements—passivization—was also included (8).14
(8) John was said to be intelligent.
Two types of PP complement were selected: PPs headed by about (9a) and PPs
headed by to (9b).
(9) a. Mary thought about John.
b. Mary said to John that she was happy.
Three types of expletive arguments were selected: expletive it matrix subject, ex-
pletive it matrix object, and expletive there matrix object/embedded subject.
(10) a. It amazed John that Mary was so intelligent.15
b. John believed it that Mary was top of her class.
c. John wanted there to be food on the table.
Three types of anaphoric complement features were selected: so (11a), null comple-
ment/intransitive16 (11b), and nonfinite ellipsis (11c).
(11) a. Mary knew so.
b. Mary remembered.
c. Mary wanted to.
14The availability of structures like (8) and the unavailability of structures like (3a), appears to
correlate with whether a predicate’s eventivity and/or its encoding of manner (Postal, 1974, 1993;
Pesetsky, 1991; Moulton, 2009a,b, see also Zwicky 1971 for other syntactic and semantic features
that track manner of speech).
15It is difficult to force the subject in a sentence like (10a) to be interpreted nonreferentially. As
I see in Figure 2.2, this likely affected the judgments for verbs like tell, which are fine in this frame
if the subject is interpreted referentially.
16Note that I cannot be sure that these structures involve null complements in either Williams’
(2015, Ch. 5) broad or narrow sense. See Hooper 1975; Hankamer and Sag 1976; Grimshaw 1979;
Depiante 2000; Williams 2012 for further discussion of these structures.
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2.2.1.2 Stimulus construction
These 19 features were then combined into 30 distinct abstract frames. (Again,
note that the features are mentioned for expository purposes only. They do not enter
into the analysis in any formal sense.) These abstract frames are listed along the
x-axis in Figure 2.2. Each categorial symbol in the frame should be interpreted as
follows:
NP NP constituent (e.g. Mary)
WH (Adjunct) WH word (e.g. why)
V Bare form of verb (e.g. think)
VP Verb phrase with verb in bare form (e.g. fit the part)
S Finite clause without complementizer (e.g. John fit the part)
For each abstract frame, three instantiations were generated by inserting lexi-
cal items, resulting in 102 frame instantiations. These 102 frame instantiations were
then crossed with the 30 verbs to create 3060 total items.
Thirty lists of 102 items each were then constructed subject to the restriction
that the list should contain exactly 3 instances of each verb and exactly 3 instances
of each frame and that the same verb should never be paired with the same frame
twice in the list. (That is, no verb showed up with more than one instantiation of
the same frame in a single list.)
These lists were then inserted into an Ibex (version 0.3-beta17) experiment
script with each sentence displayed using an unmodified AcceptabilityJudgment
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controller (Drummond, 2014). This controller displays the sentence above a discrete
scale. Participants can use this scale either by typing the associated number on
their keyboard or by clicking the number on the scale. A 1-to-7 scale was used with
endpoints labeled awful (1) and perfect (7). All materials, including the instructions
participants received, are available on my github.
2.2.2 Participants
Ninety participants (48 females; age: 34.2 [mean], 30.5 [median], 18–68 [range])
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) using a standard Human
Intelligence Task (HIT) template designed for externally hosted experiments and
modified for the specific task. Prior to viewing the HIT, participants were required
to score seven or better on a nine question qualification test assessing whether
they were a native speaker of American English. Along with this qualification test,
participants’ IP addresses were required to be associated with a location within the
United States, and their HIT acceptance rates were required to be 95% or better.
After finishing the experiment, participants received a 15-digit hex code, which
they were instructed to enter into the HIT. Once this submission was received,
participants were paid $3.50.
2.2.3 Data validation
Even with the stringent requirements listed above—a qualification test, IP
restriction, and high HIT acceptance rate—some participants attempt to game the
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system. There are two main ways that participants do this: (i) submitting multiple
HITs despite being instructed not to and (ii) not actually doing the task—e.g.
choosing responses randomly.
The first is easy to detect. When data are submitted in Ibex, the submitting
participant’s IP address is converted into an MD5 hash, which is in turn associated
with the responses they submit. This hash can then be used to check whether
participants followed instructions in only submitting a single HIT. Two participants
submitted multiple HITs: one participant submitted three and another submitted
two. In both of these cases, only the first submission was used.17
The second requires more care to detect. Here, I use the fact that multiple
participants did the same list. The idea is to compare each participant’s responses
against those of all other participants that saw the same list. If a participant has
low agreement with the other participants that saw the same list and the other par-
ticipants show high agreement with each other, then I conclude that the disagreeing
participant was providing lower quality data and remove them from the analysis.
To implement this, the Spearman rank correlations between each participant’s
responses and those of every other participant that did the same list were calculated.
For instance, if participants x, y, and z all did list 1, the correlation between x’s
and y’s responses, x’s and z’s, and y’s and z’s was computed. The distribution of
these correlations was then inspected for outliers.
The median Spearman rank correlation between participant responses is 0.64
17Note that this method does not distinguish between one participant attempting to submit
multiple HITs from the same IP and two participants each submitting a single HIT from the same
IP. I err on the side of caution in filtering all the but the first HIT from the same IP.
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(mean=0.63, IQR=0.69-0.58). To find outliers, Tukey’s method was used. Four
comparisons fall below Q1-1.5*IQR and none fall above Q3+1.5*IQR. The four
that fall below are due to two participants, each from a different list. Perhaps not
coincidentally, those participants were also the ones that submitted multiple HITs.
The remainder of the analyses exclude responses from these two participants.
After excluding these participants, the median remains the same (to two sig-
nificant figures) and the mean shifts upward slightly, from 0.63 to 0.64. (This is
to be expected since the mean is more sensitive to outliers.) The IQR becomes
slightly smaller, and Q1 shifts slightly upward (IQR=0.69-0.59). These correlations
are comparable to those reported by Fisher et al. (1991).
2.2.4 Results
In this section, I provide an exploratory analysis of the acceptability judgment
data. The goal here is two-fold: first, to show the general contours of the data set;
and second, to develop a model that extracts interpretable distributional features
from the acceptability judgment data. I begin with (hard) hierarchical clustering of
the verbs as a way of breaking into the data. One problem this method has is that
it cannot capture overlapping categories. To capture such overlapping categories,
I move to analyzing the data with factor analysis, which can capture overlapping
clusters/features. Two factor analysis approaches are explored: Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) and Nonnegative Matrix Factorization (NMF). I show that,



































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Mean rating for each verb-frame pair ordered by hierarchical clustering.
Darker shades represent higher mean ratings.
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capturing fine-grained features. I argue, however, that NMF does a better job of
capturing theoretical intuitions.
2.2.4.1 A bird’s eye view
Figure 2.2 displays the mean rating for each verb-frame pair.18 Darker cells
represent higher mean rating. The ordering along each axis is derived from a hier-
archical clustering of the verbs (y-axis) and a separate hierarchical clustering of the
frames (x-axis).19 The hierarchical clustering of the verbs can be seen in Figure 2.3
and the hierarchical clustering of the frames, in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. These
two display methods provide a bird’s eye view of the verb clusters and the syntactic
distributions that belie those groupings.
Three clusters of verbs are immediately clear from Figures 2.2 and 2.3. First,
a major cluster emerges that tends to be good with finite complements (believe,
hear, see, hope, pretend, suppose, say, think, forget, hate, love, feel, deny, doubt,
imagine, remember, understand, guess, realize, and promise). These verbs appear
to correspond roughly to Bolinger’s (1968) representational class.
18Note that averaging in this way implicitly assumes that all points on the ordinal (likert) scale
map onto (contiguous) intervals of equal measure on the latent scale (acceptability). This is not a
valid assumption in general, since each participant in acceptability judgment experiments appears
to use likert scales in slightly different ways—i.e. ordinal scale responses tend to exhibit scaling
effects. (The existence of scaling effects in ordinal scale tasks has been well-known since at least
Stevens 1946; see Schütze and Sprouse 2014 for a recent discussion of scaling effects in acceptability
judgment tasks.) A 6 response for one person could be equivalent to a 7 response for some and a
5 response for others. This is taken into account explicitly in later sections by incorporating an
ordinal logit model with participant random effects into the analyses; but for current purposes, it
seems unlikely that this violation is problematic.
19For both clusterings, Euclidean distance, the default in the R function dist(), was used as
the metric and complete linkage, the default in the R function hclust(), as the agglomerative
clustering criterion. Neither choice is principled, but since the analysis in this section is mainly
































Figure 2.3: Hierarchical clustering of verbs based on data in Figure 2.2.
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The second major cluster that arises contains verbs that involve a way of or-
dering states of affairs for their optimality with respect to some set of constraints:
desires/needs (want, need), permits (allow, forbid), and commands (demand, ex-
pect). These verbs are also the ones that tend to take nonfinite complements. This
second grouping is interesting in that it also turns out to be one of the most co-
hesive in terms of semantic similarity judgments, as I show in Section 2.3. For the
remainder of the chapter, I refer to this cluster as the preferential class.
The final high-level cluster involves some verbs that encode emotion toward
a state of affairs or object (worry, amaze, and bother)—but not others (hate and
love)—along with the apparent outlier tell.20 There are likely two reasons tell ends
up in this cluster. First, since it is impossible in a standard acceptability judgment
task to differentiate expletive subjects—e.g. it—from their referential counterparts,
participants have the option of reading any of the frames that begin with it Ved . . .
as though the it were referential. Second, since all of the frames constructed with
an expletive subject also contained an NP object and only some of the other frames
did, tell ends up globally more close to the seemingly semantically disparate emotion
verbs.
As one digs further into smaller clusters within these three major ones, some
regularities emerge, but some unexpected aspects arise as well. Among the regulari-
ties are pairs that clearly belong together semantically: hate and love, hear and see,
want and need, forbid and allow, etc. Many of the intermediate groupings are some-
20The distinction the clustering finds between worry, amaze, and bother, on the one hand,
and hate and love, on the other, is clearly driven by the fact that the former group takes their
experiencer argument as an object and the latter takes their experiencer argument as a
subject. To what extent this syntactic distinction is mirrored in the semantics is an open question.
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what odd, however. In terms of its semantics, why should believe be grouped with
perceptual verbs like hear and see and not other belief verbs like think and suppose.
Similarly, why should forget be grouped with hate and love and not remember and
cognitive verbs, like realize and understand?
Indeed, even the three high-level clusters are not immune to these sorts of
questions. For instance, though it clearly takes multiple frames that involve nonfinite
complements, expect is something of an outlier among the preferential; though it does
seem to have a use involving obligations (12a), it also seems to have a use involving
predictions (12b). This second use—which can be drawn out by making the referent
of the embedded subject something that could not have obligations (Wurmbrand,
2014)—seems much more akin to the representational (see Portner and Rubinstein
2013 for discussion of expect and its relation to wish in languages like Spanish).
(12) a. I expect you to be here on time.
b. I expect the pizza to be a little late.
(Cf. I expect that the pizza will be a little late.)
The presence of expect in the preferential contrasts with a notable absence: the
verb hope, which shows up among the representational verbs. That hope patterns
with the representational on the macro level is interesting since, like expect, hope
seems to share elements of its semantics with both the representational and the
preferential (Anand and Hacquard, 2013; Portner and Rubinstein, 2013; Hacquard,
2014; Harrigan, 2015).
The problem here is that, in partitioning verbs into classes—even hierarchical
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ones—one misses aspects of the verbs’ meanings that seem to cross-cut these par-
titions; some verbs, like expect and hope, share aspects of their meaning with both
verbs in the representational and the preferential. This results in clusters that look
interpretable at the macro level but not at the intermediate and lower levels. I refer
to this problem as the Overlap Problem and take it up in the next section.
2.2.4.2 Recasting the Overlap Problem
To approach the Overlap Problem, it will be useful to first recast it. Assume
some verb-by-frame matrix D such that dij represents (an approximation of) the
association between (e.g., acceptability of) verb i in frame j inferred from X. For
instance, Figure 2.2 is a visual representation of such a D, estimated by averaging
likert scale responses for each verb i and frame j.
The aim is then to find some S that encodes generalizations about the distri-
butions encoded in D. Suppose that S is represented as a matrix—one whose cells
sik encode the association between verb i and property k. (For the moment, I leave
vague both what these distributional features are and how to interpret the nature of
these verb-feature associations, though both questions are addressed in turn.) What
is needed, then, is some method f for inferring S from D.
S
f←− D
(Hard) hierarchical clustering (HHC) is one such (family of) method(s), in the
sense that nonterminal nodes in trees, such as the one in Figure 2.3, can be conceived
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of as representing some relevant distributional regularities. These regularities can in
turn be encoded in a matrix S in the following way: assign an index k to each node
of the tree, and let sik = 1 denote that verb i is dominated by node k (associated
with property k) and sik = 0 denotes that verb i is not dominated by node k (not
associated with property k). The possible S produced by f for arbitrary D are
subject to the following condition.21
|{i : rim = rin}| ∈
0,min
|{i : rim > 0}|
|{i : rin > 0}|

 ,∀m,n
The Overlap Problem then arises in the following way. Taking the exam-
ple from the last subsection, suppose (distributional) feature m is associated with
the (semantic) representational (in some yet-to-be-defined way) and (distributional)
feature n is associated with the (semantic) preferential (in some yet-to-be-defined
way). If it is correct to characterize verbs like expect and hope as sharing meaning
components with verbs in both the representational class and the preferential class
and if this is tracked by the syntax (which it seems to be), both would be marked
positively for features m and n. But the above constraint implies that, if features n
and m have any overlap, the verbs that are associated with one, must be a subset
of the verbs that are associated with the other. This, in turn, means that either
all representational verbs would need to have preferential components or that all
preferential verbs would need to have representational components. This could be
true (cf. Heim’s (1992) seminal analysis of want), but it begs the current question,
21Note that this itself is a generalization of “flat” hard clustering methods—e.g. k-means—which
do not allow containment.
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since hope and expect still fall onto either side of the relevant divide.
To solve the Overlap Problem, then, the representational constraint on S in-
herent to the HHC inference procedure f must be loosened. To do this, it will be
useful to represent the structure of the procedure directly. Suppose f is the func-
tion that right-applies the linear map Q to its argument. Thus, Q maps from verb
distributions to regularities underlying those distributions.
S = f(D) = DQ
If one knew Q, it could be applied to D to get S. But Q is unknown, so it
is necessary to infer it. One common way of finding such a Q is Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA). Indeed, the method often used to carry out PCA, Singular
Value Decomposition, is the same one that underlies Deerwester et al.’s (1990) La-
tent Semantic Analysis/Indexing, which was in turn proposed as a model of lexical
context-based word-learning by Landauer and Dumais (1997).
2.2.5 Principal Component Analysis
As a method for extracting regularities in data, PCA can be viewed as con-
structing a mapping Q that shifts the perspective on the data so that the most
salient regularities are laid bare—where salience, here, is defined in terms of vari-
ance. It does this by using Q (often called the loading matrix) to rigidly rotate the












































Figure 2.4: Verb embeddings on first and second principal components of data in
Figure 2.2. Dark gridlines are x = y = 0. Four verbs—amaze, bother, worry, and
tell—are missing from this diagram due to their extreme values on these components.
They lie far to the upper left.
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Figure 2.5: Frame loadings on first and second principal components of data in
Figure 2.2. Dark gridlines are x = y = 0.
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ing combinations of those dimensions.22 These weighted combinations of the origi-
nal dimensions, derived (roughly) via the correlation between different dimensions
(agreement between the columns of Figure 2.2), correspond to underlying dimen-
sions called principal components. For instance, one principal component that PCA
finds in the acceptability data positively weights frames like NP Ved S, NP Ved that
S, S, I V, and S, NP Ved and negatively weights frames like NP Ved NP S, NP Ved
NP that S NP Ved NP to VP, NP was Ved to VP, and all of the expletive subject
frames. This information is encoded along the x-axis in Figure 2.5.
Each verb is in turn associated with a weight for each principal component,
encoded in S (the score matrix). With respect to the principal component de-
scribed above, the representationals (think, believe, remember, forget, etc.) tend
to be positively weighted, and the preferentials (allow, forbid, need, want) tend to
be negatively weighted. (I refine this generalization shortly.) This information is
encoded along the x-axis in Figure 2.4.
The amount of variance along a dimension further provides a natural way of
measuring the salience of a feature in the data, with the convention that the princi-
pal components are ordered by the amount of variance they explain in the original
dataset. Figure 2.4 shows each verb’s embeddings on the first and second principal
components according to this ordering, and Figure 2.5 shows the relationship be-
tween each component and different syntactic frames. The dark grid lines on each
figure represent the zero-intercept for each axis. These lines are useful since the
22As per standard practice, each dimension (the columns of Figure 2.2) were mean-centered and
standardized prior to applying PCA.
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quadrant a verb falls into determines whether it has a preference or dispreference
for a specific frame given its value on a certain component.
For instance, think is in the positive-positive quadrant in Figure 2.4, and the
frames NP Ved S and S, I V are in the positive-positive quadrant in Figure 2.5.
This means that, given only its values on the first two principle components, think
will prefer these frames. It will further outright disprefer the frames in the negative-
negative quadrant. The converse is true of verbs in the negative-negative quadrant
in Figure 2.4, such as want. These verbs will prefer frames in the negative-negative
quadrant of Figure 2.5 and disprefer frames in the positive-positive quadrant.
It is important that these preferences and dispreferences are true given only
the values of the verbs and frames on the first two principal components. This is
because, even though a verb may show a preference for a frame via its score on
one component, its score on other principal components may encode that verb’s
dispreference for that frame. In fact, this can be seen even on these two figures.
Note that the frame NP Ved to VP shows up in the positive-negative quadrant in
Figure 2.5. The extent to which think and NP Ved to VP are positive with respect
to principal component 1 determines the preference of think for NP Ved to VP on
that dimension of its meaning. Similarly, the extent to which think is positive and
NP Ved to VP is negative with respect to principal component 2 determines the
dispreference of think for NP Ved to VP on that dimension of its meaning. Taking
into account just these two dimensions, think disprefers NP Ved to VP, though on
other principal components, it may show a preference for it.
As noted, it seems that the first principal component corresponds to some-
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thing like the classification seen earlier: representational verbs tend to be positive
along the x -axis and preferential verbs tend to be negative.23 Note that if this is a
correct characterization of the first component, both expect and hope come out as
representational. The second principal component appears to correspond to having
an ordering component. The more negative, the more likely that the verb orders
states of affairs for their optimality with respect to some set of constraints (de-
sires, commands, etc.). Of particular interest here is the fact that both expect and
hope are negative on this component. This is interesting because it suggests that
there is evidence in the syntax that expect and hope share properties with both the
representational and the preferential.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show only the two most salient underlying dimensions of
the data. And as noted, very much the same split emerges that was seen in the
hierarchical clustering in Figure 2.3, with the exception that the mixed status of
expect and hope is now apparent. But PCA yields features beyond these first two,
which explain only about half of the variance in the data. Indeed, PCA yields as
many components as there are features (frames) in the original matrix. If all compo-
nents are taken into account, X itself can be perfectly reconstructed; but since many
components will explain little variance—i.e. are not very salient—taking them into
account yields little insight into verbs’ underlying features. For this reason, many
methods for choosing how many components to keep—know as stopping rules—have
been developed (see Jackson 1993 for discussion of various stopping rules). One
23Tell is again a notable exception here in that it is quite negative along this component despite
its being a representational. This, again, is likely because it comes out good with the expletive

















































Figure 2.6: Verb embeddings on third and fourth principal components of data in
Figure 2.2. Dark gridlines are x = y = 0.
common stopping rule, known as the Kaiser-Guttman Criterion (Guttman, 1954),
is to take only the components with associated eigenvalues great than 1. For this
dataset, this yields 21 significant components. Another common rule is the total
variance criterion. With a standard cutoff of 95%, this criterion yields 14 significant
components.
Once one delves into these 14-21 later significant components, however, their
interpretations, while still somewhat clear, become murkier. For instance, in Figures
2.6 and 2.7 the third principal component corresponds quite well to factivity. The
factives hate, love, forget, remember, understand, amaze, worry, and see are all
negative, and the nonfactives suppose, think, expect, hope, believe, say, tell, and guess
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Figure 2.7: Frame loadings on third and fourth principal components of data in
Figure 2.2. Dark gridlines are x = y = 0.
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are all positive. Further, one noted distributional characteristic of factives—-that
they occur with both question and nonquestion finite complements (Hintikka, 1975;
Zuber, 1983; Ginzburg, 1995; Lahiri, 2002; Sæbø, 2007; Egré, 2008; Uegaki, 2012;
Spector and Egré, 2014; Anand and Hacquard, 2014)—also obtains; both question
(NP Ved WH S, NP Ved if S, It Ved NP WH S ) and nonquestion (NP Ved that S,
NP Ved it that S, It Ved NP that S ) finite complements are negative on component
3. The murkiness arises when considering other verbs and frames that are negative
on component 3. For instance, both doubt and deny are nonfactive yet negative on
component 3,24 and the frames NP Ved NP VPing and NP Ved NP show no clear
relationship to the question-taking generalization.
This murkiness deepens when considering the fourth principal component.
This component corresponds roughly to speech. Verbs like promise, deny, tell, de-
mand, and say are negative on this component. These are not the only verbs that
are negative, however. Nonspeech verbs like remember, forget, imagine, pretend,
hate, and love also show up with negative scores on this component. Moving further
into the next 10-17 significant principal components, this problem only worsens.
The reason for this murkiness is likely due to quirks of PCA. To fully appreciate
these quirks, it is useful to first note an important property of the sorts of Q PCA
produces: Q is orthogonal and thus right-invertible. Since Q is right-invertible, the
following equality holds.
24This is actually a well-known issue in the factives literature. See Egré 2008; Spector and Egré





Figure 2.8: Graphical model corresponding to S
P−→ D → X. (Same as Figure 2.1.)
D = SQ−1 = SQ>
Thus, PCA can be viewed as performing factor analysis: given verb-by-frame
matrix X find a verb-by-(latent) distributional feature matrix S as well as a (latent)
distributional feature-by-frame matrix P. Note that this way of viewing the problem
now maps directly onto the framework discussed in Section 2.1. Replacing Q−1
with P, the problem is one in which syntactic distributions D are the product of
projection principles P “acting on” the features of S. In this case, “acting on”
is instantiated as mapping from one vector space—one in which the distributional
features for words wi fall—to another—one in which the distribution for words wi
fall. This can be represented in a graphical model as Figure 2.8.25
There is some sleight of hand going on here, though. How valid is it to replace
Q−1 with P? The answer is: not valid in the least. This replacement is potentially
problematic in that it implies that P is invertibility. But to say that the projection
principles P can be inverted to produce a syntax-to-semantics mapping Q is in fact
25This figure—identical to Figure 2.1 but repeated here for convenience—suppresses the prior
parameters and (nuisance) parameters involved in generating X from D.
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to state a very strong thesis regarding the nature of projection. If (i) a given P were
invertible and (ii) a noiseless representation of D were accessible, this would imply
that S would be perfectly reconstructable.
I have no evidence for or against this invertibility assumption, though I think
that there are strong methodological reasons for not making it. The reason is that, if
P is invertible and that assumption is inherent to whatever procedure one carries out
to find S and P, then there is no harm done (assuming D is measured without noise,
or at least well-estimated, by X, which are themselves strong assumptions). But if P
is not invertible and the invertibility assumption is inherent to whatever procedure
is carried out to find S and P, one may end up with poor results, since the correct
P is, by definition, not in the procedure’s codomain. As a methodological strategy,
then, it seems that, if it is possible not to make the invertibility assumption, one
should not. I point this out here for the following reason: if one attempts to induce
some projection principle P using a factor analysis procedure like PCA, the true
projection principles P (if they exist) could only be discovered if they are invertible.
This suggests that one should seek a form of factor analysis that does not require
the invertibility assumption.
Though it clarifies the relationship to projection, this does not yet explain why
PCA produces the murkiness seen above. Lee and Seung (1999) note two possibly
relevant properties. First, PCA learns holistic representations; each component
(latent feature) in Q−1 has consequences for each observed feature in D (and thus
X)—i.e. most cells of Q−1 are not (close to) zero. This can be seen, for example,
in Figure 2.5, where few of the frames have near-zero values on either component.
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Second, PCA is greedy in the sense that it loads as much information as possible into
as few of the initial principal components as possible. This is useful for compression,
since only the most informative features can be saved with little loss of information,
but it is not necessarily useful for analysis, since it may distribute many intuitively
distinct features over a few components.
These properties of PCA solutions arise from two sources: (i) PCA allows
both positive and negative values in S and Q−1 and (ii) PCA puts no constraints
on the sparseness of its features—i.e. relative prevalence of (near) zero values in
S and Q−1. This results in holistic representations because one latent feature’s
upweighting an observed feature can be directly counteracted by another latent
feature’s downweighting that same observed feature. It also results in uneven feature
informativity (greediness) because latent features can make unfettered use of the
real line as opposed to preferring (near) zero values, and thus the PCA computation
loads as much information as possible into the initial features.
To ameliorate these problematic properties, I turn to a family of methods
known as non-negative matrix factorization (NMF).26 Like PCA, NMF attempts to
factor D into S and P. Unlike PCA, however, NMF puts slightly stronger con-
straints on S and P; specifically, as the name implies, NMF requires both S and P
to be non-negative. This results in a “parts-based respresentation” as opposed to a
holistic representation, as in PCA (Lee and Seung, 1999). In such a parts-based rep-
resentation, features target specific aspects of the observable distribution as opposed
26NMF methods have been used for some time in the document classification literature (cf. Xu
et al., 2003) and are becoming popular for semantic representation (cf. Murphy et al., 2012; Fyshe
et al., 2014, 2015).
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to making slight alterations to every aspect. This comes about because latent fea-
tures cannot specify which aspects of the observed distribution they disprefer, only
the ones they prefer. In this case, they can only upweight—never downweight—the
association between a verb and a frame.
One nice side effect of moving to NMF is that, though the constraints on the
forms of S and P are tightened by disallowing negative values, the requirement
that P be invertible is loosened. (This is not to say that NMF forces us into
noninvertibility, since I could define a procedure that forced constrained P to be
invertible, but this is not necessary. The procedure I use for conducting NMF will
not enforce such a constraint for the methodological reason I discuss above.)
One choice that must be made in moving to NMF is what form S and P take
beyond being non-negative. Typically, NMF is used to find non-negative real-valued
S and P. One thing I have ignored up until this point that is relevant to the current
choice point is the fact that positivity and negativity along a component are not the
only things that matter when interpreting the results of factor analysis. Extent along
that component must also be taken into account. For instance, hate and love are
associated with the third component almost four times more strongly than remember
is. This in turn has consequences for how strongly these verbs are associated with
each frame: verbs that score more negatively on the third component—e.g. hate and
love—are positively associated more strongly (as far as this component is concerned)
with frames that load negatively—e.g. NP Ved WH S—than verbs that score less
negatively—e.g. remember. But if these components—i.e. latent distributional
features—plausibly correspond to latent semantic features—e.g. factivity—what
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does it mean for the feature to be unbounded in this way? Moving to NMF does
not help this, since in the typical case, NMF features are also unbounded.
To remedy this interpretational issue, I further constrain S beyond simple non-
negativity (leaving the cells of P unbounded and non-negative). Since unbounded-
ness in the verb representations is the problem, one route that could be taken is to
assume the cells of S lie on some closed interval containing 0. A natural choice for
such an interval is [0, 1]. Another is to put an even stronger constraint on the cells
of S by forcing them to lie in {0, 1}, thus making S a binary mask. One benefit of
this second route is that it allows us to introduce sparsity into the representation at
a fundamental level: cells must be either 0 or 1.27
Except for the non-negativity constraint on the loading matrix P, this brings
the model quite close in form to those proposed by Griffiths and Ghahramani (2006)
in a nonparametric context (see also the review in Griffiths and Ghahramani 2011
and references therein).28 As noted by Navarro and Griffiths (2008), it is also closely
related to Shepard and Arabie’s (1979) ADCLUS model of similarity judgments,
which assumes that the similarity between two objects is approximated by the
weighted sum of the features they share (cf. Tversky, 1977). The importance of
this second relationship arises in Section 2.4, where I construct mappings from S to
similarity judgments Y.
27As noted in the next section, I also induce sparsity in a less fundamental way: by introducing
the equivalent of an L1 regularizer on P into the fitting procedure.
28Indeed, the parametric version of this model is quite similar to Smolensky’s (1986) Harmo-
nium, which has been recently revived under the name Restricted Boltzmann Machine (Hinton
and Salakhutdinov, 2006; Salakhutdinov et al., 2007; Larochelle and Bengio, 2008; Hinton and
Salakhutdinov, 2009; Coates et al., 2011) after the fact that they correspond to a constrained form
of Boltzmann machine (Ackley et al., 1985).
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2.2.6 Non-negative projection model
As before, specifying the forms of S and P does not tell us how to find them. In
this case, I take a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)-based sampling approach.
But before moving onto the analysis of these fits, I first need to specify two further
aspects of the model: a noise model and a way of selecting the correct number of
features—i.e. a stopping criterion.
2.2.6.1 Noise model
One difficulty with NMF—and indeed, with most matrix factorization methods
besides PCA—is the need to specify a noise model. Such a noise model is often
necessary because an algorithm for discovering a specific sort of factorization may
be intractable or non-existent without one.
Luckily, there is natural such model in this case. Note that, up until now,
I have worked under the assumption that X was well-approximated by averaging
acceptability judgments. This was useful for expediting a qualitative analysis of
patterns in the judgment data. But as I noted in footnote 18, raw means are not
technically appropriate for this kind of data due to random variation in scale use.
This can lead to poor estimates of the true acceptability of a verb-frame pair. Two
routes are often used to remedy this: (i) transformation of the data prior to analysis
or (ii) modeling the relationship between the (unobserved) acceptability and the





Figure 2.9: Graphical model corresponding to S
P−→ D → X with the addition of
the ordinal logit mixed model parameters g.
The specifics of this model will not concern us here,29 besides to say that
it requires some nuisance parameters g, on which X is assumed to be dependent.
Figure 2.9 shows the graphical model with the addition of these parameters. As with
the parameters of interest, these (nuisance) parameters are sampled using MCMC.
2.2.6.2 Stopping criterion
Another obstacle for implementing the projection model is deciding on a rea-
sonable number n of features to define the columns of S and the rows of P. This
is not a problem when using PCA, since the number of principal components will
always be equal to the number of syntactic contexts in the original data. A common
approach in these cases is to fit the model with many different values of n then as-
sess the point at which adding features no longer improves the model’s explanation
of the data.30 This is similar to the idea behind the Kaiser-Guttman criterion and
29The model is an ordinal logit mixed model with strictly nonnegative cutpoints and random
effects for participants. The interested reader can find a formal specification in Appendix A and a
computational implementation on my github.
30Another option would be to use a nonparametric prior over binary matrices, such as the Indian
Buffet Process (Griffiths and Ghahramani, 2006, 2011). I have implemented such a version, but
found convergence issue related to the discreteness of S. Benjamin van Durme (p.c.) notes that this
is a motivation for using unit-valued matrices, which remedy the “stickiness” of binary matrices
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others described above for PCA, which tend to rely on amount of variance explained
or some measure related to the variance. (In this sense, many of these criteria are
comparable to the common adjusted R2.) Since the model’s noise component does
not attempt to minimize a variance-based measure, however, a more general measure
based on likelihood must be used.
The measure I use is known as the Watanabe-Akaike—or Widely Applicable—
Information Criterion (WAIC), which Gelman et al. (2013) argue is preferable to
other common information criteria used for comparing hierarchical models—e.g.
the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC)—especially in cases where “the posterior
distribution is not well summarized by its mean” (ibid, p. 182).31 The current model
is such a case since the posterior over S is multimodal; swapping columns i and j
in S and rows i and j in P will result in a solution that is equally good in terms
of both the posterior density and likelihood. WAIC attempts to approximate the
results of Leave One Out Cross Validation (LOO-CV)—i.e. jackknifing—and has
two components: (i) the log posterior predictive density (LPPD), which measures
the model fit, and (ii) the WAIC estimate of the effective number of parameters
(pWAIC
32), which measures the number of parameters that are doing explanatory
work. The first term serves to measure the models fit to the data, and the second
serves to penalize models for fitting the data too closely.
to some extent.
31Watanabe (2010) gives the first specification of this measure. See also Watanabe 2013 for
discussion of the related Widely applicable Bayesian Information Criterion (WBIC).
32I use Gelman et al.’s second method of estimating pWAIC, which they recommend because “its
series expansion has a closer resemblance to the series expansion for LOO-CV and also in practice
seems to give results closer to LOO-CV” (ibid, p. 174).
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2.2.6.3 Model fitting
The MCMC sampler was implemented in Python using the version 2.3 of the
pymc package (Patil et al., 2010). For each number of features n between 1 and 15,
the sampler was randomly initialized and run for 11 million iterations with a burn-
in of 1 million and a thinning interval of 10000. After each run, the traces of the
loading matrix P, response model parameters, and the deviance were analyzed for
autocorrelation. In most cases, at least the deviance trace showed worrying amounts
of autocorrelation. In those cases, the sample with the lowest deviance was extracted
and the sampler was initialized with that sample and rerun using the same sampling
parameters. This was repeated until only low lag (or no) autocorrelation was found
in the traces. This took two repeats of this procedure for most values of n.33
To induce sparsity in the mapping matrix P, exponential priors (λ = 1) were
placed on each cell. This is analogous to L1 regularization, which can be derived
in a Bayesian context by placing Laplace priors on the parameters. And if x ∼
Laplace(λ), then |x| ∼ Exponential(λ).34
2.2.6.4 Results
Figure 2.10 shows both the LPPD and the WAIC of the model (both scaled
by −2) with each setting of n. (The pWAIC for each model is proportional to the gap
33Ideally, the sampler would be rerun with sampler parameters an order of magnitude larger than
the ones used. However, this is infeasible, given that even under GPU acceleration, the current
procedure took 12 days.
34With this sort of regularization, NMF is sometimes referred to as Nonnegative Sparse Coding















Figure 2.10: Log Pointwise Predictive Density (LPPD) and Watanabe Akaike
(Widely Applicable) Information Criterion—both scaled by -2—for models with
different numbers of features. The gap between the LPPD and WAIC lines is pro-
portional to the effective number of parameters as computed by Gelman et al.’s
(2013) second method (pWAIC2).
between the two lines.) I see that WAIC bottoms (tops) out at 14 features, despite
the fact that LPPD continues to decrease (increase). This continual decrease is
expected, since adding features will never worsen the model fit. (A model with
n− 1 is a special case of the model with n features, where one feature in the model
with n features is set to 0 for all verbs.) All further analyses therefore focus on the
model with 14 features.
To analyze the output of the fit model, I first extract the sample with the
minimum deviance (maximum likelihood) across all samples. Here, I focus only on
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the parameters of interest, S and P; a graph depicting the noise model parameters
(ordinal logit cutpoints) can be found in Appendix A. Figure 2.11 shows the feature
matrix S (analogous to the PCA score matrix) for this sample and Figure 2.12 shows
the projection matrix P> (analogous to the PCA loading matrix).
Figure 2.11 shows that the non-negative projection models finds roughly four
quite general features (1-4) with the remainder (5-14) being somewhat fine-grained.
Further, the general features tend to project many syntactic contexts weakly, while
the more specific features tend to project a few syntactic contexts very strongly.
This is interesting in the sense that it looks like the general features have something
like a baselining function: they serve to situate the verbs that have them in roughly
the right part of distribution space, while the more specific features refine this
placement.
In some sense, this is similar to the behavior of PCA, which also finds major
features (principal components that explain a lot of variance) and then makes small
refinements using later components. The important difference between PCA and
the current model is that the small refinements appear to target specific classes
with less noise.
This results in specific features like feature 14, which seems to target verbs
of content of speech (tell and promise); feature 13, which seems to target the (ex-
periencer object) emotive factives (worry, amaze, bother); feature 12, which seems
to target implicative verbs (remember, forget, bother); feature 10, which (excluding
feel) seems to target verbs involving permission/obligation (demand, allow, forbid,
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deny35); and feature 8, which targets preferentials (want, need, demand, expect, hate,
love).
Features 13 (worry, amaze, bother) and 14 (tell and promise) are particularly
interesting in comparing the non-negative model to PCA. I noted above that, despite
the fact that tell and promise appear to be good in the expletive subject contexts
(It Ved...)—likely due to the fact that a nonreferential reading of the subject is
not necessary—PCA discovers a component that seems to correspond to content of
speech. That is, it separates tell and promise from other verbs. One problem with
the PCA solution was that verbs like imagine and remember show up with about the
same score as tell on the same component. This problem is remedied in the current
case in that the content of speech verbs have the feature and the non-content of
speech verbs don’t; there is not equivocation with the binary representation (at
least at each sample).
One place where PCA appears to do somewhat better is in the more general
features. The general features discovered by PCA—i.e. principal components 1 and
2—corresponded quite well to previously described classes of verbs: representation-
als and preferentials. Indeed, this analysis even appeared to discover that some
verbs fall into both classes. In contrast, the general features discovered by the non-
negative model are somewhat muddled. For instance, feature 1 appears to be quite
random; feature 2 corresponds roughly to representationality, but with the addition
of worry and demand and to the exclusion of hope and pretend ; feature 3 includes
35Deny may show up in this class because of its lack of permission use in the NP V NP NP
context.
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some, but not all, of the preferentials with the addition of many representationals;
and feature 4 corresponds to a subset of representationals (again, with the addition
of worry). In this more muddled solution, hope still cross-classifies with both want
and think on different features, but it is unclear what to make of this, since the
classes themselves are hard to interpret.
The likely reason for the more muddled solution in this case has to do with the
nature of the weaker projective relationships found in P. Because those relationships
are weaker, it is less costly for the model to posit that a verb has that feature rather
than some of the more specific features, which tend to project more heavily over
fewer syntactic contexts. This could result in the model being less certain about
which verbs have a more general feature and which do not, thus meaning that the
particular configuration found in the more general features in Figure 2.11 could be
non-representative of the samples overall, which is always a problem with analyzing
point estimates (and particularly discrete ones).
Unfortunately, due to the multimodality mentioned earlier, there is not much
to be done about this here. Cells (and thus features) are not identifiable over the
course of sampling, so it is not possible to estimate the probability of a verb having
a particular feature. It is important to note, however, that, though this solution
appears muddled from the point of view of the analyst, my own labellings of an
algorithm’s output are of no consequence in the larger scheme. Indeed, the logic
I laid out in Section 2.1 explicitly eschews such labellings, at least as a matter of
determining the amount of semantic information in syntactic distribution. And as
































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 2.11: Verb features (S) inferred by non-negative projection model. Black
cells represent 1s.
interpret features extracted using the non-negative model turn out to be predictive
of participants’ similarity judgments.
2.2.7 Discussion
In this section, I presented an experiment aimed at getting a measure of how
acceptable a variety of propositional attitude verbs are in different syntactic con-
texts. My goal was two-fold. First, I assessed how closely the sorts of regularities
found in these data correspond to the attitude verb distinctions discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1. I carried this out by using two standard exploratory analyses—hierarchical
clustering and principal component analysis—and one novel (at least in this do-
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It Ved NP WH S
It Ved NP WH to VP
It Ved NP that S
It Ved NP to VP
NP Ved
NP Ved NP
NP Ved NP NP
NP Ved NP S
NP Ved NP about NP
NP Ved NP that S




NP Ved WH S
NP Ved WH to VP
NP Ved about NP
NP Ved for NP to VP
NP Ved if S
NP Ved it that S
NP Ved so
NP Ved that S
NP Ved there to VP
NP Ved to
NP Ved to NP that S
NP Ved to VP
NP was Ved that S
NP was Ved to VP
S, I V
S, NP Ved
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 2.12: Relationship between features and syntactic frames (P>) inferred by
non-negative projection model. Darker cells represent larger values.
86
main) analysis—nonnegative matrix factorization. Second, I assessed the strengths
and weaknesses of each exploratory analysis with respect to how well they satisfy
various methodological considerations. This assessment was driven in part by the
sorts of regularities I discovered in the data, along with theoretical considerations.
I came away with the following generalizations. First, the representationality
distinction is robustly discovered by every method. I noted, however, that cer-
tain methods miss the fact that the representationals and preferentials may not be
mutually exclusive. For instance, hope and expect seem to share aspects of both
classes.
This lead us to the first methodological consideration: whatever method is used
for extracting regularities should be able to represent overlapping classifications.
This motivated the move to a method that produces representations that allow
overlap. Principal component analysis (PCA) fit this bill. PCA was able to discover
the fact that hope and expect have both representational components if the first two
principal are interpreted as corresponding to representationality and preferentiality,
respectively. This seemed plausible given the the quadrants in which various verbs
that have been classified as such lie. An interesting distinction was also seen lying
along the third principal component. This component appeared to correspond to
factivity, and as has been claimed for factivity, this component involved loadings on
both question and nonquestion complements.
As I moved into the later principal components, however, generalizations about
the semantics that might be associated with that component became murkier. For
instance, the fourth principal component appeared to correspond to content of
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speech to some extent, but there were various aspects of this component that looked
quite noisy. I argued that this murkiness likely arises from two properties of PCA
that are undesirable for current purposes: PCA learns holistic representations and
loads information greedily into initial components, thus making possibly distinct
regularities indistinguishable. These properties, in turn, arise from two sources: the
availability of both positive and negative values and a lack of representational spar-
sity. These considerations motivated us to move to a model that addresses them by
constraining distributional regularities to be defined only in terms of non-negative
matrices—our non-negative model of projection. Beyond remedying these prob-
lems, I noted that this model also satisfies a theoretical consideration pointed out
in Section 2.1: mappings from semantics to syntax seem unlikely to be invertible.
The method by which the non-negative projection model explains the data
is interesting. Much like PCA, it appears to find a few very general features that
situate the verbs having those features within a general distributional space and
many much more specific features that target particular areas of that space. Unlike
PCA, the more specific features appear to less noisily target features like content of
speech.
I would like to end this section by recapitulating how these results relate to
the larger goals of the chapter. In Section 2.1, I gave a formal characterization of
the logic I hew to throughout the chapter. I focused in this section on one small
part of this logic—-that found in the lower right corner. This piece concerns how





Much of the section consisted in exploring the consequences of making various
choices for these regularity extraction procedures. This exploration was spurred
on by two concerns: relating these results to previous literature in the domain of
propositional attitude verb semantics and satisfying various methodological con-
siderations. I would like to stress, however, that though these considerations are
relevant to the ultimate question regarding what aspects of meaning syntactic dis-
tribution could be used to learn, I have not yet satisfied Fisher et al.’s method-
ological critique in that I nonetheless performed much of the exploratory analysis
by attempting to label various regularities. To assist in filling out this part of the
above logic, I turn in the next section to two methods for gathering a proxy for the
semantics Y.
2.3 Experiments 2 & 3: verb similarity
In this section, I present two experiments aimed at getting a measure of how
similar in meaning näıve speakers take the propositional attitude verbs from Exper-






The first experiment (Experiment 2) employs a generalized semantic discrimination—
or triad—task, in which participants are given lists of three words and asked to
choose the one least like the others in meaning (Wexler, 1970; Fisher et al., 1991).36
The second experiment (Experiment 3) employs an ordinal (likert) scale similarity
task, in which participants are asked to rate the similarity in meaning of a word
pair on a 1-7 scale.
There are two reasons I use both tasks. First, the generalized semantic dis-
crimination task replicates the methodologies used in the Fisher et al. 1991 and
Lederer et al. 1995, whose logic I employ in this chapter, and the ordinal scale task
is a standard way of measuring similarities, regardless of the formal properties of the
objects being compared. Second, I would like to assess to what extent the semantic
properties employed in these similarity tasks are task-dependent. This may in turn
suggest how close the representations Y used to make the judgments are to the
concepts themselves.
In Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, the experiments themselves are described along
with some exploratory analyses that qualitatively relate their results to the results
of Experiment 1. In Section 2.3.3, the two measures are themselves compared to
36I follow Fisher et al. (1991) here, but interestingly, a similar paradigm—using a larger set of




2.3.1 Experiment 2: generalized semantic discrimination task
2.3.1.1 Design
In this experiment, I aim to get a measure of how similar in meaning näıve
speakers take the propositional attitude verbs from Experiment 1 to be. To do
this, I constructed a list containing every three-combination of the 30 verbs from
Experiment 1 (4060 three-combinations total). Twenty lists of 203 items each were
then constructed by random sampling.
These lists were then inserted into an Ibex (version 0.3-beta15) experiment
script with each three-combination displayed using an unmodified Question con-
troller (Drummond, 2014). This controller displays an optional question above a
list of answers. In this case, the question was omitted and the verbs making up each
three combination constituted the possible answers. Participants could select an
answer either by typing the number associated with each answer or clicking on the
answer. All materials, including the instructions participants received, are available
on my github.
2.3.1.2 Participants
Sixty participants (28 females; age: 34.5 [mean], 31 [median], 18–68 [range])
were recruited through AMT using a standard HIT template designed for externally
hosted experiments and modified for the specific task. All qualification requirements
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were the same as those described in Section 2.2.2. After finishing the experiment,
participants received a 15-digit hex code, which they were instructed to enter into
the HIT. Once this submission was received, participants were paid $3.
2.3.1.3 Data validation
The data validation procedure is the same one described in Section 2.2.3 with
the exception that I calculate Cohen’s κ instead of Spearman’s ρ.37 The median
Cohen’s κ between participant responses is 0.45 (mean=0.45, IQR=0.52-0.37).38 To
find outliers, I use Tukey’s method. No comparisons fall below Q1-1.5*IQR and
none fall above Q3+1.5*IQR. Thus, I exclude no participants.
The median agreement here is quite a bit lower than the interrater agreement
found by either Fisher et al. or Lederer et al. (Spearman’s ρ=0.78).39 This is likely
driven by the fact that I am investigating a much smaller portion of the lexicon and
thus am bound to find that participants have less certainty about which verbs are
more semantically similar.40
Another possible contributor to this lower correlation is that Cohen’s κ is more
37Both Fisher et al. and Lederer et al. compute Spearman rank correlations over count matrices
of the form found in Figure 2.13. The method they use is not available to us without significant
alteration since I collected data from more than two participants per list. Instead, I opt for a
standard measure of interrater agreement here. This measure is preferable in any case since (i) it
allows us to assess each participant’s reliability at the same time as I assess overall agreement and
(ii) it can be applied to the raw data instead of a statistic of the data, as in the cases of Fisher
et al. and Lederer et al..
38An analysis of the distribution of Fleiss’ κ (the multi-rater generalization of Scott’s π) by list
corroborates this analysis (median=0.45, mean=0.45, IQR=0.48-0.40).
39Fisher et al. report Spearman’s ρ=0.81 (Exp. 1); 0.78 (Exp. 2); 0.76 (Exp. 3), 0.79 (Exp. 4),
0.72 (Exp. 5). Lederer et al. report Spearman’s ρ=0.81.
40If this is indeed true, interrater agreement on this and other similarity judgment tasks could
be a way of investigating the “semantic density” of a lexical neighborhood. Modeling reaction























































































































Figure 2.13: Similarity rating for each verb-verb pair from generalized semantic
discrimination experiment. Darker shades represent more times chosen similar. Note
that the diagonal elements are not observed and are set to the maximum over all
other cells.
conservative than Spearman’s ρ. As I see in Section 2.3.2.3, however, the conserva-
tiveness of Cohen’s κ is not likely to be the culprit here, since even Spearman’s ρ
shows roughly the same amount of agreement among participants using a different
measure.
2.3.1.4 Results
Figure 2.13 shows the number of times each pair of verbs occurred together
and were not chosen as dissimilar. That is, if believe, think, and want occurred
together, and want was chosen as the odd man out, then the similarity between
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believe and think is incremented. Verbs are arrayed along the x- and y-axes in the
same order they were on the y-axis in Figure 2.2. This arrangment allows for a visual
assessment of the agreement between the syntactic clustering and the similarity
judgments. Roughly, the more clearly dark blocks of cells appear in the graph, the
more the syntactic clustering and the semantic judgments are in agreement.
Blocks along the diagonal suggest high agreement. There are roughly three
blocks of size greater than three-by-three along the diagonal: a first group of repre-
sentationals (believe, hear, see, hope, suppose, say, think), a second group of repre-
sentationals (imagine, remember, understand, guess, realize), and a group of prefer-
entials (need, want, demand, expect).
Blocks off the diagonal suggest that a larger group was split in two by a
disagreement regarding some elements. The particular case of this I see in the Figure
2.13 is among the two blocks of representationals. What appears to be happening
here is that participants did not rate representationals with negative affect (forget,
hate, deny, doubt) as similar to the other representationals.
This effect of negative affect appears to be quite strong, as can be seen in
Figure 2.14. This figure shows each verb’s embedding derived from two-dimensional
nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMDS)41 applied to the generalized seman-
tic discrimination dissimilarity matrix (Shepard, 1962a,b; Kruskal, 1964a,b). This
dissimilarity matrix is derived by counting the number of times a pair of verbs oc-
41Multidimensional scaling (MDS) maps from a distance matrix into an n-dimensional coordinate
space such that the distances between elements in the n-dimensional space correspond as closely
as possible to the distances listed in the distance matrix. The definition of “as closely as possible”































Figure 2.14: Embedding derived by two-dimensional nonmetric multidimensional
scaling applied to the generalized semantic discrimination judgments represented in
Figure 2.13.
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curred together and one was chosen as the most dissimilar in the triad. In the
want, think, believe example above, the dissimilarity between want and think and
the dissimilarity between want and believe would both be incremented.
The effect of negative affect can be seen in the fact that verbs with such a
component—worry, doubt, forget, hate, bother, forbid, deny—tend to cluster together
(here, to the upper left). This sensitivity to affect mixes with a sensitivity to the
clusters noted above and in acceptability judgments. The representational cluster
(believe, hear, see, hope, suppose, say, think, imagine, remember, understand, guess,
realize) can be seen to the right—with clear pockets of more fine-grained clusters,
such as perception and speech (tell, say, hear, see) to the lower right and doxastic
state to the upper right (understand, remember, realize, suppose, think, believe,
imagine).
The two interesting cases discussed in Section 2.2.4—expect and hope—turn
out to be interesting here as well. Note that expect falls midway between the repre-
sentational cluster and what looks to be a preferential cluster (need, want, demand,
allow). Hope, on the other hand, falls much further into representational territory.
In fact, this layout is somewhat similar to that seen in Figure 2.4, where the em-
bedding of hope on the first and second principal components of the acceptability
judgments puts it closer to the representationals than expect.
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2.3.2 Experiment 3: ordinal similarity
2.3.2.1 Design
As in Experiment 2, I aim to get a measure of how similar in meaning näıve
speakers take the propositional attitude verbs from Experiment 1 to be. To do this,
I constructed a list containing every pair of the 30 verbs from Experiment 1 along
with the verb know (460 unordered pairs, 920 ordered pairs). Twenty lists of 62
ordered pairs were then constructed such that every verb was seen an equal number
of times and no pair—either unordered or ordered—was seen twice.
These lists were then inserted into an Ibex (version 0.3.7) experiment script
with each pair displayed using an unmodified AcceptabilityJudgment controller
(Drummond, 2014). This controller displays the verb pair separated by a pipe
character—e.g. think | want—above a discrete scale. Participants could use this
scale either by typing the associated number on their keyboard or by clicking the
number on the scale. A 1-to-7 scale was used with endpoints labeled very dissimilar
(1) to very similar (7). To encourage them to make a symmetric similarity judgment,
participants were instructed to rate “the similarity between the meanings of the two
verbs” as opposed to rating how similar the first verb was to the second (or vice




Sixty participants were recruited through AMT. All qualification requirements
were the same as those described in Section 2.2.2. After finishing the experiment,
participants received a 15-digit hex code, which they were instructed to enter into
the HIT. Once this submission was received, participants were paid $1.
2.3.2.3 Data validation
The data validation procedure is the same one described in Section 2.2.3. The
median Spearman rank correlation between participant responses is 0.40 (mean=0.41,
IQR=0.52-0.32). To find outliers, I use Tukey’s method. No comparisons fall below
Q1-1.5*IQR and none fall above Q3+1.5*IQR. Thus, I exclude no participants.
2.3.2.4 Results
Figure 2.15 shows the mean similarity rating for each pair of verbs, collapsing
over the two orderings (before or after the pipe character) in which the verbs in the
pair were presented. As in Figure 2.13, verbs are arrayed along the x- and y-axes
in the same order they were on the y-axis in Figure 2.2, so as for that figure, blocks
along the diagonal suggest high agreement and blocks off the diagonal suggest that
a larger group was split in two by a disagreement regarding some elements.
There are roughly three blocks of size greater than three-by-three along the di-
agonal: a first group of representational verbs (believe, hear, see, hope, suppose, say,


























































































































Figure 2.15: Similarity rating for each verb-verb pair from ordinal scale experiment.
Darker shades represent higher mean ratings. Note that the diagonal elements are
not observed and are set to the maximum over all other cells.
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stand, guess, realize), and a group of preferential verbs (need, want, demand, expect).
Each of these three corresponds to a block found in the last experiment, suggesting
high agreement between this task and the generalized semantic discrimination task.
Also as before, there are two blocks of representational verbs off-diagonal,
and again, what appears to be happening here is that participants did not rate
representational with negative affect (forget, hate, deny, doubt) as similar to the
other representational verbs. Thus it seems that negative affect is again having a
large effect on participants’ judgments.
This is corroborated in Figure 2.16, which shows each verb’s embedding derived
from two-dimensional NMDS applied to the likert distance matrix. This distance
matrix is derived by subtracting each cell in Figure 2.15 from 7, thus essentially
inverting the likert scale.
The effect of negative affect can be seen in the fact that verbs with such a
component—worry, doubt, forget, hate, bother, forbid, deny—tend to cluster together
(here, encompasses the entire left side of the diagram). This sensitivity to affect
mixes with a sensitivity to the clusters noted above and in acceptability judgments.
Some of the representational verbs (believe, see, suppose, think, imagine, remember,
understand, guess, realize) can be seen to the upper right. Some of the clear pockets
of more fine-grained clusters, like perception (hear, see, feel) are broken up, while
others, like speech (tell, say), remain coherent.
Finally, the two interesting cases discussed in Section 2.2.4—expect and hope—
turn out to be interesting here as well. They fall next to each in the lower right































Figure 2.16: Embedding derived by two-dimensional nonmetric multidimensional
scaling applied to the ordinal scale judgments represented in Figure 2.15.
verbs.
2.3.3 Comparison of (dis)similarity datasets
In the previous two subsections, I noted quite a few points of agreement be-
tween the two semantic similarity measures. And indeed, overall, the correlation
between responses on the generalized semantic discrimination task and those on the
likert scale task are quite high (Pearson’s r=0.76, p < 0.001).42 This suggests that
these two task are tapping the similar aspects of participants’ semantic knowledge.
But though these measures tend to tap similar semantic knowledge, they diverge in
42If the likert scale judgments are z-scored or ridit scored prior to averaging, the correlation goes
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Figure 2.17: Relationship between generalized semantic discrimination similarity
responses and ordinal scale similarity responses. Only low outlier pairs are labeled.
(See Table A.1 in Appendix A for high outlier pairs.)
some respects. This can be seen in Figure 2.17, which plots the number of times each
verb pair was rated similar in the generalized semantic discrimination task against
the mean likert scale rating for that pair. The line superimposed on this graph gives
a robust regression fit to these data. If a pair is above the line, it was rated higher
than expected in the likert scale task given its rating in the generalized semantic
discrimination task. If a pair is below the line, it was rated higher than expected in
the generalized semantic discrimination task given its rating in the likert scale task.
Though much of the variability around the line is likely noise in participant
responses, I also see what may be regularities. To investigate these regularities,
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I compute each pair’s standardized residual with respect to the robust regression
fit. The variance in the data is likely heteroscedastic with respect to the gener-
alized semantic discrimination ratings (studentized Breusch-Pagan = 135.54, p <
0.001), and thus standardizing by the residual standard error inferred by the model
is not warranted. Instead, I infer a scedastic function conditioned on the generalized
semantic discrimination ratings by fitting a generalized linear model with inverse-
gamma link to the absolute value of the residuals. I then standardize each residual
with respect to the robust regression fit by the inverse-gamma model’s prediction.
Table 2.1 shows all pairs whose residual is 2.5 standard deviations below the mean
according to this method—i.e. rated more similar in the generalized semantic dis-
crimination task than expected given the likert ratings. Table A.1 in Appendix A
shows all pairs whose residual is 2.5 standard deviations above the mean. I focus
on the outliers in Table 2.1, as the pattern there is clearer.
Many of these pairs appear to be antonymous along some dimension of their
meaning. For instance, the antonymous pairs remember | forget, hate | love, allow
| forbid, and allow | deny43 are rated quite highly in the generalized semantic dis-
crimination task but quite low in the likert scale task. Pairs like demand | deny and
see | tell don’t seem to immediately fit this generalization.
It is less clear what is happening in the case of see | tell, but one possibility
for demand | deny is that participants are simultaneously contacting a distinction
in the source and goal roles and negation on the modal quantifier. If x demands
43Note that the sense of deny that participants are likely getting in this case is the one that
comes out in the double object frame and not the clausal complement frame. That is, denying
someone something entails not allowing that person that thing.
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Table 2.1: Pairs rated more highly in the generalized semantic discrimination task
than in the likert scale task.
y from z, z is the source and x is the goal with respect to x’s demands, a strong
deontic modality; in contrast, if x denies z y, x is the source and z is the goal
with respect to x’s denials, the negation of a strong deontic modal.
2.3.4 Discussion
In this section, I presented two experiments aimed at getting a measure of
how similar in meaning näıve speakers take the propositional attitude verbs from
Experiment 1 to be. Within the logic laid out in Section 2.1, this corresponds to




The first experiment (Experiment 2) employed a generalized semantic discrim-
ination task, in which participants are given lists of three words and asked to choose
the one least like the others in meaning. The second experiment (Experiment 3)
employed an ordinal (likert) scale similarity task, in which participants are asked to
104
rate the similarity in meaning of a word pair on a 1-7 scale.
In the data from both tasks, I showed that, qualitatively, participants appear
to be sensitive to the representationality distinction in their similarity judgments,
though the representational cluster appears to be split in both cases by participants’
sensitivity to negative affect. By comparing the results of the two experiments, I
suggested that some aspect of meaning involving negation also appears to be differ-
entially accessed in each task. In particular, participants in the ordinal scale task
were much more sensitive to antonymy than participants in the generalized semantic
discrimination task. In the next section, I present multiple ways of quantifying the
relationship between the results presenting in this section and those presented in
Section 2.2.
2.4 Quantifying the syntax-semantic connection
Having now presented qualitative aspects of all three datasets—albeit, using
formal means—I explore in this section various ways of quantifying the relationship
between the acceptability judgments presented in Section 2.2 and the semantic sim-
ilarity judgements presented in Section 2.3. I do this in two ways. First, following
Fisher et al., I assess the overall correlation between the acceptability judgments





Second, in order to discover more fine-grained relationships, I map from the





I begin with the basic correlational analyses. This provides an overall measure
of the extent to which syntactic distribution correlates with the semantics (making
the relevant assumption laid out in Section 2.1). I then move into the more sophis-
ticated analyses involving mapping from S to Y. This second makes it possible to
delve into the relationship between the distributional regularities extracted using
the non-negative projection model and the similarity judgments directly.
I present two such analyses. The first assesses both the nature of partici-
pants perception of semantic similarity relative to the distributional features and
the salience of those features. Salience in this case is quantitatively instantiated as
feature weights in the mapping model(s). This in turn gives us a way of assessing to
what extent the distributional features S might be related to the true linguistically
relevant semantic features, which in the formal sketch presented in Section 2.1 are a
(homomorphic) function of the conceptual space C. The second uses the resulting
models to assess how useful different syntactic contexts could plausibly be for a




























Figure 2.18: Relationship between frame distances based on acceptability judgment
data present in Section 2.2 and dissimilarities based on the similarity judgment data
presented in Section 2.3. Lines show local regression fits.
2.4.1 Basic correlational analysis
To get a measure of the overall correlation between the acceptability and simi-
larity judgments, it is necessary to define a measure of distance over the acceptability
judgments. In Section 2.2 I used Euclidean distance, viewing each verb as a point in
30-dimensional space, with each dimensions corresponding to a frame (see footnote
19). This choice of distance measure is arbitrary but suitable for a first pass.
Figure 2.18 plots these acceptability-based distances against the correspond-
ing dissimilarity for each pair. Both axes are normalized by dividing each dis-
tance/dissimilarity by the maximum for that measure, which is necessary in order
107
to compare the generalized semantic discrimination and ordinal datasets on the same
axis. Superimposed on these points are local regression fits, regressing the general-
ized semantic discrimination and ordinal scale dissimilarities on the acceptability-
based distances.44
The correlation between the acceptability-based distances and both the gener-
alized semantic discrimination dissimilarities (Spearman ρ=0.27; Mantel(iter=10000),
p < 0.001) and the ordinal dissimilarities (Spearman ρ=0.28; Mantel(iter=10000), p
< 0.001) are significant and comparable. Much of this positive correlation appears
to be driven by agreement on verbs that are close together on both measures, with
less agreement regarding those that are further apart. This suggests that syntac-
tic distribution may be useful in signaling to learners which verbs are similar but
not which ones are dissimilar. One possible implication of this is that a learning
mechanism is only licensed in making conclusion about how well two verbs features
match, not how much they mismatch.
A similar analysis can be run over the binary features extracted using the
non-negative factor analysis model seen in Figure 2.11. Here again, a distance
measure must be defined. Perhaps the simplest in this case is Hamming (Manhattan)
distance, which corresponds to simply counting up the number of features that
two verbs mismatch on.45 The correlation between these feature-based distances
and both the generalized semantic discrimination dissimilarities (Spearman ρ=0.27;
44The default parameters for the loess() function were used.
45Another way of conceptualizing this distance, which will be useful for understanding the analy-
sis in the next section, is geometric. Suppose that each verb lies on the vertex of a unit hypercube,
where si (row i of Figure 2.11) identifies which vertex the verb lies on. Then, the Hamming dis-
tance between verb m and verb n in feature space corresponds to counting the number of edges of
the hypercube that one would need to traverse to get from sm to sn.
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Mantel(iter=10000), p < 0.001) and the likert dissimilarities (Spearman ρ=0.25;
Mantel(iter=10000), p < 0.001) are again significant and comparable. Further,
they hew quite closely to the distances computed from the raw data itself. This
suggests that very little, if any, of the semantic similarity information in the original
data was lost in abstracting the 14 binary features from the judgments over the 30
frames.
2.4.2 Distributional features and similarity
Looking at overall correlations does not yet tell us which distributional features
appear to be active in the similarity judgments (or at least correlated with such an
active feature). To carry this analysis out, I run two different types of regressions: a
multinomial regression, in which the generalized semantic discrimination judgments
are regressed on (similarities derived from) the features of the verbs included in each
triad, and an ordinal regression, in which the ordinal scale judgments are regressed
on (similarities derived from) the features of the verbs included in each pair.
Each of these analyses requires that I define some way of deriving similarities
from the binary features extracted in Section 2.2. There are a few natural ways of
doing this. The first is to take the raw additive inverse of the Hamming (Manhattan)
distance in N (the number of features). This maps straightforwardly onto the basic
correlational analysis in the last section in that the correlation between this measure
and the similarity judgments must be the same as the correlation between Hamming
distance and distances derived from the similarity judgments.
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= N − ‖si − sj‖
Note that this measure ensures that, if smk = snk for all k, the N-Hamming
similarity is at its maximum of N . This implies that, if m = n, Hamming(sm, sn) =
maxi,j Hamming(si, sj) = N , and if smk 6= snk for all k, then Hamming(si, sj) = 0 =
mini,j Hamming(si, sj). This seems reasonable.
Such a measure may be problematic unmodified, however, since as I note in
Section 2.3, similarity judgments seem to be sensitive to different aspects of verbs’
meanings to different degrees. To remedy this, I might include strictly positive
weights that represent the importance of each feature in that particular task. To
retain the above properties, the N-Hamming similarity would need to be generalized




wk − wk|sik − sjk|
= ‖w‖1 − ‖w(si − sj)‖1
46WeightedHammingSimw is known more commonly as weighted Minkowski (1-norm) distance.
And like weighted Minkowski (1-norm), WeightedHammingSimw is equivalent to HammingSimN—
unweighted Minkowski (1-norm)—iff w = 1N , where 1N is a vector of 1s of length N .
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Under the assumption that w is strictly positive, this second function—and a
forteriori, the first—defines a positive-definite kernel function.47. As such, I hence-
forth abbreviate it to
KHammw(i, j) = WeightedHammingSimw(si, sj)
In fact, this kernel is equivalent to the one employed in Shepard and Arabie’s
(1979) ADCLUS model but for one major difference: where ADCLUS only counts
matches between features that are both 1,48 KHammw counts matches between fea-
tures that are both 1 and 0. (I return to why I use KHammw instead of something
like the ADCLUS kernel shortly.)
This comparison makes clear the relationship between the current question and
more general questions in mathematical cognitive science regarding generalization—
e.g. Shepard’s (1987) exponential law of generalization. The relationship defined
by KHammw is linear in the the distributional features encoded in S. This raises a
possible worry, in that many generalization and discrimination phenomena are best
fit by models that involve exponential decay (see Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2001
for discussion). And indeed, returning to Figure 2.18, it seems this nonlinearity
may be appearing here in the relationship between frame distance and dissimilarity
ratings; it is easier to predict which words are similar if they are nearby in frame
space than if they are far away, and further, the drop-off in predictability appears
47More generally, WeightedHammingSim defines a positive-definite kernel if ‖w‖1 > 0 and a
positive-semidefinite kernel if ‖w‖1 ≥ 0.
48In this way, the ADCLUS kernel is like a feature-weighted version of Tversky’s (1977) Contrast
Model, though there are some other differences in that the Contrast Model is a valid positive
(semi)definite kernel only under specific combinations of weights.
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to be logarithmic. This in turn suggests that there is a need to scale distributional
distances nonlinearly—perhaps, exponentially. The problem is that, unlike the sorts
of cases that Shepard and others consider, the current feature space is discrete,
meaning that most current models of these nonlinearities are inappropriate.
To remedy this, I consider Kondor and Lafferty’s (2002) diffusion kernels on
graphs. As Kondor and Lafferty note, diffusion kernels “can be regarded as the dis-
cretisation of the familiar Gaussian kernel of Euclidean space” and that KHammw (in
its equiweighted variant) underperforms diffusion kernels in categorical prediction
tasks. This latter suggests that these sorts of kernels may be useful in this case as
well, which corresponds to Kondor and Lafferty’s diffusion kernel for the hypercube
(see footnote 45). This is a special case of the diffusion kernel for arbitrary strings
over alphabet A with number of symbols |A|, where WeightedHammingSimw. (I




1 + (|A| − 1) exp[−|A|β]
)WHSw(si,sj)
This gives the elegant characterization for binary alphabets A = {0, 1}. (See








In the following, I consider the four natural choices that this discussion delim-
its: the equiweighted linear model (KHamm1), the weighted linear model KHammw),
the equiweighted diffusion model (KDiff1), and the weighted diffusion model (KDiffw).
For each type of regression, corresponding to each similarity dataset, I fit all four
models and then compare their performance using two metrics that are similar to
WAIC, the metric used to determine a stopping criterion for the non-negative re-
gression model. In the case of the weighted models, w is learned. In the case of
the diffusion models, a second parameter β (akin to a inverse decay parameter in
the general case of nonparametric density estimation) must be set; I also learn this
parameter from the data.
I further place exponential priors—equivalent to L1 regularization—on both
w and β for the relevant models. This simultaneously serves as to bias against the
more complex models, since their MLE estimates might not be the same as their
MAP estimates under this regularization, and it also instantiates a variable selection
procedure.
2.4.3 Multinomial logit mixed model
I use a standard multinomial logit mixed model with a softmax link and subject
random effects, which account for each participant’s implicit bias toward a particular
kind of response. (See Appendix A for details on these components.) The model
was implemented in python using the pymc package and was fit using the Powell
optimization implemented in the scipy optimize module (Jones et al., 2001), which
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attempts to find the the model’s Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate given the
data. For each of the four similarity models, this optimization was repeated 100
times with random initialization and the MAP estimate selected.
2.4.3.1 Model comparison
In Section 2.2, I use WAIC to perform model comparison for the non-negative
projection model. This method is not available to us here because the parameters
were not derived via sampling. I still need a way of trading model fit with model
complexity, however. I thus fall back to model comparison measures that can be
computed using only point estimates. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are two such common measures.49 Table 2.2
shows these model comparison measures, along with the deviance (the log-likelihood
scaled by −2) for each of the four models.
Two generalizations are clear from this table. First, both diffusion kernel
models outperform both linear kernel models on both AIC and BIC. This suggests
that, as in many other areas of cognition, similarity in distributional features decays
exponentially with the distance in feature space. Second, both weighting models
outperform their unweighted counterpart. This suggests that certain distributional
features are more salient than others—a suggestion that is corroborated by the
earlier observation that different judgment tasks may tap different aspects of the
semantics. Given these clear cut results, I focus on only the weighted diffusion
49These measures are less desirable, since they require assumptions about the posterior—namely,
multivariate normality—that may or may not hold. Violation of these assumptions may not be too
problematic, however, given the clear separation between the models’ performance in the current
case.
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Kernel Feature weighting Deviance AIC BIC
Linear None 26103 26469 27825
Linear Weighted 26032 26426 27886
Diffusion None 26069 26437 27800
Diffusion Weighted 25744 26140 27606
Table 2.2: Model comparison measures for multinomial logit mixed model. The
minimum values for AIC and BIC are bolded.
model for the remainder of this subsection.
2.4.3.2 Feature weights
Figure 2.19 shows the weights w learned for the multinomial logit mixed model
with weighted diffusion kernel. (The MAP estimate for β was 0.37.) I see that the
multinomial logit mixed model utilizes three of the very general features from the
non-negative projection model (features 2, 3, and 4), and four of the more specific
features (features 5, 6, 7, and 13). The highest weighted feature (feature 2) is the one
that I pointed out comes closest to the representationality distinction. Interestingly,
the rest of the features—besides feature 13, which corresponds to emotive factivity
but has a small weight—are ones that I pointed out as harder to interpret. This is
interesting in the sense that it is an apparent justification of Fisher et al.’s critique
of beginning with a labelling of verb classes.
2.4.3.3 Frame informativity
Knowing the relative importance of each distributional feature is interesting,
but it tells us little about how a learner might go about accessing those features.
That is, it does not tell us how much discriminative power each frame has for abduc-
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ing the features strongly associated with that frame. To assess this, it is necessary
to find some way of measuring frames’ informativity relative to the weighting on dis-
tributional features presented in the last subsection and the projective relationship
between that distributional feature and that frame, as encoded in P (Figure 2.12 in
Section 2.2). With regard to the projective relationships, two things are important:
(i) strength of the relationship and (ii) relative uniqueness of that relationship. The
first is required for obvious reasons: for a frame to be important it should be im-
portant for an important feature. The second is required because the frame should
not simultaneously be important for two different important features: if a frame is
similarly important for two similarly important features, a verb’s showing up in that
frame helps little in being able to tell which of those two features the verb has.
I thus use a measure that can take into account both strength in particular
projective mappings and inequality50 across projective relationships. The Gini co-
efficient, which measures the unevenness of a distribution, is useful in this case. I
compute two Gini coefficients for each frame: unweighted Gini, computed directly
from the columns of P (the transpose of Figure 2.12); and weighted Gini, computed
by applying the weights w (Figure 2.19) to the columns of P and then performing
the same computation on the rows of the resulting matrix. Unweighted Gini, then,
provides a measure of discriminative power relative just to the distributional charac-
teristics of the data, and weighted Gini provides a measure of discriminative power
relative to the salience of those characteristics as they relate to verbs’ meanings
50Another common term for inequality in this sense is sparsity. See Hurley and Rickard 2009

















Figure 2.19: Feature weights for multinomial logit mixed model with weighted
diffusion kernel. Features correspond to those in Figure 2.11.
(presuming that the similarity judgments are a good proxy for this).
Figure 2.20 shows the results of both computations. The black bars give the
unweighted Gini for a frame and the black+grey bars give the weighted Gini. (The
grey bar thus gives the difference between weighted Gini and unweighted Gini.)
The frames are ordered along the y-axis by their weighted Gini, and so the graph
can be interpreted as follows: if one were trying to learn the semantics of a novel
word and only got to choose a single syntactic context, they should prefer the
syntactic contexts toward the top. For instance, the first six syntactic contexts
involve both NP objects—either on the surface or implicitly through passivization—
and sentential complement, so knowing whether a verb takes an NP object and a
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sentential complement would be quite useful in determining its semantically relevant
distributional features.
One thing this graph does not tell us is how useful combinations of syntactic
contexts are. Note that this is not derivable from the discriminative power of the
syntactic contexts alone, as seen in Figure 2.20, since two different frames may be
projected from very different sets of features. This means that seeing a verb in two
different frames could either make it easier to discriminate the semantically relevant
distributional feature(s) that that verb has—to the extent that the syntactic contexts
intersect on features they project strongly from—or make it harder—to the extent
that the syntactic contexts don’t intersect on features they project strongly from.
To assess the discriminative power of a combination, over and above the syntactic
contexts that constitute that combination, I then must define a way of assessing
the discriminative power of the intersection of features that those syntactic contexts
project from. But how does one measure the intersection when the latent features
and syntactic contexts are associated via continuous values?
To see how to do this, it is useful to first consider how one might do this
if the projective relationships were binary (as the relationship between verbs and
features is). If this were the case, the discriminative power of a single syntactic con-
text might be defined as the inverse of the number of feature it is projected from,
which is maximized when a syntactic context is projected from only one feature.
Intersection for two syntactic contexts could be defined as the latent features both
project from—bitwise and applied to the columns corresponding to the two syntac-
tic contexts—and the discriminative power of the combination could be computed
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from the resulting vector in the same way as it is for single frames. Then, a combina-
tion is useful over and above its constituent syntactic contexts, if the discriminative
power is increased relative to both frames.
In the continuous case, bitwise and is not available, but its natural generaliza-
tion, the Hadamard (pointwise) product, is. The Hadamard product is intuitively
correct for what I aim to do. If two different syntactic contexts project strongly
from some feature, the product of that projection will be large; if only one syntactic
context in a combination projects strongly from some feature and the other, weakly,
then the product will be middling; and if neither syntactic context in a combination
strongly projects, the product will be small. This means that, (i) to the extent that
two syntactic contexts agree on only a subset of each of their projections and (ii)
to the extent that the disagreements are large, the combination adds discriminative
power. To analyze the additional discriminative power that a combination of syn-
tactic contexts adds, I can then compute the Hadamard product of the constituent
contexts projection relationships.
Our aim is to ascertain how predictable this value is from the discriminative
power of the syntactic contexts and how much is due to their interaction. This
can be done by constructing a regression to relate the discriminative power of the
constituent contexts to that of the combination. I then residualize the combination’s
value by that regression’s prediction to get a measure of the combination’s gain in
discriminative power. Because the value of discriminative power is bounded by 0
and 1, I need a regression that assumes a dependent variable on a bounded interval.
Beta regression does the trick here. I regress the combination discriminative power
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NP Ved WH S
NP Ved that S
NP Ved S
NP Ved NP about NP
NP Ved WH to VP
NP Ved if S
NP Ved VP
NP Ved so
NP Ved about NP
NP Ved NP that S
NP Ved NP S
NP Ved VPing
NP Ved to NP that S
NP Ved NP NP
NP Ved there to VP
NP Ved NP
S, I V
NP Ved NP to VP
S, NP Ved
NP Ved for NP to VP
NP Ved
NP Ved it that S
NP Ved to
NP Ved to VP
It Ved NP WH to VP
It Ved NP to VP
NP was Ved to VP
NP was Ved that S
It Ved NP that S
It Ved NP WH S
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Discriminative power (Gini)
Figure 2.20: Unweighted (black) and weighted (black+grey) Gini computed using
feature weights from multinomial logit mixed model with weighted diffusion kernel
(Figure 2.19) and projection principles inferred from non-negative projection model
(Figure 2.12).
(weighted Gini), computed as above, on both of its constituent’s discriminative
powers (after a logistic transformation) and their interaction. I then residualize the
combination discriminative power by the regression predictions. Figure 2.21 shows
these residualized values.
I see a few interesting patterns in these data. First, on the whole most frames
enter into at least some useful interactions, suggesting that all frames have at least
some extra discriminative power in combination with others. Second, some frames
show more gains in discriminative power in combination with nearly all frames,
while others are very selective about the frames they interact with. This tends to
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Figure 2.21: Weighted frame combination Gini residualized by beta regression
on weighted Gini of each frame in combination (full bars in Figure 2.20). Grey
represents a positive residual and orange, a negative.
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pattern with initial discriminative power. For instance, both NP Ved that S and NP
Ved WH S show only non-negative increases in discriminative power in combination
with other frames, though they also have lower discriminative power to begin with.
And frames with higher discriminative power to begin with do not tend to interact
with fewer frames. For instance, NP Ved to VP tends not to show much if any
increase in interaction. (Though interestingly, it does interact positively with both
NP Ved that S and NP Ved WH S.)
To some extent this correlation between initial discriminative power and inter-
activeness is unsurprising, since if a frame is already highly discriminative, there is
less seeing a verb in another frame could do to reduce uncertainty about the features
of that verb. On the other hand, this was the point of looking at the residualized
scores, and indeed, some high informativity frames show large numbers of frames
they interact with. For instance, the top four frames look very much like the bottom
two but for their negative interaction with various low interactivity frames.
2.4.4 Ordinal logit mixed model
I now turn to the ordinal logit mixed model analysis of the ordinal scale data. I
use a standard ordinal logit mixed model with strictly positive cutpoints and subject
random effects, which account for each participant’s implicit bias toward particular
parts of the scale. (The subject random effects model is the same as the response
model described in Section 2.2; see Appendix A for details on this components.)
The model was implemented in python using the pymc package and was fit using
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the Powell optimization implemented in the scipy optimization module, which
attempts to find the model’s MAP estimate given the data. For each of the four
similarity models, this optimization was repeated 100 times with random initializa-
tion and the minimum deviance model selected.
2.4.4.1 Model comparison
As for the multinomial logit mixed model reported above, I use AIC and BIC
for the initial model comparison. Table 2.3 shows the model comparison measures for
each of the four models.51 Similar generalizations hold as in the last section, though
the results are less clear cut. Both the diffusion kernel and weighting improve the
fit in comparison to the unweighted linear model. This improvement is not additive,
however, as can be seen in the fact that the weighted diffusion model only does
slightly better than either the weighted linear model or the unweighted diffusion
model in terms of AIC, and the unweighted diffusion model does far better than
either weighting model in terms of BIC. This contrasts with the finding from last
section that the weighted diffusion model bested both the weighted linear model
and the unweighted diffusion model by a wide margin on both measures.
The reason for this difference could rest on the nature of the task. Likert sim-
ilarity scale tasks require participants to map whatever representation of similarity
they have for a given domain into a discrete scale. Regardless of how this mapping
is done, if similarities decay exponentially with distance and objects are fairly uni-
51Note that the values in Table 2.3 should not be compared to those in Table 2.2 since the
datasets are not the same. The reason the numbers are lower in the current table is that fewer
total datapoints were collected for the likert scale task.
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Kernel Feature weighting Deviance AIC BIC
Linear None 9811 10521 12699
Linear Weighted 9682 10420 12685
Diffusion None 9714 10420 12611
Diffusion Weighted 9678 10418 12689
Table 2.3: Model comparison measures for ordinal logit mixed model. The mini-
mum values for AIC and BIC are bolded.
formly distributed through a space, one would expect most verb-verb pairings to
yield low ratings on the scale. And this is indeed what I find.
But there is a catch. Because participants tend to use the scale differently, one
needs to take into account differences among participants mappings in the analysis.
I did this using an ordinal logit model with participant random effects. This means
that, in fitting the model, the inference algorithm has to simultaneously decide
whether the many low scores seen in the data arose as a consequence of participants
mappings, which could map larger intervals of the latent similarity measure to low
points on the scale than high points, or as a consequence of the similarities them-
selves. This would yield a result wherein the linear model looks better than it should
because the exponential decay in similarity is being explained in the mappings from
similarity to likert scale as opposed to the similarities themselves. That is, the linear
model has a way of mimicking the diffusion model by pushing the explanation into
the response model.
This does not appear to be the case, however. If the linear model were mim-
icking the diffusion model, one would predict the lower ratings to have exponentially
larger interval sizes than the smaller, but in fact, their size is comparable. Across
participants, the interval size for a 1 rating on the likert scale in both the unweighted
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diffusion (median=0.56) and weighted diffusion models (median=0.58) is about the
same as—or even a bit smaller than—the interval sizes in the unweighted linear
(median=0.24) and weighted linear models (median=0.36). And this pattern holds
for the remainder of the likert scale points as well (see Figure A.3 in Appendix A).
In fact, rather than the linear models mimicking the diffusion models, it ap-
pears that the diffusion models are mimicking the linear models. One of the main
differences between the linear and diffusion models is in the distribution of similar-
ities they produce: the diffusion models tend to yield more uneven distributions of
similarities, with many low similarities and few high similarities. In contrast the
linear models tend to spread similarities more evenly. In degenerate cases, however,
the diffusion models can act like the linear models if their inverse decay parameter
is relatively large or if the distances that get exponentiated are very small (below
1). This appears to be what is happening here.
In the multinomial logit mixed models, both diffusion models showed much
more uneven similarities (Gini=0.30 [unweighted diffusion], 0.46 [weighted diffu-
sion]) than their linear counterparts (Gini=0.11 [unweighted linear], 0.17 [weighted
linear]). In contrast, in the current models, both diffusion models show similar
uneveness in their similarities (Gini=0.01 [unweighted diffusion], 0.14 [weighted dif-
fusion]) than their linear counterparts (Gini=0.11 [unweighted linear], 0.15 [weighted
linear]). This appears to be driven by a large inverse decay value in the unweighted
diffusion model (β = 2.81), where distances cannot be below 1, and small distances
in the unweighted diffusion model, which arise as a consequence of small feature

















Figure 2.22: Feature weights for ordinal logit mixed model with weighted linear
kernel.
measure in the diffusion model match exactly those in the linear model, suggesting
that these two models are doing essentially the same thing. For the remainder of
this section, then, I analyze the weighted linear model.
2.4.4.2 Feature weights
Figure 2.22 shows the weights w learned for the ordinal logit mixed model
with weighted diffusion kernel. The features with non-negligible weights in the
ordinal logit mixed model are a subset of those that have non-negligible weights for
the multinomial mixed model. This again suggests that the generalized semantic
discrimination task and the ordinal scale task pick up on similar things aspects of
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the meaning. It also suggests that, whatever each is picking up on, the multinomial
logit model picks up on more distributionally relevant aspects of it.
2.4.4.3 Frame informativity
As with the multinomial logit model, I measure frame informativity in terms
of that frames unweighted and weighted Gini index relative to w (Figure 2.22) and
P (Figure 2.12 in Section 2.2). Figure 2.23 shows the results of these computations.
I again focus on weighted Gini and change in rank between unweighted and weighted
Gini.
On the whole, the most discriminative frames have less discriminative power
than in the multinomial logit mixed model, though the worst have no less. This
may be due to the fact that the feature weights are much more even in this case
than the last. With regard to specific frames, here again, I find many of the NP
object frames have high discriminative power. (This may also be why the expletive
object frame NP Ved it that S is so discriminative.) Interestingly, the NP V S and
S, I V frames show up higher than in the multinomial logit mixed model, though
this may have to do with the fact that all frames are closer in discriminative power
overall, and thus small changes can change rank.
Figure 2.24 shows data for the ordinal logit mixed model analogous to that
found in Figure 2.24 for the multinomial logit mixed model. In this case, there is a
much different overall pattern of results, where overall the increases in discriminative
power are low, and they are spread out across frames. This contrasts with the
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Discriminative power
Figure 2.23: Unweighted (black) and weighted (black+grey) Gini computed using
feature weights from ordinal logit mixed model with weighted linear kernel (Figure
2.22) and projection principles inferred from non-negative projection model (Figure
2.12).
previous situation, where certain frames had, in a certain sense, maxed out on their
discriminative power in such a way that combining them with others would not
result in better discrimination. This situation mirrors that seen in Figure 2.23 in
that no frames really outperform any others to a great extent.
2.4.5 Discussion
In this section, I explored various ways of quantifying the relationship between
the acceptability judgments presented in Section 2.2 and the semantic similarity
judgements presented in Section 2.3. First, following Fisher et al., I assessed the
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Figure 2.24: Weighted frame combination Gini residualized by beta regression
on weighted Gini of each frame in combination (full bars in Figure 2.20). Grey
represents a positive residual and orange, a negative.
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Second, in order to discover more fine-grained relationships, I map from the





I began with the basic correlational analyses. These analyses were carried out
by defining a distance measure between verbs based on X (the “raw” data) as well
as one on S. In both cases, I found significant correlations with distances derived
from both of the similarity datasets Y. In the case of both the distance on X and
the distances on S, these correlations were of roughly the same size.
I then moved into more sophisticated analyses that allow us to delve into
the relationship between the distributional regularities extracted using the non-
negative projection model and the similarity judgments directly. I presented two
such analyses. The first assessed how best to model participants’ perception of
semantic similarity relative to the distributional features and the salience of those
features. For the generalized semantic discrimination task, a model that assumes
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exponential decay in similarity (the diffusion kernel) outperforms one that assumes
linear decay. For the ordinal scale task, the linear decay model wins out. I suggested
that this may be related to the way participants make semantic discrimination
judgments v. direct semantic similarity judgments.
The second analysis used the model fits that resulted from the first analysis
to assess how useful different syntactic contexts could plausibly be for a learner in
discriminating the semantically relevant distinctions. I found that two of the gen-
eral features (features 2 and 3) and one specific feature (feature 6) showed up as
important in both analyses. These were also the only features that were assigned
non-negligible weights in the ordinal logit mixed model, while in contrast the multi-
nomial logit mixed model utlized these features plus another general one (feature
4) and three other specific ones (features 5, 7, and 13). This may suggest that
the generalized semantic discrimination responses are derived more directly from C
than the ordinal responses.
2.5 General discussion
In this chapter, I presented experiments aimed at quantitatively assessing how
much information about propositional attitude verbs’ meaning lies in their com-
petence distribution. I showed that the measure of syntactic distribution and the
measure of semantics extracted from these experiments are significantly correlated.
In analyzing the data from these experiments I developed a computational model,
based on the linguist’s notion of projection, which extracts features from the compe-
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tences distribution proxy collected in this experiment. I then analyzed these features
both qualitatively and quantitatively to assess their relationship to previous propos-
als about the relationship betwen syntax and semantics in the attitude verb domain,
finding that in large part those previous proposals are corroborated. In the next
chapter, I turn to the question of whether one finds the same amount of semantic
information present in performance distribution as well.
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Chapter 3: A computational model of syntactic bootstrapping
In Chapter 2, I show that syntactic distribution, as proxied by acceptabil-
ity judgments, goes quite far in predicting the fine-grained properties of a word’s
semantics, as proxied by semantic similarity judgments. As discussed in the last
chapter, acceptability judgments are one of the most direct measures available of
what I have been calling the competence distribution of a word. This direct mea-
sure, however, is not necessarily representative of the sort of data learners have
access to in verb-learning; rather, they have access to what I have been calling
performance distributions—e.g. cooccurrence counts between verbs and subcatego-
rization frames. With this in mind, the first goal of this chapter is to show that
similar levels of semantic information lie in the kinds of performance distributions
that learners plausibly have access to at the same time as presenting a model that
takes advantage of this information.
To assess the semantic information that lies in these performance distribu-
tions, I adapt the nonnegative projection model proposed in Chapter 2, which was
applied to acceptability judgment data, to verb-subcategorization frame counts from
a corpus. This can be done quite straightforwardly due to the modular nature of
this model: at a high level, the response model used for the acceptability judgments
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need merely be replaced with a count model. The resulting model can be con-
ceived of on two levels: on the first level, it generates competence distributions (the
sorts of syntactic structures a verb is good with) by projecting semantic features
into a distribution space using the projection rules. Then, from these competence
distributions, it generates performance distributions (the sorts of syntactic struc-
tures a verb occurs with) by sampling verb-frame pairs according to the competence
distributions.
I propose that this model abstractly characterizes the syntactic bootstrapping
process, and on analogy with the nonnegative projection model proposed in the
last section, I call this model the nonnegative syntactic bootstrapping model. This
model is, in many ways, the midway point between two types of models of learning
semantics from syntactic distribution. On the one hand are category-based models
of semantic representation, which tend to be founded in probabilistic approaches to
semantic representation like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA Blei et al., 2003); and
on the other hand are vector space models of semantic representation, which tend
to be founded broadly in matrix factorization techniques such as Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) like Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA Deerwester et al., 1990)
and, more recently, neural embedding models like skip-gram with negative sampling
model (Mikolov et al., 2013). I refer to these latter sorts of models as feature-based
models for reasons that become clear.1
The chapter begins in Section 3.1 with a review of previous models, both prob-
1This is, by necessity, a rough characterization, since at a higher level, the goal of both general
approaches is to factor the observed data into some representations involving latent objects (cat-
egories or features), and thus they have similarities. But the sorts of representations each traffics
in is distinct enough to warrant discussion.
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abilistic and vector space, that learn word-meaning representations from syntactic
distribution. The upshot of this discussion is to motivate the need for a midway
point between the representational freedom of vector space models, which can result
in hard-to-interpret features—cf. the discussion of PCA in Chapter 2—and the sorts
of representations that common category-based probabilistic models produce, which
tend to be easier to interpret but which I show have other undesirable properties
from the point of view of semantic representation.
The particular undesirable property I focus on is the fact that these represen-
tations are what I refer to as globally normalized and thus don’t allow us to naturally
represent words that may have multiple features simultaneously. In Section 3.1.1, I
discuss this normalization property at length, showing that it can be converted into
a sort of representation I refer to as locally normalized, arguing that this represen-
tation does not fall prey to the interpretability issues inherent in the vector space
models. I then suggest that the conversion process itself is of interest because it
shows a deep connection between the category view of word-meaning and a feature
view of word-meaning. The upshot of this suggestion is that normalized represen-
tations can be fruitfully thought of as topological in nature and the unnormalized
representations can be thought of as logical in nature.
In Section 3.2, I present the nonnegative syntactic bootstrapping model, which
incorporates the desirable features of both the vector space models and the proba-
bilistic models discussed in the previous two sections. This model utilizes the same
nonnegative projection model employed in the previous chapter, but it replaces the
response model used there with a model of counts. I show that the features that this
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model induces correlate with the similarity judgments presented in the last chapter
to approximately the same extent as the acceptability judgments in the last chapter.
The upshot of this—the main result of this chapter—is that syntactic distributions
in corpora—performance distributions—carry a significant amount of fine-grained
information about attitude verb syntax.
In Section 3.4, I conclude by showing how to build an incremental learning
algorithm for this model.
3.1 Computational models and syntactic distribution
Computational models of word-meaning induction from syntactic distribution
tend to fall into two main classes: category-based models that attempt to induce
verb classes from syntactic distributions culled from corpus counts (LDA and related
models) and vector space models that attempt to induce spatial representations from
these corpus counts (LSA-based models and neural embedding models). I begin
with a review of work within both domains, focusing in particular on the sorts of
representations they traffic in.
3.1.1 Category models
3.1.1.1 Prior approaches
Category-based models, which might involve either hard or soft-clustering ap-
proaches, tend to find their inspiration in Levin’s (1993) now classic handbook as
well as various resources that derive at least partially from it. One of the more
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straightforward approaches within the category-based frameworks is exemplified by
Schulte im Walde and Brew 2002; Schulte im Walde 2003, 2006.2 Schulte im Walde’s
approach was to estimate the parameter of a multinomial distribution over frames
for each verb (with additive smoothing λ = 0.5), then apply k-means clustering with
various distance metrics (Manhattan distance, Euclidean distance, KL divergence,
information radius, skew divergence, and cosine distance) and various values of k.
Choice of optimal k was based on optimizing two indices of agreement with a gold-
standard categorization. Thus, under this approach verbs are viewed as falling into
distinct hard clusters.
Other approaches make similar assumptions but utilize slightly different meth-
ods. For instance, Stevenson and Merlo (1999) and Merlo and Stevenson (2001)
were interested in whether grammatical features that constitute subcategorization
frames—e.g. active v. passive—could be used to discover a fixed set of three pre-
defined classes. To do this, they utilized both an unsupervised method, hierarchical
clustering converted to a flat hard clustering like that produced by k-means, as well
as a supervised method, decisions trees trained on the gold standard classes (see
also White et al. 2014 for a similar approach focused on the fine-grained semantics
of propositional attitude verbs). Stevenson and Joanis (2003) extend this method-
ology with a semi-supervised approach to feature selection. Simalar to Stevenson
and Merlo’s hierarchical clustering approach, Schulte im Walde (2000) used a rela-
tive entropy-based hierarchical clustering and well as a generative latent class model
2Each of these papers present slightly different analyses while keeping the general approach
roughly the same. Schulte im Walde 2006 presents perhaps the most comprehensive set of analyses;
this discussion is based on that paper.
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proposed in Rooth 1995.
More recent approaches eschew hard clusters for soft clusters. That is, instead
of representing a word as belonging to a single category, the word’s representation
is fundamentally associated with a discrete distribution over some number of cate-
gories (possibly an unbounded number). One common method for performing this
soft clustering is to employ probabilistic methods originally designed for document
classification. Perhaps the most popular current framework for carrying this out
is that of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA; Blei et al., 2003) and related models
that employ priors that allow the number of latent categories to vary, such as the
Hierarchical Dirichlet Process (HDP; Teh et al., 2006). Because it is useful for the
sake of grounding discussion, I give the generative story for the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) model (Blei et al., 2003), since it forms the core of many lexical
representation models. For convenience, I convert the common document speak into
word speak, where V is the number of words to represent—i.e. soft cluster—and
F is the number of possible contextual features (cooccurring words, cooccurring
structures, etc.).
In this model, verbs are associated with discrete distributions over categories—
sometimes referred to as topics in reference to this model’s document classifica-
tion origins—parameterized by a multinomial/categorical parameter θi of length K,
where (K + 1) is the total number of categories. These categories are in turn as-
sociated with a multinomial/categorical distribution over, e.g., possible contextual
features (words, strings, syntactic structures, etc.) of a word. The LDA generative
story is quite simple.
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1: for word category k in 1 : K do
2: Choose a distribution over contextual features φk ∼ Dirichlet(β1K)
3: end for
4: for word i in 1 : V do
5: Choose a distribution over word categories θi ∼ Dirichlet(α1K)
6: for occurrence j in 1 : ni do
7: Choose a category sij ∼ Categorical(θi)









Figure 3.1: Plate diagram for Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
Griffiths et al. (2007) propose using this sort of approach for word-word cooc-
currences, where a word’s semantic representation is discovered by associating each
of K categories with a distribution over words, and each word is associated with a
distribution over theK categories.3 Building on work in the computational literature
on selectional preferences (cf. Resnik, 1996; Ritter and Etzioni, 2010; Ó Séaghdha,
3Griffiths et al. also briefly consider some alternative model structures, but for current purposes,
I focus on the simpler model, since the more complex models represent meanings themselves in
the same way.
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2010), Ó Séaghdha and Korhonen (2014) propose various models that take into ac-
count both the words that a particular word occurs with as well as the syntactic
relationships those cooccurring words have to the word of interest.4
Vlachos et al. (2008, 2009) construct a similar model with a nonparametric
prior that infers verb representations from verb-subcategorization frame cooccur-
rences. In the same vein as Vlachos et al., Alishahi and Stevenson (2008) present a
model that learns subcategorization frames as distributions over syntactic features,
constructions as distributions over subcategorization frames, and verbs as distribu-
tions over constructions (see also Barak et al. 2013, 2014b,a, which utilize the same
model and focus on very coarse-grained attitude verb classes). The impetus for this
extra construction level in Alishahi and Stevenson’s case is to capture some notion of
semantic structure underlying multiple frames (Jackendoff, 1990; Goldberg, 1995).
A similar idea drives Lewis and Steedman’s (2013) approach. Lewis and Steed-
man use the output of a Combinatorial Categorial Grammar parser to induce types
using a k-nearest neighbors style clustering analysis. They then apply vanilla LDA
to verb-type cooccurrence counts, representing verbs as distributions over categories
that are in turn associated with distributions over types.
3.1.1.2 Representational assumptions
The representational assumption that these approaches all have in common
is what I refer to as the global normalization property: the representation of a
4See also Gormley et al. 2012, who augment the vanilla topic model of selectional restrictions to
discover a low dimensional representation of the properties that categories are constructed from.
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word’s semantics must sum to 1.5 The hard clustering models trivially assume this,
since they assume that the verb representation is given by a single category. This
can be thought of as a one-hot vector representation, with zeros in all positions
besides that corresponding to a particular category. This view seems problematic,
at least for encoding propositional attitude verb semantics for reasons discussed
extensively in Chapters 1 and 2: propositional attitude verbs’ meanings are multi-
faceted. Want and hope share a property (preferentiality), but so do think and hope
(representationality).
One way to get around this problem is, of course, to multiply the number of
categories so that, e.g., one category encodes nonfactive belief verbs (think), one
encodes factive belief verbs (know), one encodes nonfactive nonbelief verbs (want),
and another encodes factive nonbelief verbs (love). But this clearly misses a general-
ization that, e.g., think (a representational nonfactive) and know (a representational
factive) cross-classify to the exclusion of want (a preferential nonfactive) and love
(a preferential factive). Indeed, in the limit, this leaves every verb in a separate
category.6
The soft clustering models—e.g. LDA—provide more representational free-
dom, which at least partially fixes this problem by assuming that a particular verb
may be associated with multiple categories. The caveat to this freedom is that,
5The hierarchical clustering approach is something of an exception to this, at least in principle.
In practice, however, the hierarchy is cut at a certain threshold to create mutually exclusive
categories, resulting in the same sort of representation produced by hard clustering models like
k-means. Thus, it falls under this generalization.
6Of course, the whole question of this dissertation is essentially where this limit is, and it seems
unlikely that, as a matter of syntactic distribution, a learner would ever have enough evidence to
place each verb in its own category.
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on any particular occurrence of the verb, that occurrence falls into a particular
category. This is problematic in a sense related to the problematic aspect of the
hard clustering approach: many verbs seem to retain the same semantic features on
each occurrence, and so modeling them as though each occurrence is the product
of a different category seems incorrect. For instance, on each occurrence of hope,
the speaker is presumably committed to both the desire entailment and the belief
entailment.
This is not to say that one or the other component might not be foregrounded
on a particular use; indeed, it seems quite likely that on any one use, either the
belief or preference component is foregrounded. But regardless of this presumably
pragmatic foregrounding effect, both entailments remain. For instance, the belief
component seems foreground in (1b) since B presumably means to convey that she
believes its possible that John went to the store—or perhaps merely that it’s possible
that he did.
(1) A: Did John go to the store?
B: I hope he did.
But even with this foregrounding, the desire component does not go away: B in (1)
is still committed to all wanting it to be the case that John went to the store. For
instance, she cannot follow up with (2) and not contradict herself.
(2) B: ...but I don’t want him to have.
Thus, this is very different from a case of polysemy—where the word might shift
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between (possibly systematically) related meanings, and thus be amenable to a
univocal semantic description, but nonetheless has only one particular meaning,
with particular entailments, on a particular use. For instance, (3) might have an
aperture reading or an obstruction reading.
(3) The ghost went through the door.
And perhaps the event being described could be described by both expressions. But
no one would argue that the aperture reading—with its entailment that the ghost
move through the door frame—also has the obstruction entailment—that the ghost
also passed through the door filling that doorframe. This can be seen in the fact that
(3) can truly describe a scene in which the ghost passes through an open door frame.
This suggests that hope is not really the same sort of beast as the standard polysemy
examples. It really does require a description incorporating both components of its
meaning.
The question then becomes: why should both components not determine cooc-
curring words, structures, etc. on each occurrence? One common tack is to ignore
how the model itself views the representation—as a probability of a category on a
particular occurrence—and try to treat the distribution associated with each word
as something like encoding weights between particular words and its features. This
gives rise to a representation that, unlike the one-hot hard clustering representation,
can be viewed as encoding a word’s multiple features simultaneously.
I think this view is reasonable but not in its barest form. Recall the example of
think, want, hope. Suppose we encode these three verbs using two categories/features—
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representationality and preferentiality—which we can represent as a two-element
vector. The vector associated with think might be (0, 1), whereas the vector for
want might be (1, 0). But what about the vector for hope? Ideally, it would encode
an equal relationship between representationality and preferentiality. But since each
verb’s representation is, at base, a distribution over categories, and one category is
sampled on each occurrence of a verb, the verb’s category/feature relationships
must sum to one. This means that the only way to encode an equal relationship
between hope and both representationality and preferentiality is to associate hope
with the vector (0.5, 0.5). In turn, this means that a verb’s relationship to its
categories/features cannot be interpreted on its own but only relative to the entire
representation.
The reason why this problem arises has to do with the fact that the simplex
representation encodes not only the strength of the relationship between a word and
a feature but also information about how likely that relationship is to manifest itself.
But these two properties seem separable. The relationship between a word and a
component of its meaning seems more essential than the likelihood of observing that
component’s effects. How, then, does one derive the “true” relationship between a
word i and feature k from θi? One possibility is to loosen the restriction that the
representation be globally normalized.
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3.1.2 Vector space models
In the last section, I noted that many category-based models, both hard clus-
tering and soft clustering models, constrain their representations of verb semantics
to be globally normalized. I then suggested that these globally normalized represen-
tations were not intuitive as featural representations, which is seemingly what one
needs to represent the multi-faceted nature of propositional attitude verbs. In this
section, I consider a semantic representation that does not fall prey to the problems
inherent to globally normalized representations.
There are a broad range of vector space models to semantics. The general ap-
proach to semantic representation in these models is to view words as points in some
space of observable features. For instance, in the case relevant to this dissertation,
one might conceive of verbs as lying in some space whose dimensions correspond to
subcategorization frames and whose values correspond to some relationship between
the verbs and the frame—e.g. cooccurrence count, term frequency-inverse document
frequency (tf-idf), pointwise mutual information (PMI), etc. Any sort of observable
feature is possible as a dimension. (The same is of course true of the category-based
models, as discussed in the last section.)
One touchstone case of these vector space models is that arising from the La-
tent Semantic Analysis/Indexing (LSA/LSI) literature (Deerwester et al., 1990). As
is true of LDA (discussed briefly above), LSA’s original application was to document
representation, but by replacing documents with words, LSA provides a natural way
of representing words (Landauer and Dumais, 1997). Assuming the spatial view of
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words, the idea behind LSA—an idea which recurs throughout this section—is that
learning a semantic representation consists in factoring a matrix encoding the spatial
position of each word within the observable dimensions into two distinct matrices:
one that represents the relationship between a verb and various latent features or
components of that verb (the score matrix) and another that represents the rela-
tionship between the latent features and the observed features (the loading matrix).
The particular way that LSA does this is known as Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD). This method underlies the algorithms that compute Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), as used in the last chapter.
As noted in Chapter 2, one nice aspect of this sort of model is that it naturally
encodes the notion of projection from semantic features to syntactic distribution:
semantics-to-syntax projection is projection from one vector space (the semantics)
to another (the syntax).7 One problem with this sort of approach is that, left
unconstrained as in the case of LSA, it results in feature values that are hard to
interpret even if the features themselves correspond to a clear semantic class.
As noted in Chapter 2, one remedy for this—the one employed in that chapter—
is to enforce non-negativity and sparsity and to employ unit- or binary-valued fea-
tures. The first two of these are also employed in Murphy et al. 2012; Fyshe et al.
2014, 2015, though the last is not.
This general spatial meaning approach has been extended rapidly in recent
years. It has been put to particularly common use within the deep learning litera-
7In fact, it is a misnomer to call this projection in the second case, since the mapping in question
is not an endomorphism.
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ture. One model popular for inducing word representation is that given in Mikolov
et al. (2013), who present their skip-gram with negative sampling model (cf. Rumel-
hart et al. 1986 for an early example of this sort of model; see also Bengio et al. 2006;
Collobert and Weston 2008). Roughly, this model attempts to learn representations
in some real-valued space that can be used to predict words on either side of that
word. Like standard LSA models, these neural word embedding models appear to be
performing a sort of implicit matrix factorization, which Levy and Goldberg (2014b)
argue is based on a variant of a matrix containing the point-wise mutual informa-
tion between objects (e.g. verbs) and observable features (e.g. subcategorization
frames).
Levy and Goldberg (2014a) note that these representations, often called neural
word-embeddings “are considered opaque, in the sense that it is hard to assign
meanings to the dimensions of the induced representation.” (p. 303) and they give
a similar method that uses the same notion of predicting context, but instead of
predicting string-adjacent words, their model predicts adjacent adjacent words in a
dependency parse. They note that, whereas the string adjacent version produces
“broad topical similarities...the dependency-based contexts yield more functional
similarities of a cohyponym nature.”
It is useful, however, to separate interpretability of a dimension itself and in-
terpetability of a value along that dimension. In the last chapter’s section on PCA,
I showed several cases in which the component of the meaning that a particular di-
mensions was sensitive to was at least somewhat clear. For instance, it appeared that
PCA discovered meaning features like representationality, preferentiality, factivity,
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and communicativity. But the relative position of words along these dimensions was
uninterpretable.
This arises because the feature values can fall anywhere in (−∞,∞) on the
reals. This problematic aspect was noted in the last chapter in the discussion of
PCA. For instance, what does it mean to be negative on a feature? Should that be
interpreted as not having the feature? And what does it mean for a particular verb
to a value, e.g., four times greater than another verb, but in the same direction? It’s
always possible to pass individual real values through a normalizing (or “squashing”)
function—for example, the standard logistic function—but unless that value itself
is passed through that function as a part of whatever objective was used to fit the
model, it is unclear what the interpretation of that operation should be.8
For this reason, this sort of value is very different from the globally normal-
ized representations discussed in the last section, in that the value of one feature
does not affect the values of the others. In this sense, these representations are
unnormalized, since nor constraint applies to their sum. But for this same reason,
this sort of representation is more powerful, since a verb is free to be related to
a particular feature to an extent independent of its relationship to other featues.9
The problem is that it leaves the feature values themselves uninterpretable without
further constraint. Interpretability of both the feature itself and its value are im-
portant, though. If a learner’s job is to discover features of a word’s meaning such
as representationality and preferentiality, which themselves are seemingly symbolic,
8Note that it is the dot product of two vectors and not their values that is passed through a
logistic in a model Mikolov et al.’s model.
9I do not mean to say that this representation is necessarily more expressive, however.
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then it is a prerequisite to have a value that itself can be interpreted symbolically.
This is one of the main benefits of the category-based approach; the categories
that verbs are associated with can be interpreted symbolically yet the representation
itself encodes uncertainty about which aspect of the meaning is relevant on any one
occurrence of the word. The problem, noted in Chapter 2, is that some words seem
to have multiple components of their meaning on each occurrence. This is intimately
related to the normalization property discussed briefly in the last section. In the next
section, I present a model that can incorporates the benefits of the category-based
model while not requiring such constrained representations.
3.2 The model
The current model is the same as the model in Chapter 2 in terms of the priors
on S and P. In that chapter, I utilize a prior over the distributional regularities
S with a finite number of features K, fitting the model with various K and then
perform model comparison.10
πk | α, β ∼ Beta(α, β)
sik | πk ∼ Bernoulli(πk)
I further retain the previous chapter’s exponential prior on P. This prior
10I have also implemented a nonparametric version using the Indian Buffet Process prior (Grif-
fiths and Ghahramani, 2006, 2011), but as in Chapter 2, only the parametric version is tested
here.
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induces sparsity in the same way as an L1 regularizer.11
bkj | λ ∼ Exponential(λ)
Where the current model diverges from the previous chapter is in the form
of D (the representation of the competence distribution) and X (the acceptability
judgment data). In that chapter, D is a deterministic product of S and P. This D is
then “passed through” an ordinal response model, whereby larger dij get mapped to
distributions with more mass over higher scale points (denoting higher acceptability
of a verb with a particular syntactic context). Because P (the projection rules) is
non-negative real-valued, D is also non-negative real-valued. Indeed, this would also
be possible in the current setup, since counts are also non-negative real-valued and
thus, X (now, the counts) could be thought of as a product of adding some sort of
noise to D.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it produces a represen-
tation of the competence distribution that is too sensitive to the relative counts
found in the corpus unless some sort of frequency damping model is employed (cf.
Goldwater et al. 2011). This seems right for representing performance distributions,
but not competence distributions, which I argued in the last section, should involve
something more like a unit interval representation.
11Indeed, an Exponential(λ) prior is equivalent to an L1 regularizer with weight λ. In the
more general case of real-valued parameters—i.e. not non-negative parameters as in this case—the
equivalent of L1 regularization in a Bayesian context is a Laplace prior. But if x ∼ Laplace(λ),
then |x| ∼ Exponential(λ).
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This suggests that a model that conditions its learning of competence distri-
butions on performance (count) distributions must have some way of representing
the competence distributions that factors out the relative counts. But if D were
represented as in the last chapter—as non-negative real-valued—D would retain
some residue of the empirical distributions and thus would not be a good candidate
for a competence distribution representation.
To remedy this, I pass SP through a Beta distribution to produce a distribu-
tion over D with support only on the unit interval. As I will see, this boundedness
forces the model to explain the count aspects of the empirical distributions in some
other way.
dij | S,P ∼ Beta([SP]ij, 1)
In the current model, the way that the model is forced to explain the count
data is via an auxiliary (nuisance) variable g. This variable can be thought of as
encoding, in gi, the relative prevalence of verb i. The count of verb i with syntactic
context j, xij, is then modeled as a draw from a Poisson distribution with parameter
gidij.
gi | γ, δ ∼ Gamma(γ, δ)
xij | gi, dij ∼ Poisson(gidij)
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One metaphor for thinking about this component is that each word i is associ-
ated with a “potential energy” gi and each syntactic context j associated with that
word “gets” up to that much energy. The proportion that each context actually
uses of the energy it could use is encoded in dij. If one knew both gi and dij for a
word i and syntactic context j, they would then expect to see those two together
on average gidij times.
The energy in this metaphor corresponds quite directly to a word’s overall
count. Since poisson distributions can be compounded, gi
∑
j dij gives the expected
number of occurrences of word i. This means that, though the overall distribution
of proportions dij matter for the counts, they themselves are not constrained by
having to explain counts in the same way as, e.g., a globally normalized simplex
representation (multinomial parameter), since each can take on a value in (0, 1).
As I show shortly, this layout has two benefits beyond the theoretical one just
discussed: first, g can be completely collapsed in inference due to a conditional
conjugacy; second, because of this collapse, xij is distributed as a three parameter
version of the two parameter Negative Binomial (the poisson-gamma mixture dis-
tribution), which is known to describe empirical (count) distributions in language
well (Church and Gale, 1995).
Figure 3.2 gives the plate diagram for the above model. The generative story
is given by:
1: for feature k in 1 : K do










Figure 3.2: Plate diagram for non-negative projection model.
3: for verb i in 1 : V do
4: Choose a feature value sik ∼ Bernoulli(πk)
5: end for
6: for syntactic context j in 1 : F do
7: Choose a projection strength bkj ∼ Exponential(λ)
8: end for
9: end for
10: for verb i in 1 : V do
11: Choose a verb prevalence gi ∼ Gamma(γ, δ)
12: for syntactic context j in 1 : F do
13: Choose a competence distribution strength dij ∼ Beta([SP]ij, 1)





In this section, I focus on two pieces of the inference equations for a learner that
computes the posterior over latent verb features S, projection rules P, and compe-
tence distributions D given counts X—that is, a learner that computes P(S,P,D | X; Ψ),
where Ψ = {α, β, λ, γ, δ}, by “reversing” the above generative story. The particular
pieces I focus on are the likelihood P(X | D; γ, δ) and the posterior on P(D | S,P).
I provide the full equations necessary for constructing a Gibbs sampler as well as
the gradients necessary for conducting Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation
over the continuous matrices in Appendix B.
Note that g does not occur in the above probability functions. Since the goal
is a model of word-learning, g is not particularly interesting in that it encodes count
information that one needs to control for but which is only partially related to the
representations of interest S and P. In the next section, I show how it is possible
to compute the above posterior without explicitly finding a probability distribution
over g. This is possible due to a useful conditional conjugacy.
3.2.1.1 A useful conditional conjugacy
It is well-known that the gamma distribution is a conjugate prior of the poisson
distribution. A less well-known, but related, conjugacy arises from the product dis-
tribution constructed from a gamma random variable and another random variable
independent of the gamma. This product distribution is conditionally conjugate to
the poisson with respect to the gamma distribution. This can be taken advantage
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of to analytically integrate out g.








dg P(X | g,D)P(g; γ, δ)
Let us focus for the moment on the integral, since this is where the conditional
conjugacy becomes important. First, note that, if d is an arbitrary positive random
variable with parameters α, β, g ∼ Gamma(γ, δ), x ∼ Poisson(gd), and g ⊥ d then




dg P(g, d, x; a, b, γ, δ)
= P(d; a, b)
∫
R+
dg P(x | g, x)P(g; γ, δ)
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This yields the same form as our model, whereby the posterior is the product
of the prior over d and the integral over g. Since this will come up later, note also
that this integral is equivalent to the likelihood of d, P(x | d; γ, δ). This integral is
quite easily solved analytically using the standard conjugacy technique.
∫
R+


























Note that the normalizing constant in the above equation is just that of a
negative binomial distribution. Indeed, the previous equation just the PMF of a
negative binomial distribution with the parameterization NegativeBinomial(γ, d
d+δ
).
This distribution gives the distribution over number of successes before γ failures
in a series of bernoulli trials with probability d
d+δ
of success. One can think of a
success here as seeing a particular syntactic context.
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For current purposes, let us assume that d ∈ (0, 1), since in the model it is
beta distributed and thus has support only on (0, 1). Figure 3.3 shows the PDF for
this likelihood at various values of x and δ and γ set to 1—that is, in which
What can be seen here is that, for small δ, one needs a quite large x to conclude
that d is near 1. But as δ gets larger, the probability of d being near one rises quickly
for any count. This has to do with the fact that, as δ goes to 0, the quantity d
d+δ
,
the probability of success in the negative binomial, is close to 1 regardless of the
value of d, and so we expect many successes—i.e. a large x—before a failure. On
the other hand, as δ gets larger, d
d+δ
gets smaller and smaller regardless of the value
of d, since it is bounded at 1, and so the larger the count, the more the likelihood
will prefer d near one.
This is interesting, but the existence of this conjugacy alone does not imply
anything about the more complex situation present in the above model, in which
there are multiple dij for any one verb. All xij are dependent on a single unobserved
gi, which one would like to integrate out. But this dependency could cause problems
that do not arise in the simple case. It turns out, however, that due to certain
properties of the Poisson PMF, we can take advantage of the conjugacy above.
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This looks a good deal more complicated than the previous, but in the simple
case where P(dmn | X,D−(mn); γ, δ) is desired (as in Gibbs sampling), it simplifies
somewhat to.
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)γ+∑Fj=1 xij P(dmn | S,P; γ, δ)
where P(dmn | S,P; γ, δ) is the prior on dmn.
The major difference between this equation and the simpler one I began the
section with is that, instead of being divided by only (dmn+δ)
xmn+γ, dxmnmn is divided
by the sum of all dm. One interesting thing to note about this is that it penalizes
dmn that are too low relative to the size of xmn, but it does nothing to penalize dmn
that are high with respect to the relative size of xmn. This is to say that, as far as the
likelihood is concerned, it is worse to predict that an object does not have a feature
when it does than to predict that it does, when it actually doesn’t. This is not to
say that there is no pressure to push the probability of unseen object-feature pairs
down; just that that pressure is spread out across the matrix—or more specifically,
the row corresponding to a particular verb.
How this pressure gets distributed is to some extent controlled by the prior, as
I show in the next section. Thus, in a certain sense, the model is only using positive
evidence—rewarding high probability instances and not punishing low probability
instances. This allows the model to learn a verb’s distribution—particularly a low
frequency one—by making inductive hypotheses based on higher frequency verbs.
This in turn results in high frequency verbs “sucking” low frequency verbs closer to
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their distribution.
This has a second benefit relative to the results reported in the last chapter.
There, I noted that being close in distribution was predictive of being close semanti-
cally (according to the semantic similarity judgments), but that being far away was
not. This model implements this in terms of competence distributions, since if need
be, it can allow one verb’s distribution to assimilate to another’s without too much
penalty, especially of the assimilating verb is low frequency. In the next section, I
show how the beta prior I place on the dij can further take advantage of this for the
purpose of feature induction.
3.2.2 Factor analysis-based smoothing
The prior on D has the following form.




































For a particular dmn, this simplifies to the following.
P(dmn | S,P) = [SP]ijd
[SP]ij−1
ij
When combined with the likelihood term of the posterior P(dmn | X,D−(mn),S,P; γ, δ),
the following is obtained.








Thus, as before, this equations penalizes dmn that are too low relative to the
size of xmn, but it does nothing to penalize dmn that are high with respect to the
relative size of xmn. That is, it is still worse to predict that an object does not have
a feature when it does than to predict that it does, when it actually doesn’t.
Nonetheless, there is still a pressure coming from the denominator not to
overpredict dmn near 1. The addition of the prior modulates this pressure by (i)
adding what amounts to a pseudocount (as in standard LDA) and (ii) scaling the
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entire likelihood by the size of the projection strength [SP]mn, which in turn is
related to verb m’s features via the projection rules. Thus, the influence of the
features and projection rules is felt in the form of a redistribution of pressure across
dm not to overpredict particular dmn, based on the particular features a verb has.
In the next section, I report on an experiment that deploys this model of syntactic
bootstrapping on actual data.
3.3 Experiment
In this section, I report on an experiment that fits the model of syntactic
bootstrapping proposed in the last section to subcategorization frame distributions
in a corpus—as I have been referring to them, performance distributions. I then
show that the distributional regularities extracted from the corpus explain the se-
mantic similarity data from last chapter about as well as features extracted from the
acceptability judgment data in that chapter using the same core projection model.
3.3.1 Data
Three subcategorization datasets containing verb-by-subcategorization frame
counts were considered. Two of these datasets were previously constructed: an En-
glish corpus built by Schulte im Walde using the methods described in Schulte im
Walde 2003 for German and Korhonen et al.’s (2006) VALEX lexicon, which is built
using Korhonen’s (2002) update of Briscoe and Carroll’s (1997) set of 163 subcat-
egorization frames—a superset of those in the well-known ANLT and COMLEX
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dictionaries (Grishman et al., 1994). Both of these datasets lack some subcate-
gorization information important to attitude verb syntax—e.g. information about
the voice of the clause—and so a further subcategorization frame dataset was con-
structed. All datasets were submitted to the basic correlational analysis described
below, but only this latter dataset, described further below, was submitted to the
full modeling procedure.
Data constituting this third dataset were extracted from the Parsed uk Web
as Corpus (PukWaC) dataset (Baroni et al., 2009). PukWaC is the part-of-speech
(POS) and dependency parsed version of ukWaC, which is an approximately two
billion word web scrape of the uk domain. To create PukWaC, ukWaC was lem-
matized and POS tagged using TreeTagger (Schmid, 1994) and dependency parsed
using MaltParser (Nivre et al., 2007).
To extract subcategorization frames associated with particular verbs the fol-
lowing post-processing was conducted. For each item tagged as a verb in a particular
sentence, the parents and dependents of that verb were collected. For instance, in
3.3.1, the parent of amazed is was and the dependents of amazed is had.
NN VBD VVN IN PPS VHD VVN SENT






For verb dependents, the tense/aspectual marker—e.g. past or gerund (-
ing)—of the dependent was recorded by analyzing the part-of-speech tag. If the
dependent was an auxiliary verb (have or be), the tense of that verb was recorded.
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The tense/aspect of the dependents were mapped down into four values: past and
present to tensed, gerund to gerund, past participle to pastpart, and bare to
bare. Modal auxiliaries were mapped to tensed.
The dependents of this verb were then checked for the presence of a subject
(marked by the subj dependency relation) and a complementizer (that, if, like, etc.)
or WH word (who, what, etc.). Subjects were mapped to three values: unambigu-
ously nominative pronouns (I, he, she, etc.) to nom, unambiguously accusative
pronouns to acc, and all others to caseunknown. This was done to get a rough
sense of whether the verb occurred in a tensed clause (4a), ECM (4b), or small clause
(4c) construction, since the tense information on the verb is sometimes otherwise
ambiguous if the verb is in its bare form. (If the dependent verb occurred in its bare
form, the dependents of that verb were also checked for the present of an infinitival
marker to.)
(4) a. Bo thinks that he went to the store.
b. Bo wants him to go to the store.
c. Bo saw him go to the store.
The complementizers were mapped to four values: that and like (as in seems like)
to finite, for to nonfinite, if and whether to polarq, and any WH word (what,
who, etc.) to whq.
In cases with no auxiliaries, the subject of the matrix verb—in the above
example amaze—was recorded. If the parent of the matrix verb was an auxiliary,
as in the case above, the auxiliary chains were followed until a subjects (if any) was
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found.12. These subjects were mapped into four values: it to it, there to there,
everything else to referential, and no subject to none. The idea here is to get
an approximation to whether the verb occurred with an expletive subject (and if so,
what kind) or not.
Dependents were also checked for whether there were noun phrases or prepo-
sitional phrases marked with the relation obj. These were marked in three boolean
features: main object 1 (true if one or two NP dependents were found), main ob-
ject 2 (if two NP dependents were found), and prepositional object (if at least one
prepositional phrase was found).
The final feature that was extract was whether the matrix verb was passivized.
This is important for distinguishing object experiencer verbs from other verbs, which
was found ot be important in the last chapter. To assess this, the presence of a form
of the auxiliary be as the immediate parent along with past participle marking on
the matrix verb was recorded. If both were, that verb was recorded as passivized.
For each observation of each verb, these feature values were concatenated to
produce a subcategorization frame; 427 such combinations were observed at least
once. The number of times a particular verb was found with a particular frame was
then recorded to make up the performance distribution matrix X.
12If the verb is embedded, it may not have a subject if the subordinate clause it is found in does
not have a subject
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3.3.1.1 Filtering
For this particular experiment, I focus only on verbs that plausibly occur with
some sort of embedding syntax broadly construed. For instance, the sentences in
(5) count as embeddings under this broad construal.
(5) a. Bo thinks that Jo went to the store.
b. Bo wants Jo to go to the store.
c. Bo saw Jo go to the store.
d. Bo loves going to the store.
Of course, the criterion for embedderhood cannot be that the verb only occurs in
embedded clauses, since many embedders also allow nonembedding structures.
(6) a. Bo thinks about Jo.
b. Bo wants Jo.
c. Bo saw Jo.
d. Bo loves Jo.
The natural criterion would then seem to be that the verb at least sometimes occurs
in embedded clauses. The problem here is that, due to noise in the parsing, many
verbs that are not actually embedders appear as though they have embedded syntax.
Two fairly prevalent instances of this are cases where free relatives are parsed as
though they are embedded question clauses (7a) and purposes clauses as though
they are infinitival clauses (7b).
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(7) a. I’ll kiss whoever you tell me to.
b. I drank to celebrate my birthday.
These cases are likely somewhat rarer than true embedding cases relative to the
frequency of the verb, however. That is, kiss will likely not take free relatives nearly
as often as clear NPs and drink will likely not take purpose clause nearly as often as it
takes an NP object or no object at all. One strategy for filtering out nonembedders,
then, is to somehow assess the frequency of a verb-embedded clause pair relative
to the frequency of the verb with any complement and an embedded clause of any
type (finite, infintival, question, etc.) with any verb. Pointwise Mutual Information
(PMI) was used for this purpose.
Prior to calculating PMI, verbs with frequency less than 1000 were filtered.
As can be seen in Figure 3.4, this removes all but the top 1500 verbs. From this
filtered set, PMI was taken between a categorical variable verb and a binary variable
embedded-clause.13 This second variable was set to true in the case that a verb on
a particular datapoint had a verb dependent and false otherwise. PMI was taken
according to the standard formula (Church and Hanks, 1990).
PMI(verb, embedded-clause) = log
P(verb, embedded-clause)
P(verb)P(embedded-clause)
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the normalized version of the PMI mea-
sure: NPMI(verb, embedded-clause) = PMI(verb,embedded-clause)− log P(verb,embedded-clause) Verbs were then fil-

















Figure 3.4: Count v. rank of particular verbs. Black points show verbs that were
kept.
tered for whether they had PMI greater than 0 or were in verb set from previous
chapter. All verbs included satisfy both the frequency and PMI conditions except
worry from the original set, which fails to satisfy the PMI condition. This yields a
total of 232 verbs.
3.3.2 Hybrid sampler/optimizer design
The sampler designed for this experiment implements Gibbs sampling for the
posterior on D, P, and S—both parametric and nonparametric (IBP)—and Max-
imum A Posteriori (MAP) estimators (gradient descent with dynamic step-size to


















Figure 3.5: Distribution of normalized pointwise mutual information of verb and
embedded clause across verbs. Black bars show verbs that were kept at embedders.
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place of the Gibbs samplers when the dimensions of S are fixed—i.e. when S has a
parametric prior.
For the purposes of this chapter, I investigate only the parametric model and
use MAP estimators in place of samplers for D and P, meaning that estimates of
the posterior variance will be poor. This was done mostly for convenience, since the
inference algorithms converge much more quickly when using the optimizers.
Fitting was separated into three separate stages: (i) a maximum likelihood
(MLE) pre-training stage for D; (ii) a MAP pre-training stage for S and P; and (iii)
a hybrid sampler/optimizer training stage for D, P, and S. I describe each stage in
detail below.
3.3.2.1 MLE pre-training (D only)
D was pre-trained by optimizing the log-likelihood logP(X | D; γ) (as noted
above, δ is set to 1). This results in a MLE estimate, since the implicit prior
on dmn is uniform on (0, 1). Optimization was carried out using gradient descent
with dynamic step size to enforce the (0, 1) bounds on dmn. Figure 3.3 shows that
likelihood of particular dmn given values of xmn and gamma. The step size is given
by:
step-size(dmn) = rmin (dmn, 1− dmn)
where r is a learning rate parameter (set to 0.01 for all simulations). The
additive updates are given by
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logP(X | D; γ, δ)
)
where tanh is the hyperbolic tangent. The application of hyperbolic tangent
is necessary to ensure that, when the gradient is steep, dmn is not pushed outside of
(0, 1). Since the hyperbolic tangent has infimum −1 and supremum 1, and since the
step size will never be great than the distance from the current dmn and a bound,
updates will never push dmn outside its bound.
Figure 3.7 shows the sort of D this procedure produces using the PukWaC-
derived dataset and Figure 3.6 shows the counts that D is derived from. Figure
3.7 As can be seen from the similarity of these two graphs, the MLE procedure
fits D tightly. This is expected without any prior information to raise the prob-
ability of verb-subcategorization frame pairs with fewer (or even no) occurrences.
Another way of thinking about the MLE-derived D is that it represents a relatively
unsmoothed representation of the competence distributions. (I say “relatively” here
because there is of course some smoothing coming from γ and δ.)
3.3.2.2 MAP pre-training (S and P)
Subsequent to the MLE pre-training described above, S and P were pre-trained
by iteratively optimizing the log-posterior of S, logP(D | P,S) + logP(S | α, β) and
P, logP(D | P,S) + logP(P | λ). Note that because S is discrete, it is not possi-
ble to use a method like gradient descent to optimize it. A proxy of this S of the
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Figure 3.6: Log of verb-subcategorization frame counts plus 1. White represents 0
and grey is scaled with the log count.
Figure 3.7: Log of D. White represents values closer to −∞ and darkest grey
represents least negative values.
173
same form and with the same prior as P was used for this purpose. That is, for
the purposes of this pre-training, S was treated as though its cells are distributed
Exponential(λ). Thus, the pre-training reduces to a standard non-negative matrix
factorization (NMF) but for the fact that the cells of D are assumed to be unob-
served and beta-distributed, where standard NMF assumes the factorized matrix is
observed with gaussian-distributed cells.
The step size for dmn is the same as given above. The step size for both smk
and bkn is given by
14
step-size(smk) = rmax [0,min (smk, | log smk|+ 1)]
step-size(bkn) = rmax [0,min (bkn, | log bkn|+ 1)]
where r is a learning rate parameter (set to 0.01 for all simulations). Analogous
to those in the previous section, the additive updates are given by




[logP(D | S,P)) + logP(S | λ)]
)




[logP(D | S,P)) + logP(P | λ)]
)
Because the S inferred by this procedure is not of the correct form, the cells
of the S resulting from the above procedure were thresholded by the median of the
column in which they lie: cells were set to 1 if they fell above the column median
14This step size function is a rectifier from (−∞, 1) and ln from (1,∞).
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and 0 otherwise, thus converting S into a bit matrix for sampling in the next stage.15
Without any further processing, this procedure is likely to significantly de-
crease the log-posterior of the true model, since in most cases, the maximum value
in a particular column of S prior to the above thresholding procedure is far below
1. This results in cells of SP that are far too large. To remedy this, the maximum
along each column of S was calculated prior to the above thresholding and used
to scale each row of P. This returns SP to a scale somewhat similar to the one
resulting from the NMF pre-training, though its cells will still be somewhat too
large.
(Before moving on, it is worth noting that a MAP pre-training procedure that
treat S as continuous but bounded on (0, 1) in the same way as D was also tried,
but the results of this procedure were poor. This approach may still be feasible with
some tweaking of various hyperparameters, but in various trials runs, I could not
find such an appropriate set of parameters.)
3.3.2.3 Training (D, P, and S)
Subsequent to the MLE pre-training described above, D, S and P were pre-
trained by iteratively optimizing their respective log-posteriors. On each iteration,
S was sampled using the Gibbs sampling equations described above, and D and P
were incremented once using the update equations described in the previous two
sections.
15This particular thresholding procedure has a secondary benefit in that exactly half of the cells
in a particular column will be 1 and thus it is easy to tell how far S has moved from its initial
state over the course of sampling.
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Dataset Generalized Discrimination Ordinal Scale
PukWaC 0.129 (p = 0.028) 0.1348 (p = 0.059)
Schulte im Walde 0.189 (p = 0.001) 0.142 (p = 0.023)
VALEX 0.123 (p = 0.0399) 0.064 (p = 0.218)
Table 3.1: Spearman rank correlation between Jensen-Shannon divergence derived
from three different datasets and similarity judgments. P -values derived from Man-
tel (permutation) test with 10000 iterations.
3.3.3 Results
3.3.3.1 Basic correlational analysis
As in the previous chapter, I begin with a basic correlational analysis to assess
the relationship between distances defined on the syntactic distribution themselves
and the two similarity judgment tasks presented in the last chapter. This analysis
was carried out on all three datasets referenced in Section 3.3.1. For each dataset,
the conditional probability of each subcategorization frame given each verb was
estimated by taking the conditional relative frequency with additive smoothing (fol-
lowing Schulte im Walde 2006, λ = 0.5). Jensen-Shannon divergence was used as
the distance measure, and so the additive smoothing is necessary here, since that
measure does not tolerate zeros.
Table 3.1 shows the correlation between the distances as derived above and
the two similarity judgment tasks. The correlations here are much lower than the
ones seen in the last chapter between the acceptability judgment-based distance
and the similarity judgment-based distance, which were 0.28 for the generalized dis-
crimination similarities and 0.27 for the ordinal similarities. This interesting in the
sense that, in that section, both distances defined directly on the acceptability judg-
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ments and on the features extracted from those acceptability judgments using the
nonnegative projection model showed similar levels of correlation with the distances
derived from the similarity judgments. One difference here is that, whereas the sub-
categorization frames for the acceptability judgment task were selected specifically
for to discriminate well among attitude verbs, many of the subcategorization frames
extracted from the corpus may be irrelevant to distinguishing among particular
attitude verbs.
If this is the case, there are two possibilities: (i) these irrelevant subcategoriza-
tion may make it difficult for the model to extract semantically relevant features; or
(ii) the model may be able to cut through these irrelevant subcategorization frames
to discover semantic features relevant to participants similarity judgments. I show
in the next section that the latter appears to be the case.
3.3.3.2 Model analysis
The model was trained with number of latent feature values ranging from 2 to
30 with 10 chains per number of latent features. The chain that converges on the
lowest mean likelihood across samples was kept. Ideally, a stopping criterion similar
to the one employed in the last chapter—WAIC—would be used here to select the
optimal number of features. The problem is that, while the likelihood falls with
higher numbers of latent features—the likelihood at 2 features is −9099346.0 and
the likelihood at 30 is −9091140.0—these likelihood values do not always decrease
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Figure 3.8: Features extracted from PukWaC dataset using nonnegative projection
model of syntactic bootstrapping.
which was the impetus for running multiple chains; in spite of this, it appears that
for some numbers of features the fitting algorithm was not sampling from the true
posterior.16
To remedy this, I take the chain with the lowest mean likelihood, which was one
run for 25 latent features. The final S was taken from this chain and all subsequent
analyses are based on this S, which can be seen in Figure 3.8.
As in the last chapter, to measure the information shared between the inferred
features and the similarity judgments, I take the correlations between Manhattan
distance defined on this S and the two similarity judgment-based distances. Both the
16Indeed, this sampler will not necessarily sample from the true posterior, since optimizers were
used for D and P.
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correlation between the generalized discrimination judgments (Spearman ρ = 0.238,
Mantel[iter=10000] p < .001) and the ordinal judgments (Spearman ρ = 0.245,
Mantel[iter=10000] p < .001) are comparable to the correlations found in the last
chapter and are also substantially greater than those reported in the last section.
This is interesting in light of the fact that the correlations defined directly on the
observed syntactic distributions was much lower, possibly suggesting that the model
is filtering out irrelevant aspects of the distributions.
3.4 Discussion
In this chapter, I reviewed two classes of models of word representation:
category-based and vector space models. I argued that, on the one hand, the
category-based models has a representation of words that is constrained in an inap-
propriate way due to what I called the global normalization property; on the other
hand, vector space models have representations that are not constrained enough
making their feature values uninterpretable. I then gave a model that I argued was
a natural midpoint between these models that builds on each’s strengths without
inheriting their problems. I showed that this model extracts features from perfor-
mance (count) distributions that compare in their correlations with the similarity
judgments to those extracted from the acceptability judgments presented in Chapter
2, despite the fact that the raw correlations between the performance distributions
and the semantic similarity judgments were quite a bit lower.
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Chapter 4: Incrementality in syntactic bootstrapping
In the previous two chapters, I showed that there is quite fine-grained seman-
tic information present in propositional attitude verbs’ syntactic distributions—
both their competence distributions (Chapter 2) and their performance distributions
(Chapter 3). In the course of doing this, I developed a computational model of pro-
jection that could take advantage of this information. I showed that when trained
on either acceptability judgments or corpus data, using appropriate models of the
data generating process, this projection model can be used to predict participants
semantic similarity judgments well. The conclusion I draw from these results is that,
if a learner had access to (propositional attitude) verbs’ syntactic distributions in
their entirety they could learn quite fine-grained aspects of those words’ meanings.
One question that arises here is whether it is reasonable to assume that learners
have such access to verbs’ entire syntactic distribution when making inferences about
those verbs’ meanings. The answer to this is almost surely no. Learners receive data
incrementally, and it seems likely that the inferences that underlie word-learning also
operate incrementally. The question that naturally arises, then, is whether learners
can take advantage of propositional attitude verbs’ syntactic distributions in an
incremental setting.
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In this chapter, I present three experimental studies aimed at answering this
question. The chapter begins with a review of the Human Simulation Paradigm
(HSP; Gillette et al. 1999) and related tasks that serve as the inspiration for the
current studies. This paradigm is discussed extensively below, but quickly: the
idea behind HSP is to provide adult participants with a context—a scene, some
cooccurring lexical items, etc.—in which a particular word was uttered but from
which the word itself has been removed. Participants are then asked the free choice
question: what word occurred in that context? By manipulating the particular
kinds of contextual information presented, one can then investigate the amount of
information provided by particular kinds of contexts about particular kinds of words
(Gillette et al., 1999; Snedeker and Trueswell, 2004; Papafragou et al., 2007).
After this review of HSP, I then move onto the first two experiments, which
simultaneously serve as norming studies for the third experiment but which are also
of interest in their own right. The first of these norming studies is a special case of
HSP akin to that used by Medina et al. (2011) and Trueswell et al. (2013) to measure
the informativity of particular contexts themselves (as opposed to comparing types
of contexts against each other). In this variant, participants are not learning a word
given a set of contexts but rather treating each instance as a separate word. One can
then measure various properties of the response distributions to particular items—
e.g. how often the true word that occurred in the context was actually recovered—to
assess their informativity about the true word’s meaning.
In general, accurate recovery of the true word is the dependent measure ana-
lyzed in HSP—whether used in the traditional way or as a measure of item informa-
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tivity. As has long been noted in this literature, this is not an ideal state of affairs,
since it doesn’t account for the fact that participants may give a response whose
meaning is quite close to the true word’s. I show this qualitatively in analysis of
the first norming task, motivating a second norming task that aims to measure this
closeness quantitatively.
Related to this worry is a second worry: when one asks participants to re-
cover the word found in a particular context, the participant is explicitly asked
to discretize their hypothesis around a single word meaning. The question of how
discrete this hypothesis is has been a topic of recent debate—in particular, do par-
ticipants keep track of uncertainty about a word’s meaning? In the attitude verb
domain, this question is particularly poignant, since possibly unlike the well-studied
noun-learning domain, the verb domain seems to involve quite a bit more complexity
that may not make it amenable to using standard methods that ask participants to
choose discrete responses. To remedy this, I develop a novel extension of HSP that I
refer to as Spatial HSP (SHSP). The idea behind using spatial SHSP is to avoid the
possibly problematic forced discretization that comes with using a standard HSP
task. The task is spatial in the sense that, instead of giving categorical responses
regarding their hypothesis about a word meaning, they give similarity judgments
between the word they are learning and the words they already know, thus hopefully
enabling the tapping of uncertainty about the word’s meaning.
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4.1 The human simulation paradigm
4.1.1 The classic paradigm
The human simulation paradigm (HSP), introduced in Gillette et al. 1999, is
a standard instrument used in word-learning research.1 The task in this paradigm
is simple: adult participants are given some information about the context a word
was uttered in—scenes, surrounding words, structures, etc.—and they are asked
which word occurred in that context. The idea behind using adult learners here
is that, while there is a question of what level of conceptual development child
learners have attained at a particular age, adult learners presumably have some
level of conceptual development that allows them to grasp the meanings of the sorts
of words children learn in the first few years of life. This in turn allows one to
ask questions about the informational properties of various purported learning cues,
controlling for conceptual development.
In Gillette et al. 1999, six different contextual conditions are tested, which
form the basis for later work in HSP. Their first experiment investigates the useful-
ness of solely nonlinguistic scene information plus lexical category information. For
this experiment, they chose the 24 most frequent nouns and the 24 most frequent
verbs from a transcript of video-recorded play sessions. They then collected 6 video
clips for each verb and played participants each of these clips in sequence, with a
beep occurring when the word occurred. Participants were asked to guess at each
1See also Snedeker et al. (1999); Snedeker (2000) for work in this paradigm from around the
same time.
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beep which word occurred in that position, having been told (i) that the beeps for
a particular set of clips all involved the same word and (ii) whether the word was
a noun or verb. Participants did much better with nouns than with verbs for this
experiment. They further showed that this could be wholly predicted by the im-
ageability rating for particular nouns or verbs, where verbs like run are rated much
more imageable than propositional attitude verbs like think.
Gillette et al.’s second task, which is the one important for current purposes,
manipulated the kind of information participants had access to for making infer-
ences about the word meaning: (i) scene information only—the original task—(ii)
items from lexical categories (noun, verb, adjective) that surround the word; (iii)
scene information plus lexical information; (iv) syntactic frames with nonce words
replacing words from lexical categories; (v) the full sentence the word occurred in
(syntactic frame + word from lexical categories); and (vi) all of the previous kinds
of information. The upshot is roughly that more information is better.
Focusing in on the verbs, Snedeker and Gleitman (2004) replicate this more-
information-is-better result (see also discussion in Gleitman et al., 2005).2 They
argue that verbs fall into three groups with respect to the sorts of cues used to
learn them (and further that these three groups correspond to well-defined devel-
opment stages): “relatively concrete verbs that describe specific actions in and on
the observable world (fall, stand, turn, play, wait, hammer, push, throw, pop), the
more abstract mental-content verbs (know, like, see, say, think, love, look, want),
2Indeed, they argue that it is actually a partial ordering, but this is not relevant for current
purposes.
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and a third set, of what have been called light verbs (come, do, get, go, have, make,
put).” Relevant for current purposes, perhaps unsurpringly, the mental-content
verbs (propositional attitude verbs) have low accuracies in the contexts (i-iii) from
above but show a spike in accuracy when moving to contexts (iv-vi)—i.e. when one
has syntactic information, possibly in concert with lexical information.
Papafragou et al. (2007) replicate this strong effect of syntactic information on
ability to infer propositional attitude verb meanings, but they also show that scene
information is not totally irrelevant. If participants are given scenes involving some-
thing that highlights a character’s beliefs, participants are more willing to conjecture
propositional attitude verb meanings. This is further reinforced by combining these
scenes with linguistic—specifically, syntactic—information.
4.1.2 Norming HSP with HSP
A question that has arisen recently as a topic of debate in the word-learning is
how memory constrains learners’ ability to utilize cues to a word’s meaning (Medina
et al., 2011; Trueswell et al., 2013). In many accounts of noun-learning in particular,
the assumption is often that learners have access to the full history of their experience
with a word, or at least some nonnegligible chunk (see Yu and Smith 2012 for recent
discussion).
One way memory constraints have been investigated is to ask how sensitive to
the information carried by a particular piece of contextual information a learner’s
hypotheses are with the idea that, to the extent that learners decisions are based on
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particular learning instances—the less smooth their learning trajectory—the more
constrained their memory for previous instances is likely to be. Testing this requires
some way of measuring the information carried by particular learning instances.
It is this, rather than the particulars of the learning mechanisms proposed in this
subliterature that I am interested in.
Following Gillette et al. (1999), Medina et al. (2011) selected the 24 most
frequent nouns and 24 most frequent verbs from a video corpus developed by one
of the authors. They then selected 288 from this corpus and presented each of 37
participants with 96 scene-only vignettes (2 per word). Unlike the standard HSP, in
which participants would see 6 clips in a row for the same word, each of the clips in
the Medina et al. study was completely disconnected from the others. The idea here
is that, by disconnecting the vignettes, the informativity of each can be measured
on its own terms. They take as their measure of informativity, the accuracy with
which participants can recover the actual word that occurred in the vignette (as is
standard, at the point of a beep).
Medina et al. then threshold items into two sets High Informativity (HI) and
Low Informativity (LI) by their accuracy, choosing 33%, as this gave them a 1 : 5
ratio of HI:LI vignettes.3 They then use this partitioning to construct sequences of
five vignettes with one HI instances and four LI instances, thus using the experiment
with disconnected vignettes as a norming experiment for the second, a standard HSP
task. They find that manipulating the placement of the HI instances significantly
3No verb or abstract noun vignettes showed up as HI vignettes, so Medina et al. drop verbs
and abstract nouns from consideration for the rest of the experiments.
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affects participants’ ability to eventually recover the correct word. In particular, the
earlier a high informativity instance the better.
4.1.3 Spatial HSP
In the current series of experiments, I adapt this strategy of first measuring
the informativity of particular items, then using that to construct training sets, to
HSP with syntactic frames instead of scene information, as in Medina et al. (2011).
Before moving onto the actual experiments, however, I would like to first make a
note on some crucial methodological alterations to the HSP tasks described above.
In Medina et al. 2011, accuracy is used as the measure of item informativity.
But while accuracy is useful as a rough measure of informativity, going back to
Gillette et al. 1999, accuracy has had known issues as such a measure, since it
doesn’t take into account responses that may be semantically close to the true word
but which are nonetheless inaccurate. As I show evidence of in the next section, this
makes this measure susceptible to various issues. Of particular note, no distinction
is made in an accuracy measure between really bad guesses, such as ones that
don’t even fall into the correct syntactic category, and better guesses, which might
involve words that are semantically close to the true word. This second problem
is exacerbated when an item might be very informative about the semantics of the
word that occurred in it, but when a semantically related high frequency word—
plausibly, one that comes to mind more quickly—also fits well within the context.
I show evidence that such frequency effects happen in the current experiments.
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I remedy this state of affairs by implementing a, to my knowledge, novel exten-
sion of the Medina et al. norming task that takes into account not only participants’
ability to recover the exact true word, but also semantically related words. To do
this, I employ an ordinal scale semantic similarity judgment task of the sort used
in Chapters 2 and 3 to measure the relationship between syntax in competence
distribution (Chapter 2) and performance distribution (Chapter 3) to measure the
relationship between participants’ responses and the true word. To build this task,
I extract all (lemmatized) responses from the previous task and pair them with the
true word that occurred in the item they were a response to, and gather similarity
judgments for those pairs. These similarity judgments are then used to get an es-
timate of the distribution of similarity among responses to particular items, which
gives a more fine-grained view of those items’ informativity.
A potential problem for understanding verb semantics related to standard
HSP’s use of accuracy as a measure of informativity is that HSP gathers free choice
word responses. This is a problem in that, as I have discussed in earlier chapters,
many of the verbs of interest in this dissertation seem to display multiple semantic
features at once, and thus learners might plausibly be at least somewhat certain
that a particular word has some features but not certain whether it has others. But
in the classic paradigm, participants are forced to choose a particular semantics on
each trial. On the whole this might not be problematic if the method participants
use for selecting a discrete choice is guided by the uncertainty that they have about
a word’s features. We should then see these uncertainties arising out of aggregate
behavior. But this is not an ideal state of affairs; it relies on faithful mappings
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from the representation a particular participant has of a particular word’s semantic
features to whatever guides that participant’s procedure for selecting a particular
instantiation of those features to then give a response. Indeed, even if these map-
pings are faithful, passing the decision procedure through the participant’s lexicon,
may create undesired warping effects.
To remedy this, I present a novel extension of HSP that aims at more faith-
fully measuring participants’ uncertainty about the semantic features a verb has,
which I call the spatial HSP. In this task, instead of giving free choice responses,
participants are tested using a similarity judgment task that asks them to compare
a novel word they just learned from some training set—here, items culled from the
norming tasks described above—to words they already know. Thus, instead of being
forced to choose an instantiation of semantic features they may be uncertain about,
participants can hopefully show their uncertainty more clearly. The use of the two
norming tasks is then, following Medina et al. to understand how the distribution
of informativity in the training sets affects participants uncertainty.
4.2 Norming tasks
In this section, I present two norming tasks that will be used to construct
training sets for the task presented in Section 4.3. These two tasks together were
aimed at measuring the informativity of each syntactic context about the meaning
of the word that occurred there. The first task is a linguistic context-only HSP task
with disconnected instances. That is, it is not the case that participants were told
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they were learning the same word across instances. The second task is a likert scale
similarity judgment task built from the responses gathered in the first.
4.2.1 Human simulation norming
4.2.1.1 Design
This norming task takes the form of a standard human simulation task with
only linguistic context. In this task, participants are given a sentence with a blank
somewhere in it and are asked to fill the blank with the word they think most
people would respond with. All sentences were sampled from a corpus of child-
directed speech as described below, and thus the blank replaces a real word. For
instance, (1a) was an actual sentence used in the experiment.
(1) a. I told you I’m not having a new baby now.
b. I florped you I’m not having a new baby now.
This task was conducted online, and responses were collected using an HTML text
box. This text box was filled with a greyed out placeholder verb florp that disap-
peared when a participant started typing, implemented using the standard HTML
input tag placeholder attribute. This placeholder verb had tense/aspect mor-
phology matching the verb that it takes the place of. For instance, (1b) shows the
sentence derived from the true sentence (1a). Text boxes were autofocused to allow
participants to use only the keyboard while performing the task.
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The norming items fell into one of 40 conditions as formed from a full cross
of the following three factors whose descriptions are given in subsequent sections:
verb (levels: 10 attitudes verbs), lexical content (levels: real, nonce), and
context of utterance (levels: dinner, play). Participants received one item
from each condition for a total of 40 items.
In addition to providing typed responses to the HSP task, participants were
asked a memory question about the item they just responded to in order to ensure
they were paying attention. The rationale and construction of this memory task is
described further in the next section.
4.2.1.2 Materials
4.2.1.2.1 Corpus sampling procedure For each of the 31 verbs investigated in
the studies in Chapter 2, all sentences containing at least one of those verbs were
extracted from Gleason corpus (Masur and Gleason, 1980), which is part of the
CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2014b,a).4 The description of this corpus, taken
from the CHILDES manual for North American English corpora (p. 44), is as
follows.
The participants are 24 children aged 2;1 to 5;2 who were recorded in
interactions (a) with their mother, (b) with their father, and (c) at the
dinner table. The 24 participants were recruited through nursery schools
and similar networks, and were from middle-class families in the greater
4CHILDES provides a lemmatized version of the sentence. This lemmatized version was used
for the search.
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Boston area. There were 12 boys and 12 girls. All families were White,
and English was spoken as a first language in all families. Each child
was seen three times: once in the laboratory with the mother; once in
the laboratory with the father; and once at dinner with both mother
and father. The laboratory sessions were videotaped and audiotaped,
and the dinners were only audiotaped. Laboratory sessions included:
(a) play with a toy auto, (b) reading a picture book, and (c) playing
store.
This corpus was chosen because, unlike many corpora in CHILDES, it provides
data from two different contexts that children commonly find themselves in—play
and meal (dinner) contexts—thus heightening the chances that data sampled from
this context are more representative of children’s linguistic experience overall. It
also provides data from an age range where children’s verb vocabularies are rapidly
developing—in particular, where much development of the attitude lexicon occurs
(de Villiers, 2005).
In this first norming task, both contexts were considered as separate factor
levels. The number of sentences each verb occurred in within both the play and
dinner sections of the corpus (across children) were then tabulated, and the top ten
most frequent verbs from the previous study found. For each of these high frequency
verbs, up to 30 sentences were taken from the dinner sessions and up to 60 taken
from play sessions (30 from the mothers’ play sessions and 30 from the fathers’).
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Each of these sentences was then hand-checked for transcription errors and
acceptability. Unacceptable sentences were marked for exclusion, including those
that might seem unacceptable out of context. For instance, taking examples from
the sentences extracted for know, such sentences often involve continuations, as in
(2), or discourse-dependent processes, like the topicalization in (3).
(2) I think next time you go off the board, you know, I think you will dive in
instead of jump in, okay?
(3) That, I know.
In other cases, it seemed likely that an acceptable sentence might be hard to parse
in the context of a human simulation task. To retain as much fidelity to the true
syntactic distribution—what I have been calling performance distribution—of the
verb while reducing this complexity, sentences for which it was possible were modi-
fied from their original form without changing the syntactic structure or selectional
relationships to the verb in question. For instance, the conditional antecedent and
matrix verb in (4) were excluded to create new sentence with only the conditional
consequent.
(4) I said, if you have to really start really considering it, it is impossible to make
that kind of decision, you know?
After this acceptability checking and modification procedure was complete, 20 sen-
tences were subsampled for each verb from each modified context set (play and
dinner), excluding the unacceptable sentences. These sentences form the real level
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of the lexical context factor.
To create the items in the nonce level of the lexical context factor, all
nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs for the above sentences were replaced with
nonce words with morphology matching the ones found on the real words found
in the original sentence. All determiners, prepositions/particles (of, to, at, up,
etc.), and complementizers (that, if, for, to) were retained. Among the determin-
ers were included quantificational determiners/quantifiers (every(thing), any(thing),
etc.) and WH words (who, what, where, etc.). The intention here was to retain only
words from functional categories.5 To this end, some nouns and verb-like elements
were also retained.
These noun exceptions included all personal pronouns (I, you, (s)he, me, mine,
etc.) as well as temporal (now, then) and locative indexicals (here, there).6 These
exceptions seem reasonable since under many theories, they fall into the determiner
class or are at least partially constituted by a determiner-like meanings.
Verb exceptions included all auxiliary verbs: all forms of be, perfect auxiliary
forms of have, all modal auxiliaries (can, might, must, etc.). Semi-modals (have to,
ought to) were treated as lexical verbs in this respect—i.e. have or ought would be
5There is a question here whether all prepositions are purely functional. This seems unlikely,
but the replacement of prepositions can severely degrade participants ability to access the syntactic
structure of a sentence. This is likely due to the fact that prepositions are relatively closed-class—
at least compared to nouns, verbs, and adjectives. It is standard in human simulation paradigm
experiments to retain prepositions (cf. Gillette et al., 1999).
6Under this criterion might fall temporal expressions like today, yesterday, and tomorrow, since
they seem indexical in ways similar to now and then. The problem is that many complex temporal
expressions, like last night or next week are similarly indexical, and it is unclear where to draw the
line. One criterion could be to retain only single word indexical expressions, like yesterday, today,
and tomorrow, but this privileges expressions that involve days over those that involve other time
intervals, and thus some amount of arbitrariness is necessary. The current methods seems to me
the most conservative if indexical expressions are to be retained.
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replaced with a nonce word but to retained.
Finally, four common adverbs were excepted from replacement by a nonce
word: too, either, and else. This seems reasonable since, in contrast to derived
adverbs like carefully or intentionally, these adverbs’ meanings are logical in nature
and thus naturally fall into a class with, e.g., the pronouns. Indeed, all are anaphoric.
4.2.1.2.2 Memory task In many psycholinguistic experiments—e.g. acceptability
judgment tasks—it is possible to analyze the distribution of reaction times across
participants to assess whether they were in fact doing the task. (See Chapter 2
for an example of such a filtering procedure.) In this case, however, much more
variability is expected in response speed due to differences in typing speed, meaning
that reaction time analysis alone may be insufficient for detecting bad responders.
(Indeed, we exclude no participants in this section based on the same reaction time
criterion used in Chapter 2.) To this end, an additional measure was gathered to
assess whether participants are in fact doing the task: a lexical memory task.7
Of the 20 real word items participants received, half were followed by the
question “which word was in the previous sentence?” along with five words, only one
of which was actually in the previous sentence. (None of the nonce word sentences
were followed by this memory task.) For instance, participants who saw the sentence
in (5) received the memory question along with the set of words in (6).
(5) I think what we should do is try to florp what we took apart last and put
that together first.
7Much thanks to Ellen Lau for suggesting this.
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(6) a. Which word was in the previous sentence?
b. {boy, mothers, together, never, family}
Participants’ response accuracy for each item was then collected and analyzed for
the purposes of data validation.
4.2.1.3 Participants
Participants were recruited until each item had at least 20 observations as-
sociated with it after the data validation procedure described in the last section.
Participants were allowed to respond to up to three lists. 577 unique participants
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) using a standard Human
Intelligence Task (HIT) template designed for externally hosted experiments and
modified for the specific task. Of these unique participants, 483 responded to a
single list, 88 responded to two lists, and 6 responded to three lists. No participant
that responded to multiple lists responded to the same list twice.
Prior to viewing the HIT, participants were required to score seven or better
on a nine question qualification test assessing whether they were a native speaker of
American English. Along with this qualification test, participants’ IP addresses were
required to be associated with a location within the United States, and their HIT
acceptance rates were required to be 95% or better. After finishing the experiment,
participants received a 15-digit hex code, which they were instructed to enter into
the HIT. Once this submission was received, participants were paid $1.
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4.2.1.4 Data validation
Three data validation techniques were used. First, for each participant, the
number of correct responses to the memory task were tabulated (by list for par-
ticipants that responded to more than one list). The vast majority of participants
(0.793) obtain perfect scores, with almost all of the remainder answering incorrectly
only once (0.168) or twice (0.031). Given this distribution, only participants that
scored 8 (of 10) or better on the memory task were retained. This resulted in the
exclusion of 3 participants: 1 who responded with only 3 correct, 1 that responded
with only 6 correct, and 1 that responded with only 7 correct.8
Next, participants’ log reaction times (log RTs) were analyzed. First, each
participant’s median log RT and the interquartile range(IQR)—the difference be-
tween 25th and 75th precentiles)—of their log RTs were computed. The median and
IQR of each of these statistics was then computed over participants. Participants
were excluded using Tukey’s method, wherein the Tukey interval ([Q1-1.5*IQR,
Q3+1.5*IQR]) is constructed for both by-participant medians and IQRs and partic-
ipants excluded if their median log RT or IQR log RT fell outside this interval. No
participant’s median log RT fell outside the Tukey interval of median log RT over
participants and no participant’s IQR log RT fell outside the Tukey interval of IQR
log RT over participants; thus no participants were excluded under these criteria.
The median log RT-based exclusion procedure was also conducted for par-
8Even if the participant with 7 correct were retained at this stage of validation, most of that
participant’s responses would be excluded in the third stage due to the fact that that participant
gave almost solely nonce word responses.
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ticular responses. For each participant, the IQR of the log RT for that partici-
pant’s responses was computed. Responses were then excluded if they fell below the
participant-specific Tukey interval. 6 responses (across participants) were excluded
in this way.
The final filtering step was to exclude all nonword responses. As an initial
approximation, nonword was defined as any word not occurring at least once in
the PukWaC corpus. Of the 26953 total response tokens and 1517 response types,
258 response tokens and 85 response types were marked as nonwords in this way.
Those words that were marked as nonwords were then handchecked. Many cases
either involved the participant responding with the placeholder verb—i.e. florp,
florps, florping, or florped—a random string9—e.g. lmpw or toxat—or a multiword
string10—e.g. where were you or he asked me.
Other responses, however, were clear typos. (Indeed, multiple participants
emailed to apologize for having made a typo somewhere in the experiment.) For
instance, know had three typo variants—knlw, knkow and knokw. When their correct
variant was clear, these typos were corrected manually. For instance, knkow would
be changed to know.11 These corrections results in 16 of the datapoints original
marked as nonword responses to become word responses. The remaining 242 were
then excluded.
One problem with using corpus counts to filter nonwords is that, while filtered
9Some participants’ strategy in this case was to type a nonword from the sentence itself. For
instance, two of the nonwords used in the experiment were spurply and slargle, and these were
both given as responses.
10Participants were explicitly instructed not to do this at multiple points in the instructions.
11These changes were not made to the raw data itself, but rather in the analysis script, and are
documented in the analysis scripts made available on my github.
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words will tend to be nonwords (the method has high precision) some nonfiltered
words may still be nonwords, since common typos will be counted (the method
has lower recall). A subsequent filtering step was thus conducted by hand. Of the
26711 response tokens and 1432 remaining after the first nonword filtering step, 75
response tokens from 62 response types were deemed nonwords that were not typo
variants of a real word.12 Of the 26636 response tokens and 1372 response levels
remaining after this filtration, 44 were clear typo variants of true words, which were
corrected. The final number of response tokens after filtering was thus 25636 and
the final number of response types after filtering was 1328.
4.2.1.5 Results
In this section, I begin with a mixed effects regression analysis of accuracy
as conditioned by lexical context and context of utterance, controlling
variability due to participants, verbs, and items (nested within verb). I show that
only lexical context, not context of utterance reliably conditions higher
accuracy. This is something of a sanity check to ensure that the task fits with
previous findings—it does—but it is also of wider interest, since to my knowledge
no one has tested context of utterance in HSP before. Further, it allows for
the explicit quantification of variability in informativity within a verb using random
effects.
I then turn to three analyses focused on which properties of particular items
12In fact, for some of these nonwords, the intent was clear. For instance, practic is likely a typo
of practice. These typos were only corrected if the true variant already showed up at least once
elsewhere (not as a typo).
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give rise to the overall accuracies I show in the first section. In the first analysis,
I assess the extent to which participants are able to recover the correct syntactic
category of a word. This is important, since if they can’t recover the syntactic
category, other higher order properties of the linguistic context, such as the syntactic
structure, probably won’t be accessible either. In the second analysis, I delve briefly
into which aspects of the syntactic structure (tense information, complementizer
information, etc.) predict accuracy. This analysis is somewhat limited in scope,
since as I note in the final of these three analyses: a response may be inaccurate
while still being quite close to the true response semantically. In this final analysis, I
give a qualitative characterization of this “closeness.” This characterization in turn
motivates a quantitative method for assessing similarity of a response to the true
word as a measure of the informativity of a particular item.
4.2.1.5.1 Accuracy I begin with an analysis of accuracies as they are conditioned
by the two factors in the design. To repeat the original example from above, if the
true sentence were (7a), the stimulus created from that sentence would be (7b), with
florped the placeholder within a text box. The accuracy for this particular item (1
of 20 from its particular condition) would be calculated as the number of times told
were given as a response to (7b) over the total responses for (7b).
(7) a. I told you I’m not having a new baby now.




























Figure 4.1: Distribution of by-item accuracy given verb, lexical context, and context
of utterance. Each box represents the distribution of accuracy over the 20 items in
that condition.
To visualize the distribution of accuracy for particular items within particular condi-
tions, the proportion of times an item was responded to with the word that actually
occurred in the corpus was computed. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of these ac-
curacies across verbs as well as lexical context, given by the fill on the boxplot,
and context of utterance, given by the facet. Each box thus represents the
accuracies for 20 items in the standard way: boxes given Q1-Q3 and whiskers give
the Tukey fence ([Q1-1.5*IQR, Q3+1.5*IQR]). We see that, on the whole, sentences
whose content words were replaced with nonce words, had lower accuracy. This is
not surprising given that these sentences were designed to remove some information
that might help participants infer the meaning of the word in the blank.
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Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This trend is corroborated by the results of fitting a mixed effects logistic
regression to these accuracy data with accuracy as the dependent variable; fixed
effects of lexical context, context of utterance, and their interaction;
random intercepts for participants, verbs, and items (nested under verbs). This
model shows high correlation among the fixed effects, suggesting that some of the
fixed effects may not be necessary. To assess this, the same model without the
interaction was also fit and a likelihood ratio test conducted. This test did not
reach significance (χ2(1) = 0.129, p = 0.719), and thus the interaction term was
dropped.13 The same procedure was carried out for lexical context (χ2(1) =
64.077, p < 0.001) and context of utterance (χ2(1) = 0.110, p = 0.741). Only
lexical context was significant under this criterion and was thus retained while
the others were dropped.
13Note that, though it is standard to talk in terms of likelihood ratio tests—firmly within a
null hypothesis testing paradigm, this procedure will also almost always coincide with a reduction
in the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as well, and so this model building procedure can be
thought of as a procedure aimed at reducing overfitting.
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4.2.1.5.1.1 Fixed effects Table 4.1 shows the fixed effect terms of the result-
ing model. This model is given in terms of reference coding, where the reference
level is lexical context: nonce. Thus the intercept term gives the expected
log-odds of an accurate response against an inaccurate response in the nonce con-
dition. The upshot of this table is that the effect of the lexical context having real
words as opposed to nonce words is reliably positive, thus confirming the apparent
trend for participants to respond more accurately when the lexical context is real
words. This, again, is unsurprising, since the whole point of including a nonce word
condition was to remove some information relevant to making an inference about a
word’s meaning.
4.2.1.5.1.2 Random effects Turning to the random effects, the variance for
the participant random intercepts is 0.173 (sd: 0.416) (in log-odds space); the vari-
ance for the verb random intercepts is much larger at 3.183 (sd: 1.784); and the
variance for the item random intercepts was similarly large at 2.946 (sd: 1.716).
This means that participants varied little in their ability to answer accurately—for
comparison, the participant random intercept standard deviation is less than half
the size of the estimated fixed effect of lexical context. Verbs and items on the other
hand show much higher variability. This can be seen in Figure 4.1 in the fact that
some verbs—e.g. tell, know, think, and want—have much higher accuracy over most
of their items than other verbs—like remember, guess, and hear. The item variabil-
ity can be seen in the size of the boxes for each verb; even the verbs with the highest
median accuracies show a lot of variability in those accuracies.
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4.2.1.5.1.3 Frequency effects? One possible explanation for the verb vari-
ability may be a frequency effect: verbs with higher frequencies may come to mind
more readily during the task and so participants might also respond with these more
readily. But if participants are more willing to respond with higher frequency verbs,
those verbs might have a higher accuracy due to their frequency. To control for
this, a second mixed model was fit with true word log frequency (obtained from the
counts available from the ukWaC website) as a predictor alongside lexical con-
text. To ensure that the intercept corresponds to the lowest frequency word in the
set of true words (guess) instead of a log frequency of 0, the predictor was entered
as the true word log frequency minus the minimum true word log frequency over
all words. This predictor was significant (χ2(1) = 3.847, p < 0.05). A third model
was fit with the interaction between true word log frequency and lexical
context, but this term was not significant.
Table 4.2 shows the fixed effects estimates for this model. Note that the
effect of lexical context remains the same and the intercept lowers. Note that
this lowering has to do with the fact that now the intercept correspond to the
reference level lexical context: nonce at true word log frequency: 0,
which corresponds to the specific verb guess instead of the average at lexical
context: nonce. The effect of true word log frequency is approximately
the same size as that of lexical context. This means that for every order of
magnitude increase in frequency of the true word, participants were more accurate
(on average) to about the same extent as if they had gotten a real item instead of
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Table 4.2: Fixed effects for mixed effects logistic regression accuracy model with the





lexical context: real 1.112∗∗∗
(0.134)




Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
a nonce item.
Surprisingly, however, controlling for frequency does not affect the variance
estimates for verb random intercepts all that much, though there is a reduction.14
The new estimate of the variance for verb intercepts is 2.156 (sd: 1.469), which is
about a 0.25 reduction in the standard deviation from the previous estimate. This
suggests that not all variability in verb responses is driven by frequency effects.
4.2.1.5.1.4 What else might drive accuracy? To get an accurate response, it
must be clear from a particular item which verb fits in that item. On the one hand,
as I show in Section 4.2.1.5.4, many of the most common responses to particular
items are verbs that, while not accurate because they don’t match the true item,
nonetheless share a semantic component with the true item and are thus intuitively
14One wouldn’t expect it to affect the participant or item random intercepts, since frequency is
a property of verbs, not participants or items, and indeed, those estimates remain constant.
205
closer in meaning than some random item. This would suggest an item that is
somewhat informative about the semantics of a word, but not fully informative. On
the other hand, some items may be extremely uninformative—to the point that even
the syntactic category of the true response is unclear. These two states of affairs
are quite different in nature, and ideally there would be some way of pulling them
apart.
In the next section, I investigate the question of how easy it is to recover the
correct syntactic category (verb) across items (Section 4.2.1.5.2). In the subsequent
section, I then turn to a preliminary analysis of which syntactic features are most
useful in giving an accurate response. Finally, I turn to the inaccurate responses that
participants give in order to assess how informative items are about the meaning a
verb has (Section 4.2.1.5.4).
4.2.1.5.2 Nonverb responses Going back to at least Brown 1957, it has been
known that syntactic category is a useful cue to word meaning. Indeed, to use
the syntactic distribution a verb occurs in to help infer its meaning, one first needs
to know that the word they are dealing with is a verb in the first place. One pos-
sibility for at least some of the inaccuracy for some of the above verbs then could
be uncertainty about the syntactic category that the word falls into. Here, I assess
this as binary outcome: either the participant knew that an item was a verb or not.
To assess the overall uncertainty about syntactic category, responses were la-
beled for whether they were a verb or not by hand. As in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2










































Figure 4.2: Distribution of by-item proportion of nonverb responses. Verbs are
ordered as in Figure 4.1 (by median accuracy).
item. A model with the same structure as the one discussed in the last section was
fit with nonverb as the dependent variable, and the likelihood ratio test proce-
dure repeated. In this case, as before, the interaction between lexical context
and context of utterance is not significant; but in contrast to the previous
case, both main effects of lexical context and context of utterance are
significant.
Table 4.3 shows the fixed effect for this model. On the whole, the probability
of nonverb responses is quite low, even at the reference level (lexical context:
nonce × context of utterance: dinner). As one might expect, the chances of
a nonverb response go further down when the items contain real words, but they
also go down in the play context. This appears to be driven by more verbs having
207





lexical context: real −1.396∗∗∗
(0.342)




Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
at least a few somewhat uncertain items in the dinner context, especially when they
involve nonce words.
Dinner sentences were longer on average, and so one plausible driver of the in-
crease in nonword responses is that, in longer sentences, participants get overloaded
with the number of nonce words whose category they are uncertain about and then
shut down, making a random guess.15 To test this, a model including item word
count alongside the other predictors as well as one including both item word count
and its interaction with lexical context alongside context of utterance
was constructed. Neither model showed significant improvement in likelihood ratio
15To establish that dinner sentences were longer on average, a mixed effects poisson regres-
sion was conducted on only the lexical context:real sentences with sentence length as the
dependent variable, a fixed effect for context of utterance, and random intercepts for verb.
The context of utterance effect is significant under a likelihood ratio test comparing this
model to one without the fixed effect (χ2(1) = 5.08, p < 0.05). The coefficient for the dinner
level is furthermore positive (log increase in length: 0.084), suggesting that dinner sentences are
longer on average. (Only lexical context:real were used in this regression since the lexical
context:nonce sentences will necessarily have the same length as their corresponding lexical
context:real sentence.)
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tests (χ2(2) = 1.546, p = 0.462).
4.2.1.5.3 Syntactic features Once a participant knows that the word they are
trying to recover is a verb, the question arises what aspect of the syntactic structure
they might use in recovering the word. To assess this, I use an off-the-shelf method
for measuring variable importance: mean gini decrease in a random forest (Breiman,
2001).16
First, the syntactic features of every item were hand-coded using the same
feature set described in Chapter 3 (see that chapter for a description of each feature
level): complementizer (none, finite, polar question, WH question), embedded
tense (none/no embedding, infinitival, bare, gerund, tensed), matrix subject
(referential, it, there), embedded subject (none/no embedding, nominative, ac-
cusative, case unknown), matrix object 1 (true, false), matrix object 2 (true,
false), matrix oblique (true, false). These features were then merged with their
corresponding items in the HSP dataset, and along with verb, lexical context,
context of utterance, and true word log frequency, were entered into
a random forest classifier with 1000 trees and three variables tried at each split and
accuracy as the dependent variable.
Table 4.4 shows the importance of each feature as measured by the mean
decrease in the Gini obtained when including that feature. Higher numbers mean
better predictability. The best predictor by far is verb, followed closely by true
16Initially, an analysis in the same family as the previous accuracy model was attempted, since
each syntactic feature might have been entered in as a predictor and then its significance tested
in a likelihood ratio test. However, these models showed poor convergence, likely due to gross
imbalances in the distribution of particular feature values, and so a more robust method was used.
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Table 4.4: Variable importance as measured by mean decrease in Gini
mean decrease Gini
verb 1, 255.597





main object 1 131.388
context of utterance 71.683
main subject 60.163
main object 29.048
word frequency. This is somewhat unsurprising given that verbs show high
variability in the accuracies associated with them (see Figure 4.1) and it was already
noted that the log frequency of the true word also predicts higher accuracy. With
regard to other predictors already discussed, the somewhat low importance score
assigned to lexical context is interesting given its significance in the previous
analysis.
Turning to the syntactic, complementizer is the most useful of the syntactic
features. This is likely driven by question complementizers, since overt reflexes of
the nonquestion complementizers are rare; speakers almost always drop the comple-
mentizer in nonquestion complements. The second most important syntactic feature
is embedded tense, which as noted in Chapter 2, is consistently associated (at
least in English) with robust semantic distinctions. embedded subject and main
object 1 follows these. Embedded subject, which encodes the case of the embed-
ded subject if it is ambiguous, may be a useful cue for distinguishing between tensed
and untensed complements if that particular distinction is ambiguous in a particular
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instance. main object 1 is likely useful for determining whether something is a
speech verb—in particular, tell.
4.2.1.5.4 Response distributions This is useful, but it’s not quite the end of the
story. One thing that the previous analyses do not take into account is that, even
if participants don’t give the exact verb that occurred in a particular position, they
might nevertheless answer with one that is semantically similar. For instance, note
that the overall accuracy for remember is quite low, and to some extent, this could
be a product of nonverb responses. But even among verb responses, the sorts of re-
sponses participants give are far from random. As I will show, the most common re-
sponse to remember sentences was not remember, but know. Considering that know
seems to be involved in the meaning of remember at some level of representation—x
remembered p at t seems to presuppose that x knew p at s < t—it’s quite interesting
that participants give this response.
To get a feel for how prevalent inaccurate-yet-semantically-similar responses
are, I now turn to a qualitative analysis of the distribution of responses to each
verb’s items. In the next subsection (Section 4.2.2), this qualitative analysis will be
augmented with a quantitative analysis that uses a similarity judgment task akin to
those presented in Chapter 2. To delve into these responses, it will be useful to first
find the proportion of times a word was given for a particular item, then look at the
distribution of those proportions. This is analogous to looking at the distribution of
accuracy over items shown in Figure 4.1, where the outcomes are binary (accurate v.
nonaccurate); the differences is that here, the outcomes are treated as many-valued.
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Prior to looking at these distributions, it’s necessary to perform some prepro-
cessing on the responses. Because some items will involve an inflected version of the
verb, the correct response will be the verb’s inflected form. For the purposes of com-
puting response accuracy, a match between the true word in its inflected form and
the response is ideal. For the current analysis, the inflectional morphology is likely
not important. Therefore, it will be useful to map the true verb and the responses to
their root form. One way to obtain these root forms is to use a stemmer. Stemmers
make frequent mistakes, however, and since there are so few response types (see
above for counts), it is easy to lemmatize by hand. This hand lemmatization was
done for all response types, regardless of syntactic category, except for adverbs.17
After this lemmatization, the proportion of times a particular root form was
given as a response to a particular item was computed. This results in a relative
frequency distribution over the root form of responses for each item. Because (i) for
current purposes we care about general trends over items for particular verbs and
(ii) it is difficult to visualize each item’s distribution in an easy to digest way, I graph
these distributions by response type in Figure 4.3. This graph shows, for each verb,
the response roots with the highest median relative frequency over items. Thus, as
in 4.1, each bar represents datapoints for 20 items in the relevant condition. The
bar itself gives the median and the error bar gives the range.
We see that for verbs think, want, see, tell, and know, the most common
responses in both the real and nonce conditions are the true verb itself. This
17Two issues arose for this lemmatization: (i) all past participal forms were converted into their
root verb, even though this might be problematic when the response was intended to be a deverbal



















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.3: Distribution of by-item response root relative frequencies given verb,
lexical context, and context of utterance. Each bar+error bar represents the distri-
bution of relative frequency for the labeled response root over the 20 items in that
condition.
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suggests that many of the sentences these verbs are found in are highly informative
about their semantics and, further, that this seems to be a result of their syntax to a
great extent—since these verbs are guessed even without lexical context. Among the
other responses for these verbs, think and know, notably, have responses that tend to
involve representational attitudes: the second and third most common responses to
think sentences are know and hope, respectively, in both real and nonce conditions
and the third most common response to know sentences is think.18 Tell has responses
that tend to be communicative (ask and show) or that at least involve a transfer
semantics (give). See has responses that are cognitive but nonperceptual (know) but
also some very bleached responses (do). And want has a secondary response that is
quite bleached (have) but other responses that are closer to its preferential semantics
(need)—though these responses are not given much more often than representational
responses like know and think, which is interesting.
For the verbs say, need, and hear, the most common response in the real
conditions is the true verb but not in the nonce conditions. This may suggest that
much of participants’ ability to guess the correct verb in these three cases is somehow
dependent on the lexical context. Each has a slightly different response profile
in terms of how (intuitively) close the responses are to the true verb’s meaning.
For instance, like want, need receives many bleached responses (have), but it also
receives quite a few responses with preferential semantics (want) in both the real
and nonce conditions. Similarly, hear receives quite a few bleached response (do),
18It is unclear whether the use of care, the second most common response to know sentences, is
representational or not.
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but also quite a few perceptual responses (see). This may suggest that the fact that
hear is perceptual is encoded in at least some of the items—e.g. in small clause
items, like John heard Mary leave—but that what kind of perceptual verb it is is
not gleanable.19 Say differs from need and hear in this respect in the sense that,
while it has common representational responses (think and know), it doesn’t seem
to have any common speech responses, except for maybe call. One possibility is
that say—like many of the speech verbs—has more perceptual correlates than the
other representationals, and thus that a syntax-based learner would require more
nonlingistic context than for the other representationals.
The final group of verbs—remember and guess are interesting for the fact
that, though their most common responses in either the nonce or real conditions are
technically incorrect, they are both quite close semantically. In the case of remember,
the vast majority of responses are know. This is interesting since remember seems
to encode know as a subpart of its meaning (as mentioned above). Further, the
other responses to remember are also broadly representational, with both cognitive
(think) and perceptual (see) representationals. Guess similarly has a most common
response that is representational (think) and most of the other responses are also
representational (hope, know, see).
One interesting aspect of both of these cases is that the representationals cross
not only the cognitive-perceptual divide, but also the factive-nonfactive divide. Fac-
tive remember gets think responses and nonfactive guess gets factive responses know.
19The fact that see is a common response to both see and hear sentences could suggest a
frequency effect, which seems likely since see is about two orders of magnitude more frequent (as
measured by the frequency in ukWaC) in the present tense than hear. (They are about equally
frequent in the past.)
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Indeed, this extends to even the previous two groups of verbs, where nonfactive
think, say, and hear got know responses and factive know got think responses. One
reason this may be is that the purported syntactic cue to factivity—that the fac-
tive verb occurs with both polar question and nonquestion complements—cannot
be contained within a single subcategorization frame; it is fundamentally an aspect
of a verb’s distribution.
4.2.1.6 Discussion
In this section, I explored various aspects of participants’ responses to the
HSP norming task. I showed that accuracy in this task is predicted by both lexical
context, corroborating previous findings in this domain, and true word frequency.
I then investigated further drivers of this accuracy: participants ability to detect
that the target word was a verb and, once participants correctly detect syntactic
category, the syntactic features that predict accuracy. I then moved on to a more
fine-grained analysis of participants response distributions, and found that many
common responses to a particular verb’s items tended to be somewhat semantically
close to that verb. With the next norming task, I aim to quantify this semantic
closeness explicitly.
4.2.2 Similarity norming
In the previous task, I noted that despite the wide variability in item accuracy
across verbs, even inaccurate responses are not completely random. Indeed, this
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has been noted since the inception of HSP. In this task, I aim to quantify this
semantic closeness using the same sort of similarity task employed in Chapter 2. I
then conduct analyses of these similarities akin to the accuracy analyses from the
last section.
4.2.2.1 Design
All response roots that were (i) marked as verbs in Section 4.2.1.5.2 and (ii)
were inaccurate were paired with the true verb that occurred in that position. (This
is why only inaccurate pairs were retained. An accurate pair is just the same verb
twice.) There were 2429 such pairs. For each of the 10 verbs sampled from the
corpus, the pairs involving that word as the true word were then randomized and
inserted into lists, with amount of pairs proportional to the number of unique re-
sponse types to a particular word. With the criterion that each list should contain
around 60 pairs, 37 lists were created in this way.
4.2.2.2 Participants
155 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)—
five for 36 of the lists and 10 for the last20—using a standard Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) template designed for this particular experiment.21 Prior to viewing
the HIT, participants were required to score seven or better on a nine question
20The five extra participants were recruited because an off-by-one error that affected only one
list was discovered after the first five were run for that list.
21A separate experiment script was created in Ibex for each list. The javascript and HTML for
this script were then scraped and loaded into an AMT HIT template designed for this task.
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qualification test assessing whether they were a native speaker of American English.
Along with this qualification test, participants’ IP addresses were required to be
associated with a location within the United States, and their HIT acceptance rates
were required to be 95% or better. Once a participant’s submission was received,
they were paid $1.
4.2.2.3 Data validation
As in the previous task, a log reaction time-based data validation procedure
was conducted. First, each participant’s median log RT was computed. The median
of these median log RTs as well as the interquartile range (IQR)—the difference
between 25th and 75th precentiles)—was then computed. Participants were excluded
using Tukey’s method applied to both participant medians (described above) and
IQRs. 5 participants’ median log RTs fell below Q1 log RT minus 1.5 times the IQR
and were thus excluded. No participant’s IQR fell outside of the Tukey interval of
IQRs across participants.
The same RT-based exclusion procedure was also conducted for particular re-
sponses. For each participant, the IQR of the log RT for that participant’s responses
was computed. Responses were then excluded if they fell below that participant’s
median log RT minus 1.5 times that participant’s specific IQR. 18 responses (across
participants) were excluded in this way. This yielded a total of 12320 observations
with the minimum number of observations per item being 4. (Post-filtering, 7 items
had 4 responses and the remaining 1737 had 5 or more.)
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4.2.2.4 Results
Prior to analysis, two standardization procedures were applied to similarity
judgments: a ridit scoring and a z-scoring. Ridit scoring involves constructing
for each participant the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of their
responses, then mapping each discrete response level to its corresponding quantile,
thus accounting for differences in participants’ use of the ordinal scale and forcing
the ratings onto the unit interval. Z-scoring involves first mean-centering the ordinal
responses (as though they were interval responses) and dividing each by the standard
deviation of the responses (again, as though they were interval responses). This ridit
scoring is used for the purposes of visualizing the data as well as for later construction
of the task this is a norming study for. The z-scored responses are used in the
statistical analysis, since they allow for the use of standard linear models, which
tend to be much easier to fit.
The average of both the ridit score and z-score transformed variants of the
judgments was then taken (separately) and each result associated with each of the
true word-response pairs from the previous experiment. Following the lead of the
accuracy graph (Figure 4.1) from the last section, the by-item mean of these ridit
scored judgments was then taken. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the distribution of these
by-item similarity means by verb and context of utterance. Figure 4.4 includes accu-
rate response in this mean as 1s and nonverb responses as 0s (neither of which were
included in the similarity task). Figure 4.5 shows only the similarity distributions































































Figure 4.5: Distribution of ridit-scored similarity across items with accurate items
set to 1.
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4.2.2.4.1 Fixed effects To assess the effects of lexical context and context
of utterance on the similarity between an inaccurate verb response and the true
word, a linear mixed effects model was fit with mean z-score similarity for each
true word-response word as the dependent variable; lexical context, context
of utterance, and their interaction as fixed effects; and random intercepts for
participant, verb, and item (nested under verb). Thus, this model has the same
structure as the original accuracy model, but instead of being fit to accuracy as the
dependent variable, it is fit to similarity as indexed by the mean of participants’
z-scored similarity responses to a particular response-true word pair—only when
the response was inaccurate.22 And as before, likelihood ratio tests were conducted
to assess the significance of particular predictors. As before, the interaction term
was not significant (χ2(1) = 0.002, p = 0.968) and was thus dropped. The two
main effect terms lexical context (χ2(1) = 14.961, p < 0.001) and context of
utterance (χ2(1) = 7.807, p < 0.01) were significant and were thus kept.
Table 4.5 shows the fixed effect estimates for the resulting model. As in the
previous section, estimates are given in terms of reference coding with a reference
level lexical context: nonce × context of utterance: dinner. The posi-
tive effect of lexical context: real suggests that participants were able to get
closer to the true word’s semantics when they had both syntactic and lexical infor-
mation. This is yet another corroboration of the utility of combining structural and
22Indeed, the current model can be thought of as the continuous component of a two-stage zero-
inflation model: one that first considers whether the response given by a participant will be a verb
or not; then decides whether that response will be accurate; then if inaccurate, decides how similar
the response is to the true response. The accuracy and nonverb models from the last section would
serve as the first two components.
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lexical context: real 0.126∗∗∗
(0.032)




Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
lexical information. The positive effect of context of utterance suggests that
participants were able to get closer to the true word’s semantics when they were
responding to sentences that came from the play context.
This latter effect is quite interesting, since in the accuracy model, no significant
effect of context of utterance obtains. This means that though participants
are not reliably more likely to respond with the true word based alone on the context
in which a sentence was uttered, they do get reliably closer to that word. This may in
turn arise due to the same reason that participants are better able to grasp the true
syntactic category of the word in the play contexts. It further suggests that dinner
contexts may be a particularly interesting test case, since on the whole they provide
somewhat less information per-occurrence about an attitude verbs semantics. I
return to this in the discussion.
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4.2.2.4.2 Random effects Turning now to the random effects, the variance for the
participant random intercepts is 0.012 (sd: 0.111); the variance for the verb random
intercepts is 0.136 (sd: 0.369); and the variance for the item random intercepts is
0.174 (sd: 0.417). The size of the participant random intercept standard deviation
is about the size of the effect of lexical context. This suggests that partici-
pants showed variability in their ability to produce high similarity inaccurate verb
responses that dwarfs the consistently robust effect of lexical context; said an-
other way, it would be unsurprising from the point of view of this model if some
participants did about as well with nonce contexts as others did with real contexts
(holding context of utterance fixed). Given that the fixed effect of context
of utterance is slightly smaller than that of lexical context, this also holds,
mutatis mutandis, for context of utterance.
As in the accuracy model, verb and item variance far outstrip participant vari-
ance with standard deviations 3− 4 times the size of that estimated for participant
effects. Looking at the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors for the verb intercepts, this
variability appears to affect different classes of verbs differently. Inaccurate verb
responses to perception verbs (hear, see) and (tell, say) tend to be much less simi-
lar to the true verb than those to, e.g., cognitive representations (remember, know,
think, guess). This seems likely driven by the fact that the perception and speech
verbs very often take noun phrase complements, which is likely only a vague cue to
their semantics, whereas the cognitive representationals do so less often, tending to
take full clausal complements.
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Table 4.6: Variable importance as measured by increase in node purity predicting




main object 1 308.085
complementizer 209.125
main subject 149.053
context of utterance 63.127
lexical context 49.653
main prep 35.782
main object 2 3.429
4.2.2.4.3 Syntactic features To investigate this conjecture further, I carry out a
variable importance analysis similar to the one presented in the last section. There,
I entered the hand-coded syntactic features associated with each item into a random
forest classifier. In this case, I enter the inaccurate verb response z-score similarities
analyzed above along with verb, lexical context, and context of utter-
ance into a random forest regression with 1000 trees and 3 variables tried at each
split. Table 4.6 shows the variable importance measure increase in node purity
for this model.
Here, again, verb comes out as an important predictor, as one might expect
given the high variability in accuracy across verbs seen in the analysis of the random
effects in the last section. Also as in the last section, embedded tense, main
object 1, and complementizer are important predictors.
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4.2.2.5 Discussion
In this section, I presented a norming task aimed at gathering a measure of
similarity of participants’ responses to the true verb that occurred in a particular
item. I then explored various aspects of participants’ inaccurate verb responses
to the HSP norming task. I showed that accuracy in this task is predicted by
both lexical context and context of utterance. I then investigated further drivers of
these inaccurate verb response similarities: in particular, the syntactic features that
predict similarity. Here, I showed that the same predictors that predict accuracy
are also important predictors of similarity.
4.3 Spatial human simulation
In this section, I use the two norming tasks presented above to construct a
third experiment aimed at investigating participants’ ability to recover the semantics
of an attitude verb. This paradigm is close to a standard HSP experiment in the
sense that, unlike the first norming task above, participants are told that they were
learning the same word over multiple items. It differs, however, in the sense that,
instead of giving a free choice response after each item is presented, participants are
asked for similarity judgments after the entire set of items.
4.3.1 Design
The task has two main parts: a training phase, in which participants receive a
set of sentences containing the same novel word, and a test phase, in which partici-
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pants are asked to make ordinal scale similarity judgments. In the first part of the
test phases, participants make similarity judgments between the novel word they
were just trained on and all real words from the ordinal scale experiment presented
in Chapter 2. In the second part of the test phase, participants make similarity
judgments between two known words drawn from this same group and selected so
as to span the similarity range.
The experiment has four factors: verb (the same 10 verbs tested in the norm-
ing studies), lexical context (real v. nonce), informativity (high v. low)
and training size (big v. small). These latter two factors are explained in more
detail below; the former two are the same as from the norming studies.
4.3.2 Materials
Training sets were constructed by partitioning the sentences corresponding to
each verb from the previous experiment into two sets by-verb. For each of the ten
verbs from the norming studies, the median ridit similarity value was obtained by
averaging over the values for responses to each item, including accurate responses as
1 and nonverb responses as 0. Items with scores below this median were labeled low
informativity (LI) for that verb and items with scores above the median were labeled
high informativity (HI). Thus, for each verb at each level of lexical context (real
and nonce), there were 10 LI and 10 HI items.
Training sets were then constructed from either solely HI or solely LI items.23
23This diverges from Medina et al. (2011) in the sense that their training sets involved a mix
of the two sets. The reason this was done here was to attempt to draw out the largest possible
difference from the sets, which as I show, even this stark partitioning is barely able to do. People
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Two of the training sets use all of the items in the informativity partition (training
size: big). The other uses only half the items (training size: small). In the
LI + small case, the lowest informativity items were used—i.e. those in the first
quartile of informativity scores for their particular verb—and in the HI + small
case, the highest informativity items were used—i.e. this in the fourth quartile of
the informativity scores for their particular verb.
10 different nonce-real test sets were constructed. This test set consisted of 31
pairs: the nonce verb participants were trained on paired with the 31 verbs in the
ordinal scale task presented in Chapter 2 and used again in Chapter 3. A real-real
test list that remained constant across training sets was also constructed. This list
was selected from all pairs in the original ordinal scale task by ordering those pairs
based on their mean z-scored rating across participants and then taking every 30th
pair. This selection was hand-checked to ensure that a few verbs didn’t show up a
disproportionate amount of times under this procedure. None did. The reasoning
behind this selection procedure was the ensure that the pairs come from across the
similarity space, so that any contraction or expansion in the mapping governing
participants similarity responses due to the training could be detected.
4.3.3 Participants
2400 participants (515 unique) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) using a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) template designed for this
perform extremely well at the task even with LI sets.
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particular experiment.24 Prior to viewing the HIT, participants were required to
score seven or better on a nine question qualification test assessing whether they
were a native speaker of American English. Along with this qualification test, par-
ticipants’ IP addresses were required to be associated with a location within the
United States, and their HIT acceptance rates were required to be 95% or better.
Once this submission was received, participants were paid $1.
Participants were allowed to do as many of the lists as they liked, though they
were not allowed to do the same list more than once. Lists were deployed in batches
of 10, each containing a training set for a particular true verb. This was done to
ensure that any participant who did two lists in quick succession would not have
gotten two lists pertaining to the same true verb. The median number of lists that
each participant did was 1 and the mean was 4.7.
4.3.4 Data validation
Three separate filtering stages were conducted prior to analysis: (i) participant
filtering based on memory task accuracy; (ii) participant filtering based on median
and IQR of (log) reaction times to the similarity task; and (iii) response filtering
based on median and IQR of (log) reaction times by-participant.
For the first stage of filtering a mixed effects logistic regression with random
intercepts for participant and verb was built with accuracy on the memory task as
the dependent variable and all experimental conditions lexical context, item
24A separate experiment script was created in Ibex for each list. The javascript and HTML for
this script were then scraped and loaded into an AMT HIT template designed for this task.
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informativity, and training size) as well as all possible two- and three-way
interactions as fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects was meant to control
for the fact that the memory task in certain conditions may be harder—e.g. those
conditions with lexical context: nonce, where participants had to remember
nonce words—or less well estimated—e.g. an error in the conditions with training
size:small counts more than one in training size:big. This full interaction model
was tested against a model without the three-way interaction but with the two-way
interactions using a likelihood ratio test, and the three-way interaction was found
to be significant (χ2(1) = 17.01, p < 0.001), so the full model was kept.
Table 4.7 shows the fixed effects of this model. We see here that—somewhat
unsurprisingly—participants do better at the memory task when the lexical context
is real words as opposed to nonce words. More surprisingly, they also appear to
do significantly better when the lexical context is both real words and the items
are high informativity or the training size is larger. These three positive effects are
slightly tamped down by the significant three-way interaction, which is negative and
essentially works to cancel the two two-way interactions just mentioned.
Participants were excluded based on the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors
(BLUPs) of the participant random intercepts inferred by the model—fit using
Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) as implemented in the R package lme4.
These BLUPs for the participant intercepts were then mean-centered and standard-
ized by their standard deviation. All participants whose standardized intercept fell
below −2—i.e. two standard deviations below the mean accuracy—were then ex-
cluded. This results in the exclusion of 25 total participants, and the loss of 9920
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Table 4.7: Fixed effects of mixed effects logistic regression with random intercepts
for participant and verb. The reference level is lexical context:nonce x infor-











lexical context:real x informativity:high 0.526∗∗
(0.249)
lexical context:real x training size:big 0.522∗∗
(0.213)
informativity:high x training size:big 0.093
(0.170)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,724.793
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 7,801.458
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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total datapoints.
Next, as in previous sections, participants were excluded based on a reac-
tion time analysis (see above for procedure). Only reaction time to the similarity
judgment task was considered. In the median-based filtering, 9 participants had a
median log RT below the Tukey interval of participant medians and were excluded,
resulting in the enclusion of 10240 datapoints. In the IQR-based filtering, 2 partic-
ipants had IQRs of log RTs outside the Tukey interval, resulting in the exclusion of
310 datapoints.
Finally, as in previous sections, particular responses were excluded based on a
reaction time (see above for procedure). 685 observations (across participants) were
excluded for a log RT falling outside the Tukey interval for the participant that gave
that response.
The final dataset size after this filtering was 125412 observations (60568 nonce-
real judgments) with each list having at least 18 response sets (out of the 30 total
collected). Note that this results in a number of responses to any particular simi-
larity judgment item that is still more than three times greater than the number of
responses even to the original likert scale task, presented in Chapter 2, which only
had 5 responses per verb pair.
4.3.5 Results
In this section, I present two types of analysis: one that assesses the overall
effects of manipulating the training set size and informativity on participants’ ability
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to recover the true word from the training items corresponding to that word; and
another that assesses what representation participants learned.
To investigate the first, I compare the ordinal scale similarities presented in
Chapter 2 to the similarity responses reported by participants in the learning task.
As is standard with ordinal scale judgments, responses for both the original task
and the current task were z-score-transformed by participant. The mean over these
transformed responses was then taken over pairs in the original task, thus yielding
a single similarity value for each possible (unordered) pairing.
The similarity values for each of the true verbs for which training sets were built
in the current study were then paired with each set of responses given by participant.
For instance, for training sets built from sentences that originally contained think,
the (transformed) similarity judgments given after being trained on those sentences
were paired with the (transformed and averaged) similarity judgments from the
original experiment for which think was one of the verbs in the pair. The idea behind
the current analysis is to then assess the correlation between the true word similarity
judgments, obtained from the original similarity task carried out in Chapter 2, and
what I refer to as the learned word judgments, as obtained from the current task.
More specifically, I ask how predictable the learned word similarity judgments are
given the true word similarity and the various factors present in the experimental
design
To carry this analysis out, I begin with a mixed effects model with fixed effects
for true word similarity, lexical context, informativity, and training
size as well as all two-way, three-way, and four-way interactions between these vari-
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ables; random intercepts for participant and verbs as well as random slopes for true
word similarity for both participants and verbs. The fixed effects allow for the
assessment of the overall effects of the experimental factors on participants’ ability
to recapitulate the true verbs similarity ratings from the training set they received,
and the random effects allow for the assessment of variability across participants
and verbs in accuracy of this recapitulation.
As in previous sections, I carry out a series of likelihood ratio tests to as-
sess which fixed effects should be kept in the model. First, the same model as
above was fit without the one four-way interaction and compared to the full model
with that interaction. This four-way interaction does not come out significant
(χ2(1) = 2.537, p = 0.111) and was thus dropped. Next, three models excluding all
three-way interactions containing a particular categorical variable (lexical con-
text, informativity, or training size). For instance, excluding the three-way
interactions involving lexical context would entail excluding true word simi-
larity × lexical context: real × informativity: high, true word similar-
ity × lexical context: real × training size: big, and lexical context: real
× informativity: high × training size: big. Under this criterion, the three-way
interactions containing informativity (χ2(3) = 25.126, p < 0.001) and training-
size (χ2(3) = 25.197, p < 0.001) come out significant, while those containing lexi-
cal context do not (χ2(3) = 0.632, p = 0.889). Thus, all three-way interactions
containing lexical context were dropped, leaving a single three-way interaction:
true word similarity × informativity: high × training size: big. This in-
teraction was also tested alone and came out significant (χ2(1) = 24.832, p < 0.001).
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The final model’s fixed effects can be found in Table 4.8.
4.3.5.1 Fixed effects
I now delve into these fixed effect estimates. These estimates are given in
reference coding with the following reference level: lexical context:nonce × in-
formativity:low × training size:small. (As is standard for continuous variables,
the intercept represents true word similarity at 0). Coefficients for true word
similarity or any of the interactions that contain it represent slopes or changes in
slope; all other variables can be thought of as shifts in the intercept for the relevant
condition (moving the line up or down along the y-axis wholesale). Since the inter-
esting aspect of these data is the correlation between the true word similarity and
the learning word similarity, I focus solely on this former sort of coefficient. (It is
unclear to me how one should interpret for the latter with respect to participants’
ability to learn a word’s semantics from its linguistic contexts.)
The first important coefficient is the one corresponding to true word simi-
larity. This coefficient gives the relationship between the true word similarity and
learned word similarity in the reference level (lexical context:nonce × infor-
mativity:low × training size:small), which should intuitively be the hardest.
Nonetheless, on average, participants recapitulate the similarity judgments of the
true word reliably, shown by the positive slope. As one might expect from results in
the norming studies, participants do reliably better when given lexical information—
even in the low informativity contexts with small training sizes—which can be seen
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Table 4.8: Fixed effects of mixed effects regression with random intercepts for par-
ticipant and verb. The reference level is lexical context:nonce × informa-
tivity:low × training size:small. (As is standard for continuous variables, the





true word similarity 0.375∗∗∗
(0.030)




training size: big 0.050∗∗
(0.023)
true word similarity × lexical context: real 0.068∗∗∗
(0.011)
true word similarity × informativity: high 0.005
(0.016)
true word similarity × training size: big −0.035∗∗
(0.016)
lexical context: real × informativity: high −0.026
(0.027)
lexical context: real × training size: big 0.028
(0.027)
informativity: high × training size: big −0.025
(0.027)




Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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in the reliably positive interaction between true word similarity and lexical
context.
Interestingly, the other two two-way interactions—true word similarity
with informativity and training size show different trends. As can be seen from
the interaction of true word similarity and informativity, participants do no
better when given high informativity items with small training sets containing nonce
words than if they’re given low informativity items. And, as can be seen from the
reliable negative iteraction between true word similarity and training size,
if they are given more low informativity nonce items, they actually do worse. The
last makes intuitive sense: low informativity items were low informativity because
participants didn’t get very close to the relevant verb’s semantics, compared to other
items containing that verb, so giving a participant more of those items would likely
only hinder their ability to find the correct semantics. With this said, however,
the size of this interaction relative to the main effect of true word similarity
is actually quite small (less than 10% of the size), and so participants’ inferences
actually still look quite robust.
Finally, the positive three-way interaction true word similarity × in-
formativity: high × training size:big suggest that getting more contextual
information only helps when the instances received are high informativity. This
also makes intuitive sense: if one gets a lot of really good information about the
semantics of a word, they should do better in recovering those semantics. What’s
interesting about this effect is its size interpreted in the context of its constitutive
two-way interactions. Note that the size of the interaction between true word
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similarity and training size a third and a quarter the size of the three-way
interaction, meaning that getting more good items seems to help more than getting
more bad items hurts. This is interesting in the current context, since real dis-
tributions will include some high informativity and some low informativity items,
and so even if a learner were to get a string of low informativity items, a string of
high informativity items might well quickly return them to the correct part of the
semantic space.
4.3.5.2 Random effects
I now turn to the random effects estimates, which allow for the quantification
of uncertainty across verbs and participants. I again focus on the slope estimates—
here, the by-verb and by-participant random slopes—since the intercepts don’t have
clearly interesting interpretation. The variance estimate for the verb slopes was
0.007 (sd: 0.085) and the variance estimate for the participant slopes was 0.033 (sd:
0.182). This state of affairs is the complete flip of that seen in the norming studies
where there tended to be low variability due to participants and high variability due
to verbs.
For a rough comparison to the fixed effects just mentioned, this variability
among verbs might make a randomly selected verb look about as good (for the av-
erage participant) in the lexical context : real × informativity: low × training
size:small condition as an average verb in the lexical context : real × informa-
tivity: high × training size:big condition. That is, this model would not be
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very surprised if there are some verbs that could be learned twice as fast as others
even with bad data, or conversely, for which it would take twice as long to learn
even with good data. In contrast, a randomly selected participant might do just as
well (for an average verb) in the lexical context : nonce × informativity: low ×
training size:small condition as an average participant in the lexical context : real
× informativity: high × training size:big condition.
Delving into participant variance within particular conditions, the rough gen-
eralization seems to be that participants show lower variability when they are in one
of the “extreme” conditions—nonce words with small low informativity training sets
or real words with big high informativity training sets—but higher variability in the
“middling conditions.” One reason for this might be that the extreme conditions
give so little or so much information to work with that participants tend to come
to the same conclusions about the semantics, but as more or better information
comes in, participants have to work harder to incorporate that information into
their representation of the word.
4.3.5.3 Relationship to known words
One thing the above analysis does not tell us is what the representations
that participants learn might look like. To assess this, I now analyze the actual
similarity judgments that participants gave. As an initial stab, the number of times
each participant from each condition gave a particular verb the highest rating that
participant gave to any response was extracted. The maximum count for these
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was then computed within the condition and the verb with this maximum count
extracted. For the verbs want, think, tell, and know, this verb was the true verb
across conditions. For guess, the verb was think for every condition except for the
lexical context : real × informativity: high × training size:big condition. For
say, the verb was say for all but some of the low informativity conditions, where
think, want, and know were given. For remember, remember was given in about half
the conditions and know, think, and understand were given in the others. For hear,
see was given in about half the conditions, with tell, think, hear, and feel filling in
the rest. On the whole then, participants appear to be quite accurate in recovering
at the least the correct space of verbs—e.g. representational v. nonrepresentational
or even, to some extent, factive v. nonfactive—if not the true verb itself.
This, however, is only a rough measure and throws away quite a bit of in-
formation latent in the similarity judgments. To access this information, a more
fine-grained analysis is necessary. I give a preliminary one here, but leave a more
sophisticated one for future work.
4.4 Discussion
In Chapters 2 and 3, I showed that there is quite fine-grained semantic infor-
mation present in propositional attitude verbs’ syntactic distributions—both their
competence distributions (Chapter 2) and their performance distributions (Chapter
3). One question that remains even after showing this is whether it is reasonable to
assume that learners have such access to verbs’ entire syntactic distribution when
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making inferences about those verbs’ meanings. The answer to this is almost surely
no. Learners receive data incrementally, and it seems likely that the inferences
that underlie word-learning also operate incrementally. The question that natu-
rally arises, then, is whether learners can take advantage of attitude verb syntactic
distributions in an incremental setting.
In this chapter, I presented three experimental studies aimed at answering
this question. The first two experiments, norming studies for the third, were aimed
at assessing the informativity of particular sentences in children’s input using a
variant of the Human Simulation Paradigm (HSP). I did this by extending a previous
norming methodology, pioneered by Medina et al. (2011), to allow the similarity
between a true word and a response to be quantified.
I then used the results of these norming studies to construct an experiment
that manipulated the informativity of items in different training sets given to partici-
pants. In this experiment, participants were taught a novel word using these training
sets, as in the standard HSP task, but instead of asking participants to make guesses
about the word that occurred in each item of the training set, they were asked, after
viewing the entire set, to make similarity judgments between the word they just
learned and words they already knew. The idea here was that this might allow for
the quantification of uncertainty in participants’ grasp of the novel words semantic
features. Corroborating previous experiments, I showed that participants can uti-
lize syntactic information quite robustly, even using only low informativity learning
instances, to learn the meanings of a novel word.
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Chapter 5: A strategy for solving the labeling problem
In Chapter 1, I defined two of the main problems of syntactic bootstrapping
approaches to verb learning. On the one hand, the syntactic bootstrapping model
must define a method by which to discover regularities in verbs’ syntactic distribu-
tions (the clustering problem) and on the other it must have some way of linking
these regularities with the facets of meaning they are associated with (the labeling
problem). One strength of the syntactic bootstrapping approach is that it gives a
natural solution to both problems. Verbs are clustered based on how many of the
same syntactic contexts they occur in and these clusters are labeled based on rules
relating semantic features and syntactic contexts.
One weakness of this approach, at least in its traditional instantiation, is
that it is brittle to cross-linguistic variation. This brittleness does not show for
many commonly studied classes of verbs—e.g. vanilla transitive verbs like hit or
ditransitive verbs like give—since those classes tend to have fairly cross-linguistically
stable syntactic distributions. But as noted briefly in Chapter 1 and as elaborated
more fully below, this brittleness is potentially damning for traditional solutions to
the labeling problem, since they rely on fixed rules mapping syntax to semantics.
This is particularly problematic in the domain of propositional attitude verbs, since
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these verbs show much more cross-linguistic variability with respect to the kinds of
syntactic contexts they occur in.
In this chapter, I show one way that the traditional approach might be adapted
to solve this problem that relies in a crucial way on the properties of the model of
syntactic bootstrapping developed in this dissertation. Like traditional approaches
to syntactic bootstrapping, the model I propose in Chapters 2 and 3 encodes the
abstract notion of a projection rule—a rule that maps from semantic features to
syntactic contexts/features. Unlike the traditional syntactic bootstrapping model,
however, the rules themselves undergo change; they are inferred at the same time
verbs’ semantic features are. It is this flexibility in inferring the mapping rules that
I seize on to solve the labeling problem for attitude verbs.
To concretize this proposal, I focus on a particular distinction among attitude
verbs: the representational-preferential distinction. As I have noted throughout the
preceding chapters, this distinction is robustly attested in participants’ similarity
judgments, both for words they already know (Chapters 2 and 3) and for words they
have just learned (Chapter 4). And in English it appears to be robustly tracked by
tense, evidenced both in acceptability judgments (Chapter 2) and corpus distribu-
tions (Chapter 3). But as I noted briefly in Chapter 1, tense does not robustly
track this distinction cross-linguistically. In the next section, I review the syntactic
correlates of this distinction in English—suggested in previous literature and corrob-
orated in previous chapters—noting in particular that tense appears to be a robust
correlate in English. I then present two problem cases for tense in particular as a
cue to the representational-preferential distinction.
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Following previous work in this domain, I then suggest that the syntactic
correlates of the representational-preferential distinction in each of the three cases
discussed can be given an abstract characterization in the following terms: represen-
tational verbs, like think and know, take subordinate clauses that are more closely
matched to main clauses than those taken by (pure) preferential verbs, like want
and prefer. This relativizes the mapping between the representationality feature and
syntactic context to a language while retaining the abstract notion of projection.
This, in turn, makes it possible to construct such a learner within the model I have
been developing, which I give a preliminary sketch of in English. I then turn to a
small experiment in implementing this proposal before concluding with some future
directions.
5.1 The representational-preferential distinction
5.1.1 Representationals and preferentials in English
I now review the representational-preferential distinction discussed in Chap-
ter 1. This distinction is one among propositional attitude verbs is that between
verbs that express beliefs—or represent “mental pictures” or “judgments of truth”
(Bolinger, 1968)—and those that express desires—or more generally, orderings on
states of affairs induced by, e.g. commands, laws, preferences, etc. (Bolinger, 1968;
Stalnaker, 1984; Farkas, 1985; Heim, 1992; Villalta, 2000, 2008; Anand and Hac-
quard, 2013, a.o.). Within the first class—the representationals—fall verbs like think
and know—and within the second class—the preferentials—fall verbs like want and
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order.
There appear to be various aspects of the syntactic distribution that roughly
track this distinction in English. One well-known case—the parade case—is finite-
ness: representationals tend to allow finite subordinate clauses (1a) but not nonfinite
ones (1b) while preferentials tend to allow nonfinite subordinate clauses (2b) but
not finite ones (2a).
(1) a. John thinks that Mary went to the store.
b. *John thinks Mary to go to the store.
(2) a. *John wants that Mary went to the store.
b. John wants Mary to go to the store.
There are two important things to note about this distinction. First, though the
representationality distinction is often talked about as though it were mutually
exclusive, some verbs appear to fall into both categories. For instance, as noted in
the last section, hope p involves both a desire that p come about and the belief that p
is possible (Portner, 1992; Scheffler, 2009; Anand and Hacquard, 2013, but see also
Portner and Rubinstein 2013). Ideally, then, a model of syntactic bootstrapping
would discover that hope has both a representational and a preferential semantics.
Such a discovery seems plausibly since hope shows up in both finite (3a) and nonfinite
(3b) frames.
(3) a. John hopes that Mary went to the store.
b. John hopes to go to the store.
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Second, the link between representationality and finiteness is just a tendency. Some
verbs plausibly classed as representationals allow nonfinite subordinate clauses (17a)/(17b),
and others plausibly classed as preferentials allow subordinate clauses that look fi-
nite (17c). In spite of this, as I show in Chapters 2 through 4, finiteness is a useful
cue in distinguishing representationals and preferentials.
5.1.2 Representationals and preferentials outside English
The roughness of this correlation is perhaps not surprising since not all lan-
guages track representationality with tense. I focus on two cases of this: ones where
the distinction is roughly tracked by mood—in the Romance languages, representa-
tionals tend to take indicative mood and preferentials tend to take subjunctive mood
(Bolinger, 1968; Hooper, 1975; Farkas, 1985; Portner, 1992; Giorgi and Pianesi, 1997;
Giannakidou, 1997; Quer, 1998; Villalta, 2000, 2008, a.o.)—and others where the
distinction is tracked by the availability of verb second (V2) syntax (Truckenbrodt,
2006; Scheffler, 2009).
An instance of the correlation with mood can be seen in Spanish. In Spanish
both the representational (belief) verb creer (think/believe) and the preferential
(desire) verb querer (want) take finite subordinate clauses. The difference between
these subordinate clauses is that, whereas verbs like creer (think) take subordinate
clauses with verbs inflected for indicative mood (4a), verbs like querer (want) take






























This makes the subordinate clause under creer look more like the declarative main
clause in Spanish, whose tensed verb is inflected for indicative mood.
(5) Peter va a la casa.
Peter go.pres.ind to the house.
An instance of the correlation with V2 can be seen in German and other Germanic
languages—e.g. Dutch. V2, which is generally found in main clauses, is a phe-
nomenon in which a clause’s tensed verb appears as the second word in a sentence.
For instance, (6) shows a German main clause with the tensed form of the auxiliary











In subordinate clauses headed by the complementizer dass (that), this verb occurs
clause-finally, which evidences the fact that German is underlyingly a subject-object-
verb (SOV) language. Both the verb glauben (think) and the verb wollen (want)































Only glauben (think), however, allows a second sort of structure more akin to the
main clause in the position of the tensed verb (Scheffler, 2009). If the complementizer
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dass (that) is not present, glauben (think) can take a subordinate clause with syntax
that looks exactly like that of the main clause—compare the main clause in (6) with



























Thus, though both Spanish and German take tensed complements, militating against
a hard-coded link between tense and representationality, they still show language-
internal correlations between representationality and some more abstract aspect of
the clausal syntax. Further, the aspect of the clausal syntax that occurs with only
the representational verbs—indicative mood in Spanish and V2 in German—also
tends to show up in declarative main clauses.
5.1.3 Main clause syntax
This apparent language-internal correlation has led some authors to conclude
that, rather than there being a relationship directly between representationality
and tense, as is evidenced in English, the relationship needs to be specified more
abstractly. One idea is that this more abstract mapping between semantics and
syntax should be specified in terms of main clause syntax (Dayal and Grimshaw,
2009; Hacquard, 2014).
Under this view, then, the apparent relationship between tense in English,
mood in Spanish (and the rest of Romance), and V2 in German (and other Germanic
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languages besides English) is really the outgrowth of a more abstract relationship
between some cluster of syntactic features—call them main clause features—that
are language-specific but likely highly constrained. The way in which they are con-
strained is that they tend to be associated with properties of the subordinate clause’s
that are “close” to the attitude verb. For instance, both complementizers and mood
tend to be assumed to be quite high within the clausal structure (cf. Cinque, 1999;
Speas, 2004), which in turn seems to make them amenable to selection by particular
semantic classes of verbs—e.g. representationals or preferentials. Indeed, ideally,
one could pin the relevant feature to some particular type of head which carries
the relevant selection information—e.g. the complementizer— and is “as high as
possible” within the subordinate clause so as to make selection maximally local.
Suggestive of this possibility is that the standard analysis of German V2,
which has that V2 is a particular kind of complementizer-driven movement akin to
that seen in English WH-movement (Den Besten, 1983). English may be amenable
to such an analysis in the sense that complementizer drop with finite subordinate
clauses tends to only occur with representationals (Dayal and Grimshaw, 2009), as
discussed in Chapter 1.
(9) a. Bo {thinks, believes, knows} (that) Jo is out of town.
b. Bo {loves, hates} *(that) Jo is out of town.
This latter fact is furthermore suggestive, since of course English main clauses do
not have complementizers, bolstering the relationship between main clause syntax
and representationality, at least in English. This, however, also raises a potential
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problem for languages like Spanish, which lack complementizer drop in any subor-
dinate clauses but whose declarative main clauses do not have complementizer. I
return to this in this chapter’s discussion.
But regardless of whether main clause syntax information can be carried solely
in the complementizers themselves—thus allowing for an extremely local form of se-
lection giving rise to the relationship between representationality and main clause
syntax—or whether somewhat longer distance relationships need to be posited, there
is nonetheless a potential relationship between the representational-preferential dis-
tinction and this language-specific-yet-highly-constrained main clause feature.
The importance of this for current purposes is that, if such a correlation be-
tween representational and main clause syntax exists, it may signal a possible can-
didate for a hard-coded-yet-flexible projection rule that allows for a solution to the
labeling problem in this particular case. Further, since the main clause syntax itself
is presumably observable to the same extent that subordinate clause syntax is, the
language specific instantiation of the main clause feature may well itself be learn-
able. And if this can be made to work in this particular case, one might seek further
cases where, though a particular mapping between semantics and syntax appears
unstable cross-linguistically, there is nonetheless a more abstract feature that cor-
relates with said mapping and which itself might be learner from some observable
features of the input.
In the next section, I show how this insight about the correlation between
main clause syntax and representationality might be incorporated into the model of
syntactic bootstrapping developed throughout the dissertation to solve one piece of
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the labeling problem for propositional attitude verbs.
5.2 Leveraging main clause syntax
In this section, I show how one might incorporate the abstract relationship
between main clause syntax and representationality into the model of syntactic
bootstrapping I develop throughout the dissertation. The essential idea is that
the learner should construct a particular projection rule or set of rules over the
course of learning, which—unlike the other rules they construct—is directly linked
to a particular semantic feature—in this case, representationality. The model as it
currently stands only has a way of constructing sets of rules that are unlabeled, so
what needs to be added is some way of singling out a rule or set of rules that project
onto the main clause syntax features. The problem is that what these main clause
syntax features are must themselves be learned. Luckily, however, these features
should be quite easily learnable; they are just the ones that are seen every time a
declarative main clause is seen.
This suggests a quite simple addition to the current model of syntactic bootstrapping—
one that requires only a minor change to the structure or algorithm that the model
employs. This solution is to add declarative main clauses to the data set as though
they were subordinate clauses taken by a particular attitude verb that is never
heard,1 and then force the model to explain this verb’s distribution using only a
single feature. This in turn means that the model has to have at least one feature
1It is sufficient to use this only to implement the proposal here. I remain agnostic about whether
this is the correct syntactic or semantic analysis of any particular sentence.
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that projects onto the main clause features.
The idea that main clauses are in fact subordinate clauses to a particular kind
of verb (or set of verbs) is an old idea instantiated most famously by Ross’s (1970)
Performative Hypothesis (see also Rizzi, 1997; Ambar, 1999; Krifka, 2001; Ginzburg
and Sag, 2001; Speas and Tenny, 2004; Hacquard, 2010). I follow Hacquard (2010),
and others, in calling this special element assert.
Why should this minor addition of a special verb assert along with a rule
that labels assert’s feature as representational work to solve the labeling problem?
The intuition here is that (i) the syntactic contexts that assert occurs in are
extremely constrained—to one context: a finite clause with no complementizer—
and (ii) assert is extremely frequent—every declarative sentence counts as evidence
for the distribution of assert. The second property makes it expensive—in terms
of likelihood—for the model to ignore assert. This means that the model should
ensure that assert’s distribution matches up with the features that the model posits
and the projection rules for those features. The first property—in concert with the
second—will ensure that at least one feature projects onto main clause syntax. This
feature should presumably be the representational feature associated with assert




In this section, I fit the nonnegative projection model proposed in Chapter
3 to the modified dataset suggested in the last section. I show that this model
discovers a small core of high frequency representational verbs that share a feature
with assert.
5.3.1 Data
The dataset used here is the same one used in the experiment in Chapter
3, which was extracted from the PukWaC corpus (see that chapter for dataset
construction).2 To this dataset was added approximately 3.5 million observations
of main clauses, represented as a subordinate clause embedded under a special verb
assert.
Main clauses were identified within the corpus by checking that a particular
verb was a dependent of a root node in the dependency parse. Some clauses
identified as main clauses were misparses, e.g., of constituents like purpose clauses.
These were filtered out by only allowing main clauses that (i) had a subject in
the dependent parse; (ii) were tensed in the dependency parse; and (iii) had no
complementizer. (This last criterion excludes question main clauses, but, though
these may be useful to include in future experiments.)
Finally, all main subject values for assert were set to referential (see Chapter
2This corpus is not necessarily ideal for testing a learning model, but due to the fact that
annotations in CHILDES—the standard collection of child-directed speech corpora in English—
are extremely noisy, similar automatic extraction of subcategorization frames is difficult.
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3 for description). This was done to mimic the fact that performatives are claimed
to involve covert first person subjects. A version of this dataset was also constructed
in which the subject features was not included in the construction of the frames,
but this made no discernible difference on the results.
5.3.2 Model fitting
The model fitting procedure was the same given in Chapter 3 except for two
things. First, the number of features was set at 2. The idea here is to force the
model to make a choice of either giving a verb the same feature as assert or not.
(The other feature will, in essence, be a “waste bin” feature, collapsing all other
semantic features besides representationality into one.) As in Chapter 3, the model
fitting was restarted multiple times with random initializations to ensure that a high
likelihood point was discovered.
Second, as mentioned in the previous section, assert was only allowed one
feature which remained constant across the model fitting. That is, the model had
only one feature with which to explain the syntactic contexts that assert occurs
with. Thus, this feature will have an associated projection rule that picks out at
least the main clause syntax.
5.4 Results
Of the 232 verbs plus assert, 10 verbs share a feature with assert: ask,
consider, find get, know, say, see, show, tell, and think. This list is interesting because
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it includes verbs from across the range of representationals. Ask, tell, say, and show
involve communication, while think, know, see, find, and get involve cognition and
perception. Furthermore, no preferentials—besides perhaps ask, tell, and say, at
least with some frames—are represented in this list.
One interesting thing about this list is the prevalence of question-taking verbs.
As noted above, all of the question main clauses were removed from the dataset,
and so it’s interesting that these verbs are included. This is especially surprising,
since for none of these verbs does the model posit a second feature. One way
this may have happened is through a process of generalization for the projection
rule associated with the feature associated with assert. For instance, think, say,
and know both take subordinate clauses that look like main clauses (“subordinate
clauses” of assert) with high frequency. But know takes question complements
with fairly high frequency as well—as does say in certain circumstances—and so the
model may have adjusted the projection rule to include some weights on question
complements. This may in turn heightened the likelihood that verbs like ask would
find their way in.
Another interesting thing about this list is the notable absence of many rep-
resentational verbs, such as understand, realize, suppose, point out, etc. These verbs
for some reason end up in the “waste bin” category. One possibility for why this
occurs in that these verbs are slightly lower frequency than the ones that make it
into the above list and are plausibly acquired later. This may in turn have given




In this chapter, I reviewed the labeling problem for syntactic bootstrapping. I
noted that the standard approach to this problem—reliance on hard-coded links be-
tween particular projection rules and particular semantic features—runs into prob-
lems with cross-linguistic variation in the mappings from semantics to syntax. If
languages vary with respect to how they map semantic features into the syntax,
then those mappings seemingly couldn’t be hard-coded. I showed that this was par-
ticularly pernicious within the domain of propositional attitude verbs, since even
the distinctions that appeared most robustly in participants’ semantic similarity
judgments, show little cross-linguistic stability in their mappings to the syntax—at
least on the face of it.
I then turned to a discussion of what these mappings look like within partic-
ular languages. Following recent work, I noted that though the particular syntac-
tic syntactic features a semantic distinction like representationality maps to differ
across languages, there appears to be a family resemblance between these cross-
linguistically active syntactic features. The particular family resemblance relevant
to representationality appears to be whether or not a verb takes main clause syntax.
In the latter part of the chapter, I then showed how this family resemblance
might be incorporated into a syntactic bootstrapping learner of the kind proposed
throughout the dissertation. I showed in a preliminary experiment that, when im-
plemented this sort of learner shows promising results, though there is much more
work yet to be done on this problem.
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There are two particular directions that seem likely to be fruitful. First, these
sorts of models could—indeed, should—be deployed on languages other than English
to truly test their robustness to different sorts of input conditions. For instance,
would the sort of model developed here be able to detect that subjunctive rather
than tense is the property important to the representational-preferential distinction
in Spanish? Would it similarly be able to detect that V2 is relevant in German?
Second, since the model was fit to a dataset that likely does not reflect the child’s
input, a dataset derived from a corpus of child-directed speech is desirable.
257
Chapter 6: Conclusion
I began this dissertation by laying out the central problems of learning what
Gleitman et al. (2005) dub the hard words, focusing in particular on the proposi-
tional attitude verbs like think, know, and want. I noted two main problems for
learning these verbs: (i) the eventualities they describe tend not to have sensory
correlates, and (ii) their meanings are both fine-grained and multi-faceted, thus pre-
senting problems for accounts based on learning from nonlinguistic context (or even
discourse context) alone.
I then turned to a discussion of learning from linguistic context, noting two
particular kinds of linguistic contexts that have been discussed as possible learning
cues: lexical context and syntactic context. I noted that, while lexical context is
likely useful for certain distinction among verbs—indeed, it may be useful even for
some distinctions among propositional attitude verbs—it likely does not track other
distinctions of central interest. This led me to turn to the use syntactic context as
a word-learning cue—a strategy exemplified most notably in syntactic bootstrapping
approaches to word learning.
I noted two problems that any syntactic bootstrapping approach must solve:
(i) it must explain how learners cluster verbs based on the syntactic contexts they
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occur with—the clustering problem—and (ii) it must explain how learners label
these clusters with the facets of meaning they correspond to—the labeling problem.
The ability of a syntactic bootstrapping account to solve either of these problems
for any particular type of verb is dependent on the (i) the granularity with which
that particular verb type’s semantics is mirrored by the syntactic distribution and
(ii) the availability of principles that would allow a learner to label the semantic
features. I raised doubts about this second prospect having to do with the cross-
linguistic stability of the mapping principles, particularly in the attitude domain,
arguing that the labeling problem quite plausibly could be solved via other means,
and so the first problem should be attacked first in isolation.
I then turned to an overview of what is known about this relationship in the
domain of propositional attitude verb. I showed that the results are quite promising
but also that the correlations are not perfect. This raises the need for a more
fine-grained investigation of these correlations, which I carried out.
In Chapter 2, I began the investigation by showing how to quantify the rela-
tionship between näıve speakers’ knowledge of the syntactic contexts a propositional
attitude verb can occur in—what I refer to as the competence distribution—and
their knowledge of that verb’s semantics. To do this, I deployed a methodology that
Fisher et al. (1991) used to probe such relationships as they obtain for verbs across
the lexicon, here focusing in on the propositional attitude verb domain in order to
test the limits of this relationship. The main result of this chapter was that there
is a significant correlation between the syntax measure and the semantics measure.
This omnibus result, however, tells us little about the relationship between partic-
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ular syntactic contexts and particular facets or features of the meaning. To delve
into this, I developed a model, which I dubbed the nonnegative model of projection,
to investigate this relationship. The benefit of this model is that it furthermore
implements part of a solution to the clustering problem. I showed that this model
discovers the sorts of fine-grained features discussed in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 3, I investigated to what extent the same sort of relationship
found between verbs’ competence distributions and their semantics also obtains
between the distribution of syntactic contexts a propositional attitude verb occurs
in in a corpus, what I refer to as its performance distribution, and participants’
knowledge of those same verb’s semantics. To do this, I developed a model that
augments the nonnegative model of projection presented in the previous chapter
with a model of corpus count data. This model simultaneously discovers competence
distributions using the corpus distributions, while at the same time solving the
clustering problem. The main result of this chapter is that performance distributions
also carry a significant amount of information about propositional attitude verb
semantics and that this information is comparable with that found in the direct
measures of competence distribution employed in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 4, I investigated whether the information in performance distribu-
tions is in fact accessible to learners and how robustly represented this information
is. To do this, I adapted recently developed methodologies related to the Human
Simulation Paradigm (HSP) to (i) measure the informativity of particular items in
the performance distribution about the semantics of the word that occurs in them
and (ii) measure the informativity of the distribution itself. The main result of this
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chapter is that, even if items are manipulated in such a way to give participants as
little information as possible, inference to all propositional attitude verbs meanings
are extremely robust, even down to extremely fine-grained facets of those verbs’
meanings.
In Chapter 5, having focused for the majority of the dissertation on solv-
ing the clustering problem, I presented a novel proposal for how to approach the
labeling problem. This proposal starts with the observations that, particularly in
the propositional attitude verb domain, the relationship between particular aspects
of the semantics and particular syntactic contexts seems to be cross-linguistically
unstable. This does not raise problems for the model presented in previous section
necessarily, since as long as those languages exhibit roughly the same patterns of
correlations between meaning and syntactic context, this model should similarly
succeed in solving the clustering problem. The problem arises if labels are some-
how associated a priori with particular syntactic contexts—for instance, if tense
were somehow associated with the representationality distinction—since not all lan-
guages show this correlation. The proposal presented in this chapter was that, while
not all languages associate particular facets of the semantics with particular syn-
tactic contexts, at least some particular facets may be associated with families of
syntactic contexts and that the learner’s job is to select the appropriate syntactic
context to associate with that facet using the data. I then show how this might be
encoded in a model like the one I develop in the previous chapters.




In Chapters 2 and 3, I validate the nonnegative model of projection and the
nonnegative model of syntactic bootstrapping against semantic similarity judgments.
Semantic similarity judgments are useful for validation in that many disparate mod-
els of semantics can be tested against the same dataset. This is because most compu-
tational models of semantics—be they category-based, vector-based, ontology-based,
etc.—provide some way(s) of measuring the distance between two meanings (or at
least the divergence of one meaning from the other).
This generality presents a problem, however, in assessing what these similarity
judgments are actually indexing, since they are designed to some extent to provide
omnibus measures of the semantics. To be sure, such omnibus measures seem to be
differentially sensitive to certain semantic features, as I showed in Chapter 2; but it
is very hard to tell a priori which features a particular methodology will be sensitive
to.
As such, one potential future direction is to utilize the method presented in
Chapter 2 of comparing the outcomes of two similarity tasks against each other to
pinpoint exactly where they disagree. This line runs two risks, however. First, it
is possible that particular methods tap necessarily vague concepts. In Chapter 2,
the difference between the two methods lie in how participants responded to some
vague notion of antonym, where many semantic distinctions that are different in
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principle are collapsed into one.1 This might be so no matter how many words are
tested. Second, and relatedly, one risks studying the particular methods themselves
as opposed to the underlying space they are meant to tap. That is, it is always
possible that with so few verbs, the apparent differences between the methods had
little to do with the underlying space itself, but were artifacts of some other process
involved in making the sorts of decisions the task demands.
Another potential direction in the vein of methods for quantifying meaning are
tasks aimed more explicitly at particular features. These tasks come in roughly two
flavors: those that explicitly ask about semantic features of the verb (Hartshorne
et al., 2013) and those that explicitly ask about semantic properties of a verb’s
arguments (Kako, 2006).2 These sorts of methods are useful since, as long as they
are well normed, they give much more direct access to particular features, thus
bypassing a step of inducing features from similarities.
The main problem with these latter sorts of methods is that they may not
exhaust the space of features, where semantic similarity judgments might be more
successful. Thus, these methods, like the traditional methods employed by linguists
fall prey to the criticism that our discoveries are limited by the space of features
that readily come to the mind of the investigator. But this was just the problem
that quantitative assessment was intended to solve (Fisher et al., 1991).
A potential remedy here is to combine these more explicit methods with se-
1The hope in this case would be that, even though the notion of antonymy in the “residual
space” of the two methods is vague, other aspects of the judgments in each method would help to
parcel different sorts of antonymy out based on other aspects of a word’s content.
2The distinction between these two kinds of properties is sometimes difficult or impossible to
discern. The fact that break involves a change of state implies that one of its arguments undergoes
a change of state.
263
mantic similarity-based methods to assess to what extent the more explicit methods
exhaust the information in the similarities—e.g. by predicting the similarities from
the explicit feature judgments. One way of generating new explicit feature ques-
tions might then be to take similarity values that are not well predicted, find clusters
within those badly predicted values, ask annotators what commonality that group
has, and then construct a question based on that commonality.
A final potential direction is to validate directly onto psycholinguistic data.
6.1.2 Mapping from syntax to meaning
As discussed throughout the dissertation, the main job of a syntactic boot-
strapping mechanism is to map from a word’s syntactic distribution to the concept
associated with that word. In Chapter 2, I showed that, though a learner can con-
clude by similarity in distribution that there is likely a similarity in meaning but
not that, if there is a dissimilarity in distribution, there is dissimilarity in meaning.
I then incorporated this idea into the syntactic bootstrapping model in Chapter 3
by using the particular combination of prior and likelihood I did.
One question for future research is why this property should exist. Why
shouldn’t being different in distribution also implied difference in meaning? One
intuition is that, in generalizing about two words based on their distribution, it is
easier to ask which frames they share than which frames they don’t share. But this
intuition is vague and possibly wrong, since of course linguists do such comparisons
on a conscience level all the time. What lower-level aspect of cognition—perhaps
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specifically linguistic cognition—gives rise to this state of affairs?
A second question in this same vein is what, if anything, the particular func-
tional relationship between similarity in distribution space and similarity in seman-
tic similarity space means about cognition. In Chapter 2, I showed that similarities
gathered in the generalized discrimination task appeared to be logarithmically re-
lated to the syntactic similarities, whereas those gathered in the ordinal scale task
appeared to be sigmoidal.3 Are these logarithmic relationships fundamental to the
syntactic bootstrapping mechanism? Or are they merely artifacts of the similarity
tasks?
Finally, and relatedly, how does the learner, whose whole job is to find the
correct mapping from words to concepts use distributional similarity to construct
the mapping? One potential future direction aimed at investigating this question
is to construct a model which has access to the concepts—e.g. proxied by similar-
ity judgments—and the distributions, but does not have the mapping from verbs
to concepts. This model would then need to learn this mapping by discovering a
permutation (of indices) that is optimal under some loss. Relevant to the previ-
ous discussion in this section, this loss should encode that similarity in distribution
should match similarity in meaning. How divergence in such similarity are penal-
ized is relevant to the question of what status (if any) the exponential properties
mentioned above have in the learning mechanism.
3The best fitting model for the generalized discrimination task was the diffusion ker-
nel/exponential model, whereas the best fitting one for the ordinal scale task was the linear model.
(The sigmoid would arise from the latter in due to the presence of a logistic function implicit in
that mapping.)
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6.1.3 Finer-grained incremental conjectures
In Chapter 4, I defined a way of looking at fine-grained aspects of participants’
final conjectures about a word’s meaning after different amounts of training. This
provides a view of their incremental conjecures with a grain-size proportional to
the number of different training set sizes—in that chapter five or ten sentences.
Ideally, however, one would have such fine-grained resolution about the participant’s
conjecture after each sentence in the training set—not just at the end—and it would
be prohibitively expensive to test all possible set sizes in a systematic way.
One way this might be remedied is to instead run the spatial human simulation
experiments from Chapter 4 to get a series of fine-grained final conjectures, and then
attempt to “backtrack through” the conjectures after each training item. This might
be done in two complementary ways.
The first is a modeling approach. If a model is set up that assumes (i) a unique
starting point for conjectures and (ii) that each item draws a participant’s conjecture
toward a particular point in similarity space more or less strongly (depending on its
informativity), then assuming full randomization of the training sets, a rough idea
of the conjecture path over the course of the training set might be attainable.
In concert with this modeling approach, one might also collect data from a
standard human simulation paradigm run on the same training sets. Though the
standard paradigm gives less fine-grained results than the similarity judgments gath-
ered after each training set, it still gives an indication of nearby words in similarity
space. With this in mind, the backtracking model sketched above might be aug-
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mented to incorporate data from a standard human simulation paradigm.
6.1.4 Main clause syntax and beyond
Chapter 5 gives a preliminary sketch of a model that takes advantage of main
clause syntax features to label verbs as either representational or preferential. There
are multiple ways this sketch could be expanded.
The first involves the corpus used in training the model. As an initial stab, the
use of child-directed speech corpora is crucial for testing the efficacy of this approach.
The current problem with such corpora is the poor state of the parses associated
with their sentences. Good parses are crucial for extracting good subcategorization
frames, so either producing better parses or working around the current parses in
an innovative way is necessary. Second, and perhaps more importantly, corpora
from other languages must be tested. A similar hurdle arises for such corpora—
particularly child-directed speech corpora.
Beyond logistical questions are questions regarding the model itself. In par-
ticular, how quickly does labeling happen if this model is converted into an online
version? And what other sorts of labels might be learned in a similar fashion?
For instance, could different sorts of non-main clause features be helpful in labeling
distinctions among preferentials?
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Appendix A: Appendix A
A.1 Figures and tables
It Ved NP WH S
It Ved NP WH to VP
It Ved NP that S
It Ved NP to VP
NP Ved
NP Ved NP
NP Ved NP NP
NP Ved NP S
NP Ved NP about NP
NP Ved NP that S




NP Ved WH S
NP Ved WH to VP
NP Ved about NP
NP Ved for NP to VP
NP Ved if S
NP Ved it that S
NP Ved so
NP Ved that S
NP Ved there to VP
NP Ved to
NP Ved to NP that S
NP Ved to VP
NP was Ved that S
NP was Ved to VP
S, I V
S, NP Ved
Figure A.1: Hierarchical clustering of frames based on data in Figure 2.2.
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Table A.1: Pairs rated more highly in the likert scale task than in the generalized
discrimination task.
A.2 Non-negative projection model
A.2.1 Parametric binary feature model
πj | α ∼ Beta(α, 1)
rij | π ∼ Bernoulli(πj)
A.2.2 Nonparametric binary feature model
In footnote 30 in Section 2.2, I note that a nonparametric version of the non-
negative projection model was implemented. To do this, I use an Indian Buffet
Process prior on the verb binary feature space (Griffiths and Ghahramani, 2006).
This allows us to simultaneously infer the number of features at the same time as we
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infer what those features are. For ease of implementation, a stick-breaking process
representation was used (Teh et al., 2007). A truncation of 100 features appears to
be more than sufficient.
π | α ∼ IBPStick(α)
rij | π ∼ Bernoulli(πj)
A.2.3 Projection principles (feature loading) model
pjk ∼ Exponential(1)
A.3 Response models
A.3.1 Ordinal logit mixed model
Because both the non-negative projection model D̂ = ZB (Section 2.2.6) and
the similarity kernels K (Section 2.4.2) both have strictly non-negative codomains,
an ordinal logit mixed model with strictly positive cutpoints was used. The model
for all participants i, for all but one likert scale response level j, for all verbs m,n
is then
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λi ∼ Gamma(1, 1) = Exponential(1)
ci1 | λ ∼ Exponential(λi)
cij | λ,C>1:j−1 ∼ ci(j−1) + Exponential(λi)
limn | Q ∼ Multinomial(qi1mn, qi2mn − qi1mn, . . .)
























































Figure A.3: Distribution over participants of size of similarity interval mapped to
each rating.
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A.3.2 Multinomial logit mixed model








, . . .
]
The idea behind this model is that participants choose a verb in the generalized
discrimination task based on the similarity of the other two verbs according to some
kernel K. The more similar those two verbs are the more likely the participant is
to choose the other verb. The model also encodes a participant-specific bias vector
bi to account for random variation in how much participant i likes to choose a
particular response based on which position it had on the display, independent of
its semantics.
δi ∼ Gamma(1, 1) = Exponential(1)
bij | δ ∼ Exponential(δi)
timno | B ∼ Categorical
softmax

K(n, o) + bi1






















Figure A.4: Distribution over participants of bias for response based on placement
in response list.
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Appendix B: Appendix B
B.1 Generative story for IBP prior
In Chapter 3, I give the generative story for S with finite columns (features).
This generative story does not work for the infinite feature case because the first
outer for-loop would never terminate and thus no observed counts would be gener-
ated. To describe the infinite case, we can use the Indian Buffet Process metaphor,
wherein the feature probabilities are implicitly integrated out.
1: Choose K ∼ Poisson(α) + 1
2: for verb i in 1 : V do
3: for feature k in 1 : K do






6: Choose a number of new features Knew ∼ Poisson( αK )
7: for new feature k in 1 : Knew do
8: Set si(K+k) ≡ 1
9: for verb v in 1 : (i− 1) do




13: Set K ≡ K +Knew
14: end for
15: for feature k in 1 : K do
16: for syntactic context j in 1 : F do
17: Choose a projection strength pkj ∼ Exponential(λ)
18: end for
19: end for
20: for verb i in 1 : V do
21: Choose a verb prevalence gi ∼ Gamma(γ, δ)
22: for syntactic context j in 1 : F do
23: Choose a competence distribution strength dij ∼ Beta([SP]ij, 1)




In Chapter 3, I give the derivation of the log-likelihood and log-posterior for
D. This in turn yields a relatively simple form for the log-likelihood.
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log P(S,P,D | X; Ψ) ∝ log P(S,P,D; Ψ) + log P(X | D; Ψ)



























The Jacobian (gradient) ∇ logP(X | D; γ, δ) has cells.1
1The Hessian is also quite easy to compute, but since D is bounded, we need a constrained




























































































This is useful because it can be used in the initialization of a sampler—
e.g. using an optimization procedure to set D to its MLE—and/or in the sampler
itself—e.g. by including the prior over D to get the Jacobian of the log-posterior
∇ logP(X | D; γ, δ)P(D | S,P), given samples for S and P. Finding the Jacobian
of the posterior might be useful if one does not care to quantify the distribution
over D and are satisfied with a point estimate. For instance, the Jacobian of the
log-posterior might be employed in lieu of an Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
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approach. In the next section, we derive this Jacobian explicitly in the same section
that we present the necessary equations to construct a Gibbs sampler for D.
B.2.1 Inference equations
I now show how to discover S, P, and D. One way to do this is to construct a
Gibbs sampler for these variables. I show how to construct two mixed approaches:
one that samples S and P using Gibbs, then optimizes D using∇ logP(X | D; γ, δ)P(D | S,P);
and one that samples S, then optimizes D using ∇ logP(X | D; γ, δ)P(D | S,P) and
P using ∇ logP(D | S,P)P(P;λ). The last of these approaches is used the experi-
ment below, though all approaches were implemented, and the code is available on
my github.
I begin by deriving the joint P(S,P,D; Ψ), which, due to the way it factors,
will provide us with the raw ingredients for both the Gibbs transition probabilities
and the optimization gradients. First, note that
P(S,P,D; Ψ) = P(D | S,P)P(P;λ)P(S;α, β)
B.2.1.1 Inferring D
The (log-)prior on D has the following form.
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log[SP]ij + ([SP]ij − 1) log dij
Interestingly, the likelihood places a very similar pressure on D:
One can now find the gradient ∇ log[P(X | D; γ, δ)P(D | S,P)]. Because the
log-posterior is the sum of the log-likelihood and the log-prior, one can simply add
the gradient of the log-prior to the gradient of the log-likelihood to get the log-
posterior. But the gradient of the log-likelihood has already derived, so one need




















log[P(X | D; γ, δ)P(D | S,P)] = ∂
∂dmn
log P(X | D; γ, δ) + ∂
∂dmn














) + [SP]mn − 1
dmn
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This gradient might be used in optimizing D within the internal loop of a
Gibbs sampler (instead of, or prior to, sampling). Another option is to sample D as
well. The relevant equations:
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P(dmn | D−(mn),S,P,X; Ψ) ∝ P(X | dmn,D−(mn); γ, δ)P(dmn,D−(mn) | S,P)







































This leaves us to define a proposal distribution for dmn. Using a symmetric
proposal distribution (given the current dmn) is preferable in order to reduce com-
putations; if the proposal is symmetric, we need not compute the ratio of proposal
probabilities. Since dmn must be bounded on (0, 1), one simple symmetric proposal
distribution is Uniform(0, 1). The problem with this distribution is that it will often




Instead, one might condition the parameters of the proposal based on the closest
















where b ≥ 1. The size of b determines the size of the possible jumps. For
instance, if doldmn = 0.5, b = 1 yields Uniform(0, 1), b = 2 yields Uniform(.25, .75),
etc. This is dynamic in the sense that, as dmn approaches either bound, the interval
over which the proposals are drawn gets smaller, regardless of b. This is nice, because
intuitively, if dmn is closer to the bounds already, we are probably fairly sure it should
be there (though this means we will need a good initialization strategy).
This dynamicity presents a problem, however, in that the proposals will no
longer be symmetric in the majority of cases. (The only time the proposals will be
symmetric is if dnewmn = 1 − doldmn.) Luckily, though, the Uniform PDF is simple, so
the ratio of proposal densities is just
P(dnewmn → doldmn)











min (dnewmn , 1− dnewmn )
The full log acceptance probability is then
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log A(doldmn → dnewmn ) = log min
(
1,
P(dnewmn | D−(mn),S,P,X; Ψ)
P(doldmn | D−(mn),S,P,X; Ψ)
P(dnewmn → doldmn)





P(dnewmn | D−(mn),S,P,X; Ψ)
P(doldmn | D−(mn),S,P,X; Ψ)
P(dnewmn → doldmn)































− log min (dnewmn , 1− dnewmn )

Though this equation looks quite expensive, much of the necessary computa-
tions can be done once and saved.
B.2.1.2 Inferring P
The simplicity of our prior on P makes its gradient and sampling equations
extremely easy to derive. Whether sampling or optimizing P, we assume that D,
S, and X are known.
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log P(P | D,S,X;λ) ∝ log P(D | P,S) + log P(P;λ)
We already know the first term, so we need merely derive the second. (In this
section, we leave the restrictor of the sums over k undefined. The reason for this


























Note that this is just an L1 regularizer, as mentioned above. The Jacobian of

















[log P(D | P,S) + log P(P;λ)] = ∂
∂pln






































































The Gibbs sampling equation is given by






































log[SP]in + (silpln − 1) log din
B.2.1.3 Inferring S
As with P, we ultimately want to compute
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log P(S | D,P,X;λ) ∝ log P(D | P,S) + log P(S;α, β)
And since we already know the form of logP(D | P,S), we need merely define
the prior over S. I specified two related priors on S: one that requires a set number of
features K and another that allows for an unbounded number of features. Both take
advantage of the Beta-Bernoulli conjugacy. We’ll derive the finite (parametric) case
first, then return to the infinite (nonparametric) case. (A less explicit derivation
of the finite case can be found in Griffiths and Ghahramani 2011, which is more
concerned with the infinite case.)
The finite prior is given by
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P(S | α, β,K) =
∫
(0,1)K

































































































































And the log-prior is


































Since it will be useful in deriving the Gibbs equation, we now derive the
conditional distribution of sil given all other cells of S.



























Note that this can be simplified when taking the ratio of the probability that
sml = 1 to the probability that sml = 0.
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P(sml = 1 | S−(ml);α, β)






























β + V − 1 +
∑V
i 6=m sil
(Note that inverting the ratio results in inverting the term involving α with
respect to the term involving β.)
we now move onto the infinite case. Due to some complexities that arise from
taking limits, the prior in the infinite case must be specified in terms of equivalence
classes over binary matrices. Griffiths and Ghahramani (2011) discuss this exten-
sively. The gist is that, if variates (instantiations) of S are treated as sequences of
binary numbers, one can define a mapping [·] that maps from unordered sequences
to ordered sequences. The net effect of this is to reduce the support of the prior
considerably. The prior over these equivalence classes can then be defined in terms
of a sum over the image of [S].
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where K+ is the number of columns k for which
∑V
i=1 sik is nonzero and Kh
is the number of columns that correspond to the hth binary number. (Only K+ is
important in the actual sampling, since it gives the number of rows of P we must
keep track of.) This makes the relationship to the finite case clear ( α
K
→ 0 and
β ≡ 1). The only difference is in the fact that K+ may vary. (Indeed, this is the
point of using the nonparametric prior in the first place.)
Interestingly, this equation simplifies substantially when computing the same
conditionally probability as above. Indeed, the infinite version of P(sml | S−(ml);α, β)
is just like the finite version.
P(sml = 1 | S−(ml);α, β)







The trade-off is that some of the complexity inherent to the infinite version is
moved into other procedures in the sampler, as we specify below.
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we can now move onto computing logP(S | D,P,X;λ). For both D and P, we
found both the gradient for the relevant quantity and the Gibbs equation. In this
case, computing a gradient is not useful since S is discrete. And since the constraints
would not be linear, we cannot use a method like Integer Linear Programming (ILP).
Thus, we will compute only the Gibbs equations.
General to both the finite and infinite cases (where, as for P, [SP]mj assumes
the replacement of sml with the proposed):
log P(sml | S−(ml),D,P,X; Ψ) ∝ log P(sml | S−(ml);α, β) + log P(D | sml,S−(ml),P)
= log P(sml | S−(ml);α, β) +
[∑F






j=1 log[SP]ij + ([SP]ij − 1) log dij
]
∝ log P(sml | S−(ml);α, β) +
F∑
j=1
log[SP]mj + ([SP]mj − 1) log dmj











∝ log P(sml | S−(ml);α, β) +
F∑
j=1
log[SP]mj + (smlplj − 1) log dmj







+ (smlplj − 1) log dmj
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The log posterior odds for the finite case is then given by
log
P(sml = 1 | S−(ml),D,P,X; Ψ)










j=1 log[SP]mj,1 + (plj − 1) log dmj
−
∑F


































And the log posterior odds for the infinite case is given by
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log
P(sml = 1 | S−(ml),D,P,X; Ψ)





















Finally, note that the log posterior odds is equivalent to the acceptance proba-
bility since the only reasonable proposal distribution (up to isomorphism), Bernoulli(1−
soldml ), will always cancel out.
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